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Individual decision making is one of the corner stones of economics. Many
decisions of economic agents involve trade-oﬀsb e t w e e nd i ﬀerent uncertain
outcomes and/or between present and future utility. For example, individuals
and households have to decide on housing and consumption of durables,
saving and portfolio choice, insurances and pension schemes, and household
consumption over life cycle. Therefore, many economic theories and models
are based on decision making under uncertainty in an intertemporal setting.
After the discounted utility (DU) model and expected utility (EU) model
were introduced, their simple and elegant structures quickly made them be-
come the “standard” models of individual decision making in intertemporal
choice and under uncertainty, respectively. In the more than ﬁfty years since
then, however, many ﬁndings contradicting these models (so-called “anom-
alies”) were found in empirical and experimental studies. This made behav-
ioral economics more and more relevant in individual decision making, par-
ticularly after the seminal paper of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Many
concepts in behavioral economics and traditional economic theory, such as
preference parameters, discount rates, loss aversion, reference points, and
risk aversion are all closely linked with individual decision making. The sur-
vey paper of Camerer and Loewenstein (2003) gives a good introduction of
behavioral economics and how it changes the traditional way of modeling
individual decision making. With taking advantage of loss aversion and ref-
erence points, some ﬁnancial phenomena can also be better understood. This
is what behavioral ﬁnance is doing, and it has recently become a major alter-
native approach to study individual decision making in ﬁnancial markets, the
traditional view is based upon expected utility maximization. See Barberis
and Thaler (2003) for a comprehensive survey of behavioral ﬁnance.
The most important concepts in behavioral economics are loss aversion
and reference points. With the help of these two concepts, Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) presented a reference dependent model for decision making
under uncertainty: prospect theory. In 1991, they proposed a similar ref-
erence dependent model for riskless choice. The key idea of their reference
dependent models is a value function in which gains and losses are deﬁned
on deviations from a reference point, rather than on total wealth for utility
function as in the traditional theory. The results of experimental studies
show that the value function is steeper for losses than for gains. This implies
people are loss averse: the disutility of a loss is greater than the utility asso-
ciated with the same amount of gain. The value function will have a kink at
the origin, the reference point. The value function is also assumed to have
a diminishing sensitivity: the marginal value of an additional unit both in1.1 Summary 3
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Figure 1.1: Value function
the domain of gains and in the domain of losses is decreasing. See Figure 1.1
for a typical value function in reference dependent models, this kind of value
function is quite diﬀerent from the utility function in the traditional EU and
DU models.
Both loss aversion and reference points are concepts that originate from
psychology. Many traditional economists are still not convinced of the useful-
ness of reference points. Reference points are closely linked with loss aversion,
and experimental results suggest that they are a useful baseline when people
reframe a result as a gain or a loss. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) claimed
that the reference point usually corresponds to the decision maker’s current
position, and it can also be inﬂuenced by aspirations, expectations, norms,
and social comparisons. More research is needed to investigate how refer-
ence points vary across a population, and how they relate to other preference
parameters and individual decision making.
Diﬀerent from the EU model, which is the traditional theory of individ-
ual decision making under uncertainty, an appealing analogue in behavioral
economics is cumulative prospect theory (CPT) developed by Tversky and
Kahneman (1992). In CPT, not only the value function is diﬀerent from the
utility function in the EU model, but also the way probabilities are used dif-
fers. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ﬁrst introduced a probability weighting4 Introduction










Figure 1.2: Probability weighting function
function, which is a nonlinear transformation of probabilities into “decision
weights”, p → w(p), for decision making under uncertainty, because individ-
uals do not treat probabilities linearly. Instead of taking the mathematical
expectation of utility where possible utility outcomes are weighted with the
probabilities, Kahneman and Tversky propose to use transformed probabil-
ities based upon the nonlinear weighting function. Many experimental ﬁnd-
ings showed that non-linear probability weights were needed for both very
small and big probabilities. Normally, the probability weighting functions are
inverse S-shaped both for gains and losses. People tend to overweight small
probabilities and underweight large probabilities. This implies that people
are risk-seeking in small probabilities for gains and in high probabilities for
losses, and risk averse in high probabilities for gains and in small probabil-
ities for losses. Figure 1.2 is an example of an inverse S-shaped weighting
function.
In the traditional DU model, the preference of trade-oﬀs between out-
comes (either gains or losses) right now and in the future is described entirely
by a single discount rate, that is constant for all situations and across all indi-
viduals. This implies, in the DU model, that the amount one is willing to pay
for postponing a payment of $100 for one month should be about the same
as the amount of compensation one demands for receiving $100 one month1.2 Two Examples 5
l a t e r . B u tt h i si sn o ts u p p o r t e db ye x p erimental studies. Research in ex-
perimental economics has found a number of systematic deviations from the
DU model, see Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002). The most
famous ones are the sign eﬀect, meaning that gains are discounted more than
losses; the delay-speedup asymmetry, indicating that diﬀerent discount rates
are used depending on whether a gain (or a loss) is delayed or speeded up;
the hyperbolic discounting, showing that the discount rate over two periods
diﬀers from the product of the two corresponding one period rates; and the
magnitude eﬀect, implying that small outcomes are discounted more than
large ones. Therefore, understanding the way in which people make their
decisions and how preferences, behavioral rules, and decision strategies vary
with socioeconomic characteristics is crucial for policy making and policy
analysis.
It is not easy to use loss aversion and reference points in an empirical
study for individual decision making, because reference points and the co-
eﬃcient of loss aversion are not directly observed. Discrete choice models
with reduced forms are still very useful for the study of individual decision
making. Housing tenure choice and residential mobility are two closely linked
and important decisions faced by households in their life cycles. It should
be a good exercise to use a traditional discrete choice model (multinomial
probit model) to investigate how these two choices are linked, and how so-
cioeconomic variables aﬀect households decision making.
1.2 Two Examples
The literature suggests that when measuring rates of time preference, four
scenarios should be distinguished that lead to markedly diﬀerent discount
rates: delay of gains, delay of losses, speedup of gains and speedup of losses.
Consequently, it is crucial to ﬁnd out what kinds of discount rates are used in
order to understand individual’s behavior. For example, Warner and Pleeter
(2001) estimated the discount rate from a social experiment in which the U.S.
Department of Defense oﬀered separatees the choice between two separation
beneﬁt packages: a lump-sum separation beneﬁt and an annuity. Because
annuities are more common than lump sum payments in practice, people
might be more likely to use an annuity as the baseline when they make their
decision. If people use the annuity as their reference point, the lump sum
payment should be considered as a speedup of gain. In contrast, if people
would use the lump sum payment as their reference point, the annuity should
be considered as a delay of gain. It seems plausible that most people will use
t h ed i s c o u n tr a t eo fs p e e d u po fg a i n st oc o m p a r et w oa l t e r n a t i v e sw h e nt h e y6 Introduction
make their decision because of the popularity of annuity. But actually, their
result implied that the vast majority of personnel had discount rates of at
least 18 percent. From the results of previous studies, it is obvious that the
discount rate of delay of gains is much bigger than that of speedup of gains.
This indicates that most of personnel set the lump sum payment as their
reference point and employed the discount rate of delay of gains to make
their decision, rather than the annuity as their reference points and speedup
of gains as their discount rates. This example also shows that the way in
which people frame questions have big eﬀects on their decision making.
A n o t h e re x a m p l eo fap o l i c yi s s u ew h e r et h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ei s
of vital importance, is giving incentives for purchasing energy saving appli-
ances. In a seminal paper, Hausman (1979) analyzed such a decision. He
used data on both the purchase and the utilization of room air conditioners to
estimate individual discount rates, based upon the trade-oﬀs between capital
cost and operating costs. Purchasing an energy saving appliance normally
needs pay quite big amount more for the appliance only once, but then pays
less energy bill periodically. This kind of decision making can be considered
as the choice between a lump sum loss and periodical losses. If people set
the energy eﬃcient appliance as their baseline, then buying the energy in-
eﬃcient one becomes a delay of losses, people probably use their discount
rate of delay of losses to make their decision. On the contrary, if the energy
ineﬃcient appliance is their reference point, then buying the energy eﬃcient
one becomes speedup of losses; people may use their discount rate of speedup
of losses to make their decision. The high discount rates found by Hausman
(1979) suggest that for most households this second situation is the relevant
setting.
These two examples reveal that it is very important to understand how
people choose from diﬀerent discount rates when they make their decisions,
a n dw h a ti st h ei n t e r a c t i o nb e t w e e nt h ed i s c o u n tr a t ea n do t h e rp r e f e r e n c e
parameters, in order to predict individual behaviors well and to analyze them.
1.3 Contents of the Thesis
This thesis is based on four independent papers. Some notations may diﬀer
in each chapter. The ﬁrst three papers are about the interactions among
preference parameters, such as loss aversion, reference points, discount rate,
risk aversion, and how demographic and socioeconomic variables aﬀect them.
Chapter 2 is a paper about time preference of gains and losses. Specially
designed experiments but also ﬁeld studies have revealed that people tend
to discount gains more than losses and that there are diﬀerences in the ways1.3 Contents of the Thesis 7
delays and speed-ups of payments are discounted. Such diﬀerent discount
rates might have important implications for the analysis of various economic
policies, making a better understanding of them of interest. Using a repre-
sentative household panel survey, the implied discount rates for four diﬀerent
scenarios are analyzed: delay of gains, delay of losses, speed-up of gains, and
speed-up of losses. First, the existing literature on the relationship between
discount rates and other individual characteristics is summarized. Then the
discount rates are linked to frequently observed demographic variables, like
gender and age, but also to subjective variables, such as price expectations.
Many of these variables signiﬁcantly aﬀect individual discount rates, and,
more importantly, these variables aﬀect the discount rates in diﬀerent ways.
Such diﬀerences permit us to generate scenario speciﬁc discount rates for each
individual. Unobserved heterogeneity, which explains a substantial part of
the variation in the reported discount rates, is allowed in the model. In-
terestingly, both unobserved heterogeneity and the remaining error terms
appear to be positively correlated across the four scenarios. The observed
relationships can be used to better understand and predict the behavior of
households for policy evaluation.
In order to better understand time preference of gains and losses in four
diﬀerent scenarios, a structural model which incorporates loss aversion and
reference points for intertemporal choice based on the insights of Loewen-
stein’s (1988) reference point model is presented in Chapter 3. Data from a
Dutch representative household panel survey of the years 1997-2002 is used,
containing rich information on individual time preferences and other charac-
teristics. A non-linear random coeﬃcients model with panel data is employed
t oj o i n t l ye s t i m a t et h er e f e r e n c ep o i n t so fd e l a ya n ds p e e d u p ,t h ec o e ﬃcient
of loss aversion and the discount rate. The result shows that on average the
reference point of delay is larger than the reference point of speedup, consis-
tent with the hypothesis of Loewenstein; the mean coeﬃcient of loss aversion
is around two, similar to other ﬁndings, showing that the disutility of a loss is
a st w i c el a r g ea st h eu t i l i t ya s s o c i a t e dw i t ht h es a m ea m o u n to fg a i n ;f e m a l e s
are more loss averse than males, and high education and age make people
less loss-averse; high educated or older people are also more patient.
In Chapter 4, a joint estimation of loss aversion and probability weight-
ing function with a power utility function is presented for decision making
under uncertainty. Cumulative prospect theory is becoming a dominant way
to model individual decision-making under risk. Tversky and Kahneman
estimated a model with a power utility function with loss aversion and a
two-part power function as the weighting function for probabilities. In this
study, we use a similar structure to model individual decision making. The
ﬁve main parameters of interest are the powers in the value functions for8 Introduction
gains and losses, the loss aversion parameter, and the coeﬃcients of the
weighting functions for gains and losses. To model heterogeneity across the
population, the empirical model treats these as random coeﬃcients, depend-
ing on observed demographics and unobserved characteristics. The data we
use stem from a survey which is a representative of the Dutch population,
with seven questions about one or two bets. Our results show that on average
powers of value functions are 0.68 and 0.73 for gains and losses respectively,
females have smaller power for gains than males, implying that females are
more risk averse in domain of gains. The average coeﬃcient of loss aversion
is 3.1; on average, the coeﬃcients of weighting functions are 1.0 and 0.59 for
gains and losses respectively.
T h el a s tp a p e r ,C h a p t e r5 ,i sq u i t ed i ﬀerent in content from the other
three papers, but uses similar econometric techniques and models. The chap-
ter is about how to model household’s mobility (moving decision) and housing
tenure choice (decision of renting versus owning) jointly, using a multinomial
probit model with panel data. Account is taken of the fact that a change of
housing tenure can only be observed when the household moves. The models
are estimated by the method of maximum simulated likelihood, emphasiz-
ing the importance of properly accounting for the initial conditions problem.
The estimation is based on unbalanced panel data from the CentER Panel,
1994-2003. Negative state dependence in the moving decision is found. Own-
ers are less likely to move to either another owner-occupied or a rented home
than renters, which can be explained from the much higher moving costs for
owners.
1.4 Further Research
In this thesis, there are three papers about the interactions among preference
parameters, such as the discount rate, loss aversion, reference points, and risk
aversion, and one paper about estimating household decision making using
a discrete choice model with a reduced form. There are still many questions
that need further research.
The problem of dynamic inconsistency is quite diﬃcult to understand.
The currently popular way to explain dynamic inconsistency assumes that
t h ed i s c o u n tr a t ei sad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no ft h et i m ep e r i o di n v o l v e d .T h i s
is hyperbolic discounting. It might be extremely interesting to investigate
whether the structural model in chapter 3, which is a behavioral model with
loss aversion and reference points for intertemporal choice, could be one
of the explanations of dynamic inconsistency. Another question which was
found to be important and in need of further research is to ﬁnd how to use1.4 Further Research 9
preference parameters: discount rate, loss aversion, reference points, and risk
aversion in an often used reduced form model like in chapter 5. With help
of these concepts of behavioral economics, maybe we can better predict and
understand household moving decisions and tenure choice.10 IntroductionChapter 2
T h eT i m eP r e f e r e n c eo fG a i n s
and Losses
1112 T h eT i m eP r e f e r e n c eo fG a i n sa n dL o s s e s
2.1 Introduction
Time preference plays a crucial role in large parts of economics. Indeed, eco-
nomic agents, when dealing with intertemporal choices are confronted with
the task to compare economic quantities related to the present and future
periods. As early as 1834, John Rae discussed the concept of time preference
quite clearly in his book “The Sociological Theory of Capital”. Samuelson
introduced the discounted utility model in 1937, as a way to model time
preference and, more generally, intertemporal choice. The simple and ele-
gant structure of this model made it popular straight away. Since then it
has been dominating in intertemporal choice modelling. In modern micro-
economic theory of individual and household behavior, people are assumed
to maximize their lifetime discounted utility given some economic and other
constraints, resulting in decisions on their consumption, saving, and invest-
ment behavior. Moreover, economic theories like those dealing with asset
pricing and economic growth generally include intertemporal tradeoﬀsb y
means of time discounting. So, indeed, time preference modelled by means
of time discounting is one of the cornerstones of economic analysis. A re-
cent overview of the history of and studies on time preference is given by
Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002).
Time preference has important implications for many aspects of public
policy and individual economic behavior. Policy makers with a good un-
derstanding of how households decide on intertemporal tradeoﬀsa r ea b l et o
design policies that are better accepted by the public. For example, the U.S.
Department of Defense oﬀered separatees the choice between two separation
beneﬁt packages: a lump-sum separation beneﬁt and an annuity. Over half of
the oﬃcers and over 90 percent of the enlisted personnel took the lump-sum
payment. Oﬀering this choice was not only welfare improving for separatees,
but also saved $1.7 billion in separation costs (Warner and Pleeter, 2001).
Another policy issue where the rate of time preference is of vital importance,
is giving incentives for purchasing energy saving appliances. In a seminal
p a p e r ,H a u s m a n( 1 9 7 9 )a n a l y z e ds u c had e c i s i o n .H eu s e dd a t ao nb o t ht h e
purchase and the utilization of room air conditioners to estimate individual
discount rates, based upon the tradeoﬀs between capital cost and operating
costs.
Estimation of individual discount rates from real-life decisions is often
very complicated, as many other factors aﬀect such decisions. See, for an
illustration, the discussion of Hausman’s work by Kooreman (1995), who
showed that accounting for stochastic lifetimes of the appliances substan-
tially aﬀects the estimated discount rates. Consequently, a large literature
has arisen that analyzes discount rates in specially designed experimental2.1 Introduction 13
frameworks, see Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002). This ex-
perimental literature has found a number of systematic deviations from the
traditional discounted utility model.
In this paper we analyze two of these ﬁndings in particular using a repre-
sentative household panel rather than small scale experiments: the sign eﬀect
and the delay-speedup asymmetry.T h e sign eﬀect (Thaler, 1981; Loewen-
stein, 1987, 1988; Shelley, 1993) is the asymmetry in the discounting of gains
versus losses, such as postponing receiving a prize versus paying a ﬁne. Ex-
periments show that gains are discounted more than losses. The traditional
discounted utility model, however, states that the amount one is willing to
pay for postponing a payment of $100 for one month should be about the
same as the amount of compensation one demands for receiving $100 one
month later. That is to say, gains and losses should be discounted equally.
The delay-speedup asymmetry is the ﬁnding that diﬀerent discount rates are
used depending on whether a gain (or a loss) is delayed or speeded up. For ex-
ample, Loewenstein (1988) showed that respondents who expected to receive
a video cassette recorder one year later were willing to pay an average of $54
to receive it immediately, but those who expected to receive it immediately
demanded an average of $126 to delay its receipt by a year.1
If present, the sign eﬀect and the delay-speedup asymmetry should be
taken into consideration when designing economic policies. In particular, the
framing of the policy measure may determine which discount rate is used,
and can, therefore, aﬀect the response to the policy (Brendl and Higgins,
1996). Consider, for example, once again the payment of a lump-sum versus
an annuity for the US army separatees as analyzed by Warner and Pleeter
(2001). Take an employee who expects to receive an annuity. Suppose this
employee is also oﬀered the choice to receive a lump-sum payment instead,
giving him a large instantaneous gain. The discount rate applied is, therefore,
the discount rate for speeding up gains. Alternatively, if the separatee takes
the lump-sum payment as the benchmark, and the separatee is oﬀered as
alternative an annuity, then the relevant discount rate will be the discount
rate for delay of gain. Due to the delay-speedup asymmetry the choice in
both cases might be quite diﬀerent. In other situations, other discount rates
will be used. When purchasing energy saving equipment, consumers usually
have to pay a higher price. The beneﬁts are lower energy bills in the future.
1Other deviations from the traditional discounted model include, in particular, hyper-
bolic discounting (Laibson, 1997), which is the phenomenon that the discount rate over
two periods diﬀers from the product of the two corresponding one period rates, and the
magnitude eﬀect, meaning that small outcomes are discounted more than large ones. In
our analysis we will keep the time horizon and the outcome ﬁxed, and, thus, will not
address these issues.14 T h eT i m eP r e f e r e n c eo fG a i n sa n dL o s s e s
Suppose the status quo for this decision is buying the non-energy saving
p r o d u c t .T h ed i s c o u n tr a t et h a tw i l lb eu s e df o rt h i sd e c i s i o ni st h ed i s c o u n t
rate for speeding up losses, which, due to the sign eﬀect,m i g h tb em u c h
higher than the discount rate used for speeding up gains. Given the large
diﬀerences among the discount rates that are indicated by the literature
on time preference, it is important to use information on the appropriate
discount rate in analyzing a given policy.
Recently, researchers have started to link discount rates to other individ-
ual or household characteristics, see, for example, Harrison, Lau and Williams
(2002), and Kirby et al. (2002). An important motivation for investigating
this link is that one will be better able to predict the choices made by house-
holds with given characteristics. For example, many policy issues that relate
to pensions aﬀect only the elderly. The appropriate discount rate for ana-
lyzing such a policy will, therefore, be the discount rate used by the elderly,
which might diﬀer from the population average. Similarly, programs aimed at
getting high-school drop-outs back into the education system in order to let
them invest in the short run with the purpose of obtaining long run beneﬁts,
mainly aﬀect adolescents.
In this paper we extend this literature by analyzing how individual char-
acteristics aﬀect the diﬀerent types of discount rates that one can use. We
distinguish four diﬀerent scenarios that (might) lead to diﬀerent discount
rates. These scenarios diﬀer in whether it concerns a gain or a loss (to take
account of the potential sign eﬀect) and in whether the payment date is
postponed or speeded up (to deal with a possible delay-speedup asymmetry).
The literature suggests that these four scenarios lead to markedly diﬀerent
discount rates, a ﬁnding supported by our data. However, to do proper pol-
icy analysis on various types of policies, one would need to know the level of
the discount rate for the households that are aﬀected. Therefore, we relate
the four diﬀerent discount rates to an extensive set of explanatory variables.
This provides information on each of the four discount rates, enabling policy
m a k e r st os e l e c tt h ea p p r o p r i a t et y p eo fd i s c o u n tr a t ei nc o m b i n a t i o nw i t h
the relevant household characteristics.
Moreover, using four years of panel data on respondents who answer the
questions for all four scenarios, we are able to distinguish between unobserved
heterogeneity and idiosyncratic noise. This makes it possible to analyze
how much of the variation that is not explained by observed household’s or
respondent’s characteristics reﬂects genuine heterogeneity in time preferences
and how much is noise. By jointly analyzing the four scenarios, we can also
identify the extent to which common factors drive the four discount rates.
Our analysis is based on a rich dataset from the Netherlands, the CentER
Saving Survey (CSS), which is representative of the Dutch population. The2.1 Introduction 15
data we use stems from four waves, 1997-2000. The survey contains sixteen
questions about time preference, including the four diﬀerent scenarios, but
with varying amounts and time horizons. This wealthy data set gives us a
unique opportunity to investigate the relationships of time preference and its
determinants in detail. In our study, four ordered probit models are used to
simultaneously estimate the time preference for gains and losses, and delay
and speedup. Maximum Simulated Likelihood and the GHK simulator2 are
employed to estimate the model.
Ar e m a r k a b l eﬁnding is that the mean of the discount rate for speedup
of gains has the same size as the rate for delay of losses, but is much smaller
than the mean of the discount rate for delay of gains. We ﬁnd that discount
rates vary with individual characteristics, and the four discount rates vary in
diﬀerent ways, implying that policy analysis should take account of diﬀerent
trade-oﬀsi nd i ﬀerent demographic groups. In particular, females have lower
discount rates than males in all four scenarios, but especially in delaying
losses and speeding up gains; age has a robust U-shaped relationship with
both discount rates of gains and losses. We ﬁnd that unobserved individual
heterogeneity explains a substantial part of the variation in reported discount
rates, and that heterogeneity in the four discount rates is positively corre-
lated. Idiosyncratic errors for the four scenarios in a given time period are
positively correlated too. The correlation coeﬃcients of the random eﬀects
and the error terms in the econometric model are highest between the dis-
count rates for delay of losses and speedup of gains. Thus, we may conclude
that the discount rates for speedup of gains is more like that for delaying
losses than delaying gains; and, for the same reason, speedup of losses is
more similar to delaying gains than losses.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
brieﬂy review the relationships between time preference and a number of so-
cioeconomic variables that have been found in both the theoretical and the
empirical literature. We describe the data in Section 3. In Section 4, we
discuss the econometric model and the estimation procedure. In Section 5,
the results of two models are presented. The ﬁrst model contains only basic
demographics. The second model contains a wide range of variables, includ-
ing subjective variables that can be seen as alternative indicators of time
preference and are helpful in predicting discount rates. Section 6 concludes.
2Named after Geweke, Hajivassiliou, Keane who developed the procedure indepen-
dently in the early 1990s. See Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994).16 T h eT i m eP r e f e r e n c eo fG a i n sa n dL o s s e s
2.2 Socioeconomic variables and time prefer-
ence
In this section we discuss the existing literature on time preference and its
relationship with other individual characteristics. Many studies have consid-
ered time preference as a determinant of household behavior. Other studies
aim at explaining the rate of time preference from other factors. A promi-
nent example of the latter is Becker and Mulligan (1997). They argue that
time preference is aﬀected by wealth, mortality, addictions, uncertainty, and
many other demographic and socioeconomic variables. Our interest is in pre-
d i c t i n gw h oi sm o r ea n dw h oi sl e s si m p a t i e n t . T h e r e f o r e ,w ew i l ln o tp a y
attention to causality in the empirical analysis, although we will discuss this
issue here, to get insight in the mechanisms through which the empirical re-
lation between time preference and other variables comes about. Given the
important role of time preference in all kinds of decisions, only very few vari-
ables are unambiguously strictly exogenous to the level of time preference.
In the data set we have available, only gender and age would be classiﬁed as
such. All other variables we discuss below are potentially endogenous, i.e.,
they might also be determined by the rate of time preference. Still, these
variables should help us in identifying who is patient and who is not.
2.2.1 Age and time preference
Becker and Mulligan (1997) give a clear prediction for the age-pattern of time
preference: the future would tend to be discounted relatively heavily at both
young and old ages, giving a U-shaped relationship between the discount rate
and age.
However, empirical studies on the rate of time preference have not been
able to conﬁrm this U-shaped pattern. For example, Harrison, Lau, and
Williams (2002) use three dummy variables for age: young, middle, old, and
found an inverse U-shaped age pattern, which was not signiﬁcant. Pender
( 1 9 9 6 )d i da ne x p e r i m e n tw i t h9 6p a r t i c i p a n t si nt w ov i l l a g e si ns o u t h e r n
India. He found that the coeﬃcient of age was very small and insigniﬁcant.
But some studies comparing the elderly with the youngsters, did ﬁnd that
elderly people are more impatient than youngsters. For example, Van Der
Pol and Cairns (1999) showed that the average discount rates of respondents
younger and older than 64 were 0.118 and 0.166 in case of 5 years delay,
respectively, and 0.066 and 0.114 in case of 13 years delay. Kirby et al.
(2002) also investigated the age pattern of time preference. They ﬁnd the
lowest discount rates at the age of 20 and increasing discount rates after age2.2 Socioeconomic variables and time preference 17
20. Donkers and Van Soest (1999) found that the rate of time preference
is negatively correlated with age, using the Dutch CentER Savings Survey
waves of 1993 and 1995.
2.2.2 Gender and time preference
A number of empirical studies have included gender as an explanatory vari-
able. Kirby and Marakovic (1996) estimated the discount rate of delay of
gains with an experiment that used more than 600 students as subjects. A
reliable gender diﬀerence was found with males discounting at higher rates
than females, on average. Daniel (1994) and Donkers and Van Soest (1999)
found the same: females have lower discount rates, on average. Other studies
have not found a signiﬁcant eﬀect of gender, see, for example, Kirby et al.
(2002), Harrison, Lau and Williams (2002), and Pender (1996).
2.2.3 Health and time preference
More than 160 years ago, Rae (1834) already realized that the uncertainty
of human life has important eﬀects on time preference. He wrote:3
“When engaged in safe occupations, and living in healthy countries, men
are much more apt to be frugal, than in unhealthy, or hazardous occupations,
and in climates pernicious to human life. Sailors and soldiers are prodigals.
In the West Indies, New Orleans, the East Indies, the expenditure of the
inhabitants is profuse. The same people, coming to reside in the healthy
parts of Europe, and not getting into the vortex of extravagant fashion, live
economically. War and pestilence have always waste and luxury, among the
other evils that follow in their train.” (Rae 1834, p. 57)
Clearly, bad health of individuals reduces their life expectancy, and it is
easy to understand that people with long life expectancy are more patient.
Many studies indicate that there is some relationship between time preference
of individuals and their health status. Becker and Mulligan (1997), following
Rae’s (1834) suggestion, argue that diﬀerences in health cause diﬀerences in
time preference. Better health reduces mortality and, therefore, raises future
utility levels, which would make people more patient. On the other hand,
Fuchs (1982) and others argue that diﬀerences of time preference have big
eﬀects on the individual health-related decisions, and, therefore, inﬂuence
the health of the individual. In all cases, the conclusion is that better health
status is associated with lower time preference and more patience. A recent
paper of Picone et al. (2004) checked the role of risk and time preference,
3Cited from Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002).18 T h eT i m eP r e f e r e n c eo fG a i n sa n dL o s s e s
expected longevity, and education on demand for medical tests of women,
their results revealed that women with a short time horizon is less likely to
do these tests, it means impatience makes people invest less in health.
As explained above, we will not analyze causality between health and time
preference, but will model the (partial) correlation between health and time
preference so that information on health status can be used to better forecast
individual rates of time preference. In this paper we use three variables to
present the health status of individuals: First, the Quetelet index or Body
Mass Index (BMI), which is a common measure for obesity; second, a self-
reported measure on general health; and third, a dummy indicating a serious
illness or other health problems in the previous year.
2.2.4 Addiction and time preference
Addiction is an interesting topic in relation to time preference. Many exper-
imental studies illustrate that drug addicts discount the future signiﬁcantly
heavier than those who do not use drugs.4 Carrillo (1999), O’ Donoghue
and Rabin (2000), and Gruber and Koszegi (2001) also show that hyper-
bolic discounting could explain the over-consumption of the harmful addic-
tive products in their models. In general, the causality between addiction
and impatience is not clear. Becker and Murphy (1988) assume that people
with higher discount rates would consider the future less important, making
them more likely to become addicted. But Becker and Mulligan (1997) also
stress the reverse causality, arguing that addictions cause persons to discount
the future more heavily, and this higher discount rate might lead to an even
stronger addiction.
We do not have data about strong addictions like drug-use, but our survey
does include information on smoking and drinking behavior. These could be
considered as some kind of addiction, though not as strong as drug-use.
2.2.5 Income and time preference
Economic theory provides no reason to expect that people with lower incomes
would have higher discount rates, because the relative valuation of consump-
tion now and in the future need not depend on the level of income. In Becker
and Mulligan’s (1997) model also, there are opposing forces with respect to
4Madden et al. (1997) show that Opioid-dependent participants discounted delayed
monetary rewards signiﬁcantly more than non-drug-using participants. Furthermore,
opioid-dependent participants discounted delayed heroin signiﬁcantly more than delayed
money. Kirby, Petry and Bickel (1999), and Giordano et al. (2002) have similar results
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t h ei m p a c to fi n c o m eo nt i m ep r e f e r e n c e ,r e s u l t i n gi na na m b i g u o u so v e r a l l
eﬀect.
The existing empirical literature has some results on the relationship be-
tween income and time preference. Hausman (1979) shows that the discount
rate is inversely related to income (for example, 39 percent for households
with income below $10,000 and 8.9 percent for households earning between
$25,000 and $35,000). Harrison, Lau and Williams (2002) also found that
rich people have lower discount rates than poor, using Danish data, but their
results were not signiﬁcant. Finally, Houston (1983) presents individuals
with a decision of whether to purchase a hypothetical energy-saving device
and also concludes that income “played no statistically signiﬁcant role in
explaining the level of discount rate.”
2.2.6 Schooling and time preference
Becker and Mulligan (1997) discuss two diﬀerent causal relationships between
schooling and time preference. They argue that schooling focuses students’
attention on the future, and at the same time educated people should be
more productive at reducing the remoteness of future pleasures. Both eﬀects
imply a lower discount rate for people with higher education levels. This is
also implied by the notion that inherently more patient people will tend to
invest more in education, reducing current consumption in order to reap the
beneﬁts later in life.
There are all kinds of empirical results about the relationship between
schooling and time preference. Viscusi and Moore (1989) used a multi-period
Markov model of the lifetime choice of occupational fatality risks to estimate
the discount rate. They used the 1982 wave of the University of Michigan
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and show that the discount rates
decrease with education. Harrison, Lau and Williams (2002) and Pender
(1996) found insigniﬁcant eﬀects of education.
2.3 Data
The data we use is a panel data set with four waves (1997-2000) taken from
the CentER Savings Survey (CSS, formerly known as the VSB Panel). The
CSS is a large Dutch household survey, collected every year for a panel of more
than 2000 households, starting from 1993. The CSS is a rich data set contain-
ing information on employment status, pensions, accommodation, mortgages,
income, assets, debts, health, economic and psychological concepts, and per-
sonal characteristics. Our data constitutes an unbalanced panel, with a total20 T h eT i m eP r e f e r e n c eo fG a i n sa n dL o s s e s
of 3,938 individuals and 6,962 observations. Table4.1 shows the structure of
this unbalanced panel. The average time that an individual stayed in the
panel is 1.8 years.
Table 2.1: Structure of the panel
By wave By number of waves
Year Observations Number of waves Obs. Number of individuals
1997 2,657 1 2,299 2,299
1998 1,363 21 , 3 7 8 6 8 9
1999 1,366 31 , 5 4 5 5 1 5
2000 1,576 41 , 7 4 0 4 3 5
Total 6,962 Total 6,962 3,938
Left panel: Year is the survey year, 1997-2000, in total we have four waves of
the survey.
Right Panel: Number of waves that the households stay in the panel.
Starting from the year 1997, a detailed set of questions about time pref-
erence is included in the CSS.5 There are sixteen questions about the way
people value opportunities in the future compared to the present. These
questions diﬀer on four aspects with each aspect having two levels, resulting
in a total of sixteen questions. The ﬁr s ta s p e c ti st h ea m o u n to fm o n e yc o n -
cerned, either Dﬂ.1 0 0 0 o r D ﬂ. 100,000.6 The second is the time horizon,
either three months or one year. The third is whether the amount of money
is to be received or to be paid7. The last one is whether the transaction
(payment or receipt) is speeded up or delayed.
In this paper, we analyze the four questions with the amount of money
equal to Dﬂ. 1000 and a time horizon of one year. Therefore, the four diﬀer-
ent scenarios we consider are the following (using the (translated) questions
asked in the questionnaire):
Delay of gains
Now imagine that the National Lottery asks if you are pre-
pared to wait A YEAR before you get the prize of Dﬂ. 1000.
There is no risk involved in waiting. How much extra money
would you AT LEAST want to receive to compensate for the
5In earlier waves time preference was elicited with questions that diﬀer in the answering
format (cf. Donkers and van Soest, 1999). Therefore, we do not use these data.
61D ﬂ. is approximately 0.45 Euro.
7We consider “need to pay a tax assessment ” as a loss and “win a prize of the National
Lottery” as a gain.2.3 Data 21
waiting term of a year? If you agree on the waiting term without
the need to receive extra money for that, please type 0 (zero).
Delay of losses
Imagine again that you have to pay a tax assessment of Dﬂ.
1000 today. Suppose that you could wait A YEAR with settling
the tax assessment. How much extra money would you AT MOST
be prepared to pay to get the extension of payment of A YEAR?
If you are not interested in getting an extension of payment or if
you are not prepared to pay more for the extension of payment,
please type 0 (zero).
Speedup of gains
Imagine again that you receive notice from the National Lot-
tery that you have won a prize worth Dﬂ. 1000. The money will
be paid out after A YEAR. The money can be paid out at once,
but in that case you receive less than Dﬂ.1 0 0 0 .H o wm u c hL E S S
money would you AT MOST be prepared to receive if you would
get the money at once instead of after a year? If you are not in-
terested in receiving the money earlier or if you are not prepared
to receive less for getting the money earlier, please type 0 (zero).
Speedup of losses
Imagine again that you receive a tax assessment of Dﬂ. 1000.
The assessment has to be settled within A YEAR. It is, however,
possible to settle the assessment now, and in that case you will
get a REDUCTION. How much REDUCTION would you AT
LEAST want to get for settling the assessment now instead of
after a year? If you are not interested in getting a reduction for
paying early or if you think there is no need to get a reduction
for paying early, please type 0 (zero).
Each of these four questions leads to a diﬀerent discount rate, providing
discount rates for the delay of gains (δDG), delay of losses (δDL),s p e e d u po f
gains (δSG) and speedup of losses (δSL).I f w e u s e xDG, xSG, xDL, xSL to
represent the answer to each question above, then we can compute these four22 T h eT i m eP r e f e r e n c eo fG a i n sa n dL o s s e s













Some descriptive statistics on these discount rates are provided in Table
4.2. Notice here that we use only those observations with a discount rate of
at most 120% to compute some of descriptive statistics. In the Appendix we
provide a list of deﬁnitions of our explanatory variables and some descriptive
statistics.
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of the discount rates
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
δDG 0.208 0.1 0.250 0.0 1.2
δDL 0.032 0.0 0.076 0.0 1.2
δSG 0.028 0.0 0.078 0.0 1.2
δSL 0.109 0.053 0.164 0.0 1.2
N o t e :t h em e a n ,s t d .d e v . ,m i n .a n dm a x .o fδ are computed
with the obs.which δ is smaller or equal than 1.2
In case of perfect ﬁnancial markets without constraints8, a “rational”
individual should have discount rates that are the same for all four scenarios.
As expected, our data does not support this. Instead, one can see from
Table 4.2 that our data is in line with the ﬁndings in the literature. First
of all, people discount gains heavier than losses, i.e., the mean of δDG (the
discount rate of delay of gains) is more than ﬁve times larger than that of
δDL(the discount rate of delay of losses); this is what is called the sign eﬀect.
The sign eﬀect is also clearly present when comparing δSG (the discount rate
of speedup of gains) and δSL (the discount rate of speedup of losses). The
second conﬁrmation of existing ﬁndings is the delay-speedup asymmetry:w e
ﬁnd that δDG is much bigger than δSG,a n dw eﬁnd that δDL is much smaller
than δSL.
8Our data includes information on savings accounts. More than 95% of the individuals
had more than Dﬂ 1,000 in their bank account. This means that these people are not
likely to be ﬁnancially constrained for the amount of Dﬂ 1,000 we investigate.2.3 Data 23
The answers to the questions show a number of patterns worth noting.
First, respondents have a tendency to provide answers in relatively round
numbers, for example, 10, 20, 25, or 50, but not 11 or 37. For example,
for the delay of loss question 57% of the observations used one of these four
numbers 25, 40, 50, 100, in case the answer is not equal to zero. This is also
illustrated in Figure 2.1. We account for this in our econometric model in
the next section.
A second feature is that there are a large number of respondents that
answer zero. In particular for the delay of loss and the speedup of gain, more
than 50% of the answers is zero, indicating that these respondents are not
willing to pay more or receive less. Table 2.3 provides some statistics and
the average discount rates and the percentage of answers that equal zero for
each of the four waves. In general, the average discount rates increase over
time, especially in 2000, while the number of answers equal to zero decreases
over time.
Table 2.3: Discount rates and zero answers by wave
Variable Year Mean Std.Dev. % of obs. answered
with zero
δDG 1997 0.190 0.234 18.3%
1998 0.210 0.251 13.9%
1999 0.215 0.263 14.1%
2000 0.232 0.261 9.2%
δDL 1997 0.029 0.074 67.7%
1998 0.032 0.076 64.9%
1999 0.033 0.076 62.3%
2000 0.037 0.078 57.0%
δSG 1997 0.026 0.070 70.5%
1998 0.028 0.082 69.6%
1999 0.027 0.075 69.1%
2000 0.033 0.089 63.5%
δSL 1997 0.105 0.168 38.8%
1998 0.098 0.149 37.1%
1999 0.104 0.160 35.6%
2000 0.131 0.172 20.2%
Note: the mean and Std. Dev. of δ are computed with
the obs. which δ is smaller or equal than 1.2.24 T h eT i m eP r e f e r e n c eo fG a i n sa n dL o s s e s







Anwser to the question (in Dfl.)
Figure 2.1: Frequencies of the answer to the question on Delay of losses2.4 Econometric Model 25
2.4 Econometric Model
In this section, we present the econometric model for the analysis of the ob-
served discount rates for the four scenarios. To estimate the time preference
for the four scenarios jointly, we use a model with four equations and allow
for correlated errors and individual eﬀects. As discussed in the previous sec-
tion, respondents tend to use round numbers to answer the questions. We
expect this to be the result of rounding oﬀ the ”true” answer, an observed
discount rate of 10% might indicate that the actual discount rate is, for ex-
ample, between 5% and 15%. To account for this, we group the reported
discount rates and deﬁne a categorical outcome yit for each discount rate,
which indicates the interval of the reported discount rate δit.W e u s e 0 % ,
7.5%, 15%, 30%, and 60% as the cutoﬀ points and classiﬁed the data into 6
intervals as follows:
yit =0if δit ≤ 0
yit =1if 0 <δ it ≤ 7.5
yit =2if 7.5 <δ it ≤ 15
yit =3if 15 <δ it ≤ 30
yit =4if 30 <δ it ≤ 60
yit =5if δit > 60
This classiﬁcation is chosen on the basis of the distribution of the reported
discount rates in the data. The categories are located around the focal points
with many observations. In particular, there are a large number of observa-
tions with 0%, 5%, or 10%, which will dominate the lower three categories
of our discretization. Another advantage of this discretized variable is that
outliers, i.e., very large observations, will not aﬀect the estimation results too
much. When we would use a continuous model, taking the reported values
as the actual values, we would use more information on the detailed answers,
inferring too much precision from the rounded numbers. This is avoided by
using the discretized variable instead of the continuous one.
To explain the ordered discrete dependent variable, we adopt the ordered
probit model adapted to a panel data context with multiple equations. Using
standard notation for the ordered probit panel data model, the underlying
latent variable of individual i at time t for scenario J, J = DG, DL, SG, SL,
is denoted as yJ∗








it i =1 ,···,N; t =1 ,···,T.
For each individual respondent we have four scenarios, i.e., four observed
outcomes, per wave and up to four waves. As we expect that the explanatory26 T h eT i m eP r e f e r e n c eo fG a i n sa n dL o s s e s
variables in Xit do not capture all individual heterogeneity, we allow for








We assume that both the individual eﬀects and the error term are multivari-


























Moreover, we assume that νit is independent of νjs, for all i,j and all s 6= t,
and that the error terms νit are independent of the individual eﬀects ηi.T h e



























5 are cutoﬀ points for equation J. T h em o s tc o m m o n
normalization restrictions in ordered probit models are restrictions on the
variance of the error term, ε, and the constant term. In our application,
however, we are interested in comparing parameter estimates across equa-
tions. As the variances of the error terms are not necessarily equal, we adopt
ad i ﬀerent normalization: we set cutJ
1 =0and cutJ
5 =6 0 . T h e s ev a l u e sa r e
the same values that are used in discretizing the observed discount rates. A
change from 0 to 60 in the underlying latent variable, yJ∗, is therefore equal
to a change in the observed discount rate from 0% to 60%. This permits us
to compare the estimated coeﬃcients across the four equations.
Our aim is to estimate the four equations at the same time. Given the four
waves in our panel, this means that we have 4 × 4 ordered probit equations
with correlated error terms. In particular, the 16 × 16 dimensional covariance
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It is almost impossible to compute the probability of this 16 dimensional
multivariate normal distribution using numerical methods directly. There-
fore, we rely on simulation techniques to calculate these high dimensional
integrals. The GHK simulator and the method of maximum simulated like-
lihood (MSL) are well known tools to estimate this kind of high dimensional
discrete choice models, see Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) or Train (2003).
We use 100 random draws9 when we compute the simulated likelihood, and
then employ the BHHH10 algorithm to maximize the simulated likelihood.
2.5 Results
As time preference might be determined simultaneously with a large num-
ber of individual characteristics, including, for example, education, income,
health status, and home ownership, we estimate two models. The ﬁrst model
includes only strictly exogenous variables, which, in our data, are age and
gender. The second model includes many more variables that can improve
the predictive performance of the model. This model reveals the correlations
between time preference and the explanatory variables, but these relations
are not necessarily causal.
The estimation results of the ﬁrst model with only exogenous variables
are presented in Table 2.4. The model includes age, age-squared, a dummy
for female, and three dummies to capture changes over time. The eight
parameters of age and age-squared are all signiﬁcant except age-squared in
case of δSL.T h e s ee s t i m a t e si n d i c a t et h a tt i m ep r e f e r e n c eh a saU - s h a p e da g e
pattern, which would ﬁt Becker and Mulligan’s (1997) prediction perfectly.
The minimum values, however, are attained at age 86, 79, 52, and 168 for
δDG, δDL, δSG,a n dδSL, respectively. For a reasonable age range like 20
to 85 years old, only the time preference for speedup of gains and to some
extent delay of losses have a U-shaped pattern in the relevant age range. The
discount rates for the other two scenarios decrease with age. This is in line
with the mixed ﬁndings on the U-shaped age structure in empirical studies
in the literature.
The results in Table 2.4 also show that females are more patient than
males. This holds especially for time preference of delay of losses and speedup
of gains. Given the scaling of the cut-oﬀ levels, the parameters have a direct
9Our results are checked by double draws (using 200 draws), and compared to the result
using 100 draws, the relative change of estimated parameters is smaller than 5 percent. It
s e e m st h a ti ti sa c c u r a t ee n o u g h( 5 % )w ith 100 draws to estimate our model.
10Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974) proposed this procedure of the numerical
search for the maximum of the log-likelihood.28 T h eT i m eP r e f e r e n c eo fG a i n sa n dL o s s e s
interpretation. For example, the estimate of -4.92 for females in the delay-
loss-scenario indicates that for this scenario females have a discount rate that
is about 4.9% points lower than for males on average. Similar interpretations
hold for the other coeﬃcients.
The second part of Table 2.4 are Wald tests for two hypotheses on the
parameters. Wald Test 1 is the test of the null hypothesis that the four









0 vs. the alternative that this is not the case. Wald test 2 is the test of the









i , against the alternative that this is not the case. Under
the null, both test statistics are asymptotically chi-squared distributed with
degrees of freedom equal to four and three, respectively. The critical values at
the 5% conﬁdence level are 9.49 and 7.81, respectively. The test results imply
that the variables are highly signiﬁcant. With respect to the age pattern we
can conclude that equality of the parameter across the equations cannot be
rejected. However, a more appropriate test is whether the joint eﬀects of
age and age squared are equal or the same across the four equations. The
Wald test 1 and 2 for age and age squared parameters jointly are 379.5 and
82.8 respectively, so the parameters of age structure are jointly signiﬁcant,


















age−sq is rejected at the 1% conﬁdence level. This result is important, as it
indicates that diﬀerent discount rates, even as a function of age, should be
used for the analysis of diﬀerent types of economic policies. The same holds
for the eﬀect of gender, as the size of the gender eﬀect diﬀe r sa c r o s st h ef o u r
discount rates.
To check whether the quadratic age structure of the rate of time preference
is a ﬂexible enough speciﬁcation, we compared it with two other structures
for the age pattern. One is a model with a much more ﬂexible structure for
age: a piecewise linear structure with kinks at ﬁve year intervals, starting
from 16-20 years of age to 86-90 years of age. We calculated 95% conﬁdence
bands of the piecewise linear model. The estimated curve of the quadratic
model is situated well inside these conﬁdence bands of the piecewise linear
model for all ages. This suggests that the quadratic age structure provides a
good description. The other age structure we tested is a model with diﬀerent
quadratic age structures for males and females. Based on a likelihood ratio
test value of 9.88 with 8 degrees of freedom, we cannot reject the hypothesis
t h a tm a l e sa n df e m a l e sh a v et h es a m eq u a d r a t i ca g es t r u c t u r e .
The results of the year dummies imply that there are diﬀerences over
time, especially for the year 2000. In order to check whether only using a2.5 Results 29
Table 2.4: Estimation results with only strictly exogenous variables
Variable δDG δDL δSG δSL
Para. t-st. Para. t-st. Para. t-st. Para. t-st.
Age -7.87 -6.53 -5.03 -3.79 -5.82 -3.50 -4.75 -3.59
Age-sq. 4.59 3.59 3.20 2.20 5.62 3.19 1.41 0.99
Female -0.938 -1.29 -4.92 -6.13 -5.40 -5.24 -1.65 -2.14
Dum. 98 2.49 3.53 2.08 2.59 0.721 0.70 0.163 0.21
Dum. 99 2.85 4.13 3.37 4.04 0.800 0.76 1.27 1.60
Dum. 00 4.39 6.11 5.44 6.51 5.05 4.90 7.23 8.76
Constant 50.0 18.6 7.30 2.51 0.054 0.01 28.7 9.70
Cutoﬀ 1 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 -
Cutoﬀ 2 14.5 44.3 16.3 24.7 18.9 30.2 13.3 40.7
Cutoﬀ 3 33.1 89.6 30.6 26.6 39.6 36.4 32.5 68.9
Cutoﬀ 4 45.8 123 42.4 28.7 49.0 42.7 44.4 85.2
Cutoﬀ 5 60.0 - 60.0 - 60.0 - 60.0 -
Loglikelihood -34198.2




Dum. 98 17.9* 7.55
Dum. 99 30.3* 7.61
Dum. 00 113* 9.73*
Constant 375* 172*
Cutoﬀ 2- 6 4 . 1 *
Cutoﬀ 3- 4 0 . 4 *
Cutoﬀ 4- 1 6 . 9 *
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 5% level for Wald test.
Wald Test 1 is the test of the null hypothesis that four para-
meters in one row are all zero, Wald Test 2 is the test of the
null hypothesis that the four parameters in one row are equal.30 T h eT i m eP r e f e r e n c eo fG a i n sa n dL o s s e s
time dummy is suﬃcient to pick up the changing trend or not, we estimated
a model allowing for diﬀerent coeﬃcients in each period and tested equality
of parameters over time by using Wald tests. None of the alternative speciﬁ-
cations resulted in a signiﬁcantly better model, so there is no evidence that
age and gender parameters change over time. What remains unexplained is
the large coeﬃcient for the dummy for the year 2000.
Note that we discretized our data with non-equidistant cutoﬀ levels at
0.0, 7.5, 15, 30, and 60. Looking at the parameter estimates, we ﬁnd that
the distances between the cutoﬀ levels are about equal. In terms of the
underlying latent variable, an increase in the discount rate from 7.5% to 15%
seems to be about as same large as a change from 15% to 30%, or from 30%
to 60%. This indicates that there is some non-linearity in this model, that is
easily accounted for in our ordered probit model. We did a likelihood ratio
test, and the results show that the three cut-oﬀ points we estimated for each
equation are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 7.5, 15, and 30, at the 1% level.
Table 2.5: Standard deviations and correlation coeﬃcients of random eﬀects,
η.
Standard Correlation coeﬃcients
deviations δDG δDL δSG δSL
δDG 15.9 (40.6) 1.0
δDL 15.1 (23.4) 0.19 (4.65) 1.0
δSG 19.3 (21.5) 0.24 (5.82) 0.67 (20.4) 1.0
δSL 15.8 (32.1) 0.47 (15.8) 0.36 (9.13) 0.36 (9.04) 1.0
t-statistics in parentheses.
Table 2.6: Standard deviations and correlation coeﬃcients of error terms, ν.
Standard Correlation coeﬃcients
deviations δDG δDL δSG δSL
δDG 17.9 (85.0) 1.0
δDL 17.4 (25.2) 0.17 (7.69) 1.0
δSG 21.4 (35.7) 0.18 (7.45) 0.33 (13.8) 1.0
δSL 20.0 (60.5) 0.24 (13.0) 0.17 (8.00) 0.27 (12.2) 1.0
t-statistics in parentheses.
In the four equations model, the correlations between the error terms
and individual eﬀects are also of interest, as they provide insights into the
dependencies among the observations for a given respondent, conditional
on the explanatory variables. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present the variances and2.5 Results 31
correlation coeﬃcients of the random eﬀects and error terms. The amount of
unexplained variation is of comparable order of magnitude in three of the four
scenarios, but substantially larger in the speedup of gains scenario. In all four
scenarios, the variance of the individual speciﬁce ﬀects is somewhat smaller
than the variance of the error terms, implying that there is a substantial
amount of unobserved heterogeneity, explaining between 38 and 45% of the
nonsystematic variation in the four discount rates.
All correlation coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, with values
ranging from 0.17 to 0.67. In general, there is a substantial dependency
among the observations. Correlations between random eﬀects are always
larger than corresponding correlations between error terms, in line with the
notion that the errors also capture purely idiosyncratic noise. One would
expect that discount rates of gains (δDG and δSG) are more similar, as well
as the two discount rates of losses (δDL and δSL), so we expect relatively
high correlation coeﬃcients between these variables. However, the correlation
coeﬃcients of random eﬀects and error terms are highest between δDL and
δSG. This suggests that time preference of speedup of gains (δSG) has a closer
relationship with δDL than δDG; in this sense δSG behaves more like delayed
losses (δDL) than delayed gains (δDG). Similarly, speedup of losses is more
similar to a delayed gain, as δSL has a higher correlation coeﬃcient with δDG
than with δDL.
To gain more predictive power, we also included a much larger set of
socioeconomic and demographic variables. The estimation results are shown
in Table 2.7. Given the large number of explanatory variables, we focus our
discussion mainly on those variables that are jointly signiﬁcant for the four
scenarios, i.e., the variables with a signiﬁcant value for Wald test 1. The
interpretation of the size of the coeﬃcients is similar to that in case of the
model in Table 4, as the scaling of the problem is the same. The coeﬃcient
of -0.79 for females in the delay of gains scenarios, therefore, means that
f e m a l e sh a v ead i s c o u n tr a t et h a ti so na v e r a g ea b o u t0 . 8 %p o i n tl o w e rt h a n
that of males with the same other characteristics.
We get a similar result for the age pattern as in the earlier model, with
as i g n i ﬁcant quadratic structure; the coeﬃcients of age and age-squared are
all signiﬁcant except the coeﬃcient of age-squared in δSL, just like before.
Also the result that females are more patient than males is not aﬀected by
including the other variables. The gender diﬀerence, however, varies signif-
icantly, but also substantially across the four scenarios. For δDG and δSL
the diﬀerence is less than 1% point and insigniﬁcant, while for the other two
scenarios the diﬀerence is more than 4% points and highly signiﬁcant. Notice
that similar to the correlation coeﬃcients in the earlier model, the eﬀects are
more similar for the delay of gains and speedup of losses and not for the two32 T h eT i m eP r e f e r e n c eo fG a i n sa n dL o s s e s
Table 2.7: Estimation results for the full model.
Variable δDG δDL δSG δSL Wald Test
Para. t-st. Para. t-st. Para. t-st. Para. t-st. 12
Age -9.10 -7.14 -5.96 -4.18 -6.71 -3.75 -5.24 -3.70 63.8* 6.70
Age-sq. 5.53 4.01 4.10 2.57 6.94 3.57 1.91 1.23 25.7* 7.43
Female -0.79 -1.02 -4.76 -5.63 -4.54 -4.25 -0.99 -1.22 36.5* 19.2*
Child -1.60 -1.98 0.48 0.53 1.37 1.18 -1.15 -1.29 7.64 6.43
School2 -0.93 -1.21 0.91 1.05 1.74 1.52 2.27 2.63 12.5* 11.5*
School3 -0.01 -0.01 2.36 2.42 6.01 4.74 3.68 3.84 33.4* 22.5*
Owner 0.44 0.47 1.03 1.05 3.02 2.28 1.94 2.02 7.45 4.35
Urban. -0.01 -0.02 -0.19 -0.65 0.02 0.06 -0.06 -0.21 0.57 0.42
Job 0.80 0.91 -1.04 -1.02 0.40 0.30 0.07 0.07 2.55 2.53
Income -0.42 -1.13 0.38 0.88 -0.56 -1.02 -0.67 -1.60 5.59 4.47
Manag. -0.87 -1.77 -1.84 -3.16 -1.31 -1.79 -0.82 -1.45 12.9* 2.28
Fin. sit. -0.76 -1.00 -0.91 -1.06 1.91 1.80 2.25 2.68 15.4* 15.2*
Pri. exp. 2.67 3.00 2.92 2.54 2.52 1.73 5.00 4.75 30.8* 4.45
Time-h. -0.09 -0.33 -0.24 -0.80 -0.36 -0.89 -0.20 -0.68 1.30 0.40
Smoke 0.39 1.09 -0.08 -0.20 -0.36 -0.71 0.09 0.25 2.16 1.94
Drink 0.78 0.56 0.89 0.59 2.22 1.24 0.26 0.18 1.70 0.95
Que. Ind. 0.34 4.16 0.02 0.20 -0.20 -1.56 0.07 0.73 22.5* 15.6*
Health -0.33 -0.65 0.46 0.82 -0.19 -0.26 1.47 2.63 10.3* 9.30*
Illness 1.45 1.75 0.64 0.68 0.18 0.15 1.57 1.67 4.57 1.28
Dum. 98 2.30 3.22 2.10 2.59 0.89 0.85 0.13 0.16 15.9* 6.34
Dum. 99 2.67 3.82 3.44 4.03 0.99 0.92 1.24 1.54 27.8* 6.65
Dum. 00 4.21 5.56 5.67 6.39 6.36 5.78 7.86 8.85 116* 13.3*
Constant 4 8 . 71 1 . 49 . 4 81 . 9 15 . 1 30 . 8 21 9 . 33 . 9 2130* 57.9*
Loglikeli. -34104.7
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 5% level for Wald test.2.5 Results 33
gains scenarios or the two loss scenarios. However, this pattern is not found
for all variables.
Households that can manage ﬁnancially are more patient than households
that cannot, keeping total household income (and other variables) constant.
This eﬀect is not diﬀerent across the four scenarios. Households that spend
less than their income tend to have higher discount rates for the speedup
scenarios and lower rates for the delay scenarios, although the latter is not
signiﬁcant.
Price expectation has quite a strong positive eﬀect on all four discount
rates. It is easy to understand that people with higher inﬂation expectations
also will have higher nominal discount rates. As the eﬀect of inﬂation is the
same for all scenarios, we expect the eﬀe c to ft h i sv a r i a b l et ob et h es a m e
across all scenarios. This hypothesis is not rejected.
For three of the four scenarios, we ﬁnd that higher levels of education
imply higher discount rates. This eﬀect is particularly strong for the speedup
scenarios, where the highest education level corresponds to an increase in
the discount rates with 3.7 to 6% points. As there are two variables related
to education level, we also tested the joint signiﬁcance and equality of all
eight parameters of school2 and school3. The Wald test statistics for these
hypotheses are 38.2 and 27.4, respectively, implying that both hypotheses
are rejected. Note that this result is not in accordance with the theoretical
predictions in the literature that higher educated people are more patient.
Although a large number of theoretical and empirical papers suggest a
positive relationship between addiction and discount rates (impatience), we
do not ﬁnd such a relationship for smoking and drinking. Obviously, these
might not be very severe addictions, which might explain this result.
Two of the three health related variables are signiﬁcant: the Quetelet
index and the measure of general health. More obese people have higher
discount rates of δDG, while better general health positively aﬀects δSL.T h i s
last ﬁnding is surprising, as good health makes people live longer and, there-
fore, they might be expected to be more patient.
The estimates of the cutoﬀ levels and the covariance structure of the error
terms and the random eﬀects are similar to the simple model. In general, the
variances of the error terms and the random eﬀects are a bit smaller than
for the simple model. This is expected as some of the variances are now
explained by the additional variables into the model. Given the similarity of
the results we do not present the details.
The diﬀerences in estimation between the four discount rates should be
very useful for policy making. For example, the discount rates of delay of
gains and speedup of gains are quite often used. When policy makers want
to take into account these two discount rates, they can understand from our34 T h eT i m eP r e f e r e n c eo fG a i n sa n dL o s s e s
model not only that the intercepts are diﬀerent, but also that a number of
variables, like age pattern, gender, education level, and the Quetelet index
all have diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent discount rates.
2.6 Conclusions
Time preference has a substantial impact on households’ responses to all
kinds of policy measures. Information on individual rates of time preference
will, therefore, help in predicting the eﬀectiveness of such policy measures.
As individuals tend to have diﬀerent discount rates for diﬀerent types of
intertemporal tradeoﬀs, one needs to investigate the diﬀerent discount rates
simultaneously. For example, a typical ﬁnding in the existing literature is the
sign eﬀect, meaning that gains are discounted at higher rates than losses; not
only do we ﬁnd the sign eﬀect for the delaying, like mostly mentioned in the
literature, but we also get a sign eﬀect for the two discount rates of speeding
up, but in the opposite direction: the mean of δSG is 2.8%, much lower than
δSL (11%). In addition, discount rates for speeding up and delaying gains or
losses behave diﬀerently, the delay-speedup asymmetry: the mean of δSG is
2.8%, which is much lower than δDG (21%). A similar ﬁnding applies to the
two discount rates of losses, δSL and δDL, which are also quite diﬀerent, and
again the eﬀect is in the opposite direction, δSL is much higher than δDL.
To predict discount rates for each scenario, we estimated a multivariate
ordered probit model. Our estimation results indicate that females have lower
rates of time preference than males, especially for delay of losses and speedup
of gains. For females, δDL and δSG are, on average, more than 4% points
lower than for males; for δDG and δSL this diﬀerence is less than 1% points.
Income has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on time preference in all four situations, while
education increases discount rates for three of the four scenarios. We ﬁnd a
U-shaped age structure for all four scenarios, in line with the predictions of
Becker and Mulligan (1997). For delay of losses δDL and speedup of gains
δSG, the lowest discount rates are at age 73 and 48, respectively. For these
scenarios, we observe that people are really discounting heavier both at young
and old ages. However, the lowest points of δDG and δSL are found above the
age of 80 years. This implies that, in general, discount rates are decreasing
with age.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant (all at the 1%) correlations between the random eﬀects
and error terms of the four scenarios. An unexpected ﬁnding is that the
correlation coeﬃcients of the random eﬀects and the error terms are highest
between δDL and δSG. This suggests that time preference of speedup of gains
(δSG) has a closer relationship with δDL than δDG;i nt h i ss e n s eδSG behaves2.6 Conclusions 35
more like delayed losses (δDL)t h a nd e l a y e dg a i n s( δDG). Similarly, speedup
of losses is more like a delayed gain, as δSL has a higher correlation coeﬃcient
with δDG than with δDL.
Further research can focus on ﬁnding a model to explain why people have
asymmetries between time preference of gains and losses, delay and speedup.
Models with interaction between members of a household, and causality of
time preference and many socioeconomic variables will also be interesting
topics for further study. Future research can also focus on the role of time
preference in particular policy applications, for example, over-education and
the dropout from high school; decisions that are likely to be related to an
individuals degree of impatience.36 T h eT i m eP r e f e r e n c eo fG a i n sa n dL o s s e s
2.7 Appendix to Chapter 2
Explanatory variables
Table 2.8: Variable deﬁnitions
Variable Deﬁnition
Age Age of the individual / 10
Age-sq. Age-squared of the individual / 1000
Female Dummy variable for female, 0 no, 1 yes.
Child Dummy for the presence of children in the house-
hold, 1 present, 0 not
School2 Dummy variable for education level 2 (middle), 1
yes, 0 no.
School3 Dummy variable for education level 3 (high), 1 yes,
0n o .
Owner Dummy variable for homeowner, 1 yes, 0 no.
Urban. Degree of urbanization of the residence place, 5
levels, 1 very high, 5 very low.
Job Dummy variable for having a paid job, 1 yes, 0 no.
Income Total net income of household, 6 levels, 1 is lowest.
Manage Can you manage the total income of your house-
hold? 5 levels, 1 is very hard and 5 is very easy.
Fin. sit. Dummy variable for ﬁnancial situation, 1 for those
“expenditure were lower than the income”.
Pri. exp. Dummy variable for price expectation, 1 is for
prices increasing.
Time-h. When deciding about what part of the income to
spend, and what part to save. Which time-horizon
is in your household MOST important with regard
to planning expenditures and savings?
1: the next couple of months, 2: the next year,
3: the next couple of years, 4: the next 5 to 10
years,
5: more than 10 years from now2.7 Appendix to Chapter 2 37
Smoke Dummy variable for smoking, 1 yes, 0 no.
Drink Dummy variable for dinking, 1 yes, 0 no.
Que. ind. Quetelet index; a measure for fatness.
Health Self-measured general health, 5 levels, 1 poor and
5 excellent.
Illness Suﬀer from a long illness, disorder, or handicap, or
the consequences of an accident, 1 yes, 0 no.
Dum. 98 Dummy variable for observations in year 1998.
Dum. 99 Dummy variable for observations in year 1999.
Dum. 00 Dummy variable for observations in year 2000.
Table 2.9: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Age 4.77 1.54 1.6 8.7
Age-sq. 2.52 1.50 0.26 7.57
Female 0.433 0.495 0 1
Child 0.437 0.496 0 1
School2 0.307 0.461 0 1
School3 0.315 0.464 0 1
Owner 0.697 0.430 0 1
Urban. 3.02 1.33 1 5
Job 0.592 0.488 0 1
Income 3.74 1.03 1 6
Manag. 3.51 0.799 1 5
Fin. sit. 0.376 0.460 0 1
Pri. exp. 0.888 0.299 0 1
Time-h. 2.20 1.15 1 5
Smoke 0.246 0.419 0 1
Drink 0.078 0.261 0 1
Que. ind. 24.9 3.92 15.6 63.2
Health 3.93 0.715 1 5
Illness 0.260 0.426 0 1
Dum. 98 0.196 0.397 0 1
Dum. 99 0.196 0.397 0 1
Dum. 00 0.226 0.418 0 138 T h eT i m eP r e f e r e n c eo fG a i n sa n dL o s s e sChapter 3
Reference Points and Loss
Aversion in Intertemporal
Choice
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3.1 Introduction
Reference points and loss aversion are two essential concepts in behavioral
economics1. After the seminal paper of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) about
the reference dependent model for decision-making under uncertainty, prospect
theory, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) also proposed a reference-dependent
model in riskless choice. The most important idea of reference-dependent the-
ory is a value function with three basic features: (1) reference dependence,
gains and losses are deﬁned on deviations from a reference point, rather than
on the ﬁnal level of wealth, (2) loss aversion, the value function is steeper
for losses than for gains, losses loom larger than corresponding gains, (3)
diminishing sensitivity, the decreasing marginal value for both domains of
gains and losses. This kind of value function is quite diﬀerent from the util-
ity function in traditional expected utility theory. The concepts of reference
points and loss aversion came from psychology. As Kahneman and Tversky
mentioned in their paper, the reference point is fragile, might depend on ex-
pectations, consumption level in previous periods, comparison with others,
status quo, etc.; and with the changing of the reference point, a gain could
be reframed as a loss, and vice versa (see also Rabin (1998)). The complexity
of the reference point makes it quite diﬃcult to use in empirical studies.
As far as we know, no paper estimated the reference point of individu-
als before, although it is prevalent in economic theories nowadays. In this
paper, we propose a structural reference-dependent model for intertempo-
ral choice based on the insight of Loewenstein’s (1988) paper. We estimate
the reference points of individuals and other important parameters for indi-
vidual decision-making, in our case the coeﬃcient of loss aversion and the
discount rate. Using a Dutch representative household survey, we investigate
the distributions of the reference point, loss aversion and discount rate in a
population.
Reference points and loss aversion are widely used in models of decision-
making under uncertainty since a long time ago (Fishburn 1977, Kahneman
and Tversky 1979, Bell 1982, Loomes and Sugden 1982), and are becom-
ing dominant in behavioral economics. For example, a reference-dependent
model would give a diﬀerent prediction of the consumption growth pattern
when future income changes, than the traditional Permanent Income Hy-
pothesis (Shea 1995a, 1995b, Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin 1999). A re-
cent paper of Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2003) examined the eﬀects of reference
income on the behavior of young male physicians. Their result shows that
1See for a comprehensive overview of behavioral economics, Camerer and Loewenstein
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the reference point and loss aversion can explain the data well, but other tra-
ditional theories without a reference point and loss aversion have diﬃculty
in doing so. An extensive literature illustrates that there is a big divergence
between valuations of willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept
(WTA). The analysis of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) illustrated
that reference points and loss aversion might be a possible explanation of
this divergency. Bateman et al. (1997) attempted to test a set of predictions
derived from the loss aversion hypothesis of reference-dependent theory, by
using the data of WTP and WTA from experiments. They showed that diver-
gences between WTP and WTA could be predicted by reference-dependent
theory.
Loewenstein introduced the reference point and loss aversion to the analy-
sis of intertemporal choice in 1988. He found that the delay premium is larger
than the speed-up cost, and the speed-up cost is larger than the diﬀerence
between the immediate and delayed consumption prices from several exper-
iments. For example, in one experiment, he found that respondents who
expected to receive a video cassette recorder (VCR) one year later would
be willing to pay on average $54 to receive it immediately, but those who
expected to receive it immediately demanded on average $126 to delay its
receipt by one year. As explained in his paper, the traditional discounted
utility (DU) model could not explain this phenomenon, but a descriptive
model with the reference point and loss aversion can solve the problem eas-
ily. Furthermore, with the help of a reference point model, Loewenstein and
Prelec (1992) could explain two often observed anomalies of time preference:
the gain-loss asymmetry and the delay-speedup asymmetry. The gain-loss
asymmetry is also called the “sign eﬀect”, gains are discounted more than
losses. The delay-speedup asymmetry is an asymmetric preference between
speeding up and delaying gains or losses. For gains, the amount required to
compensate for delaying is much bigger than the amount willing to sacriﬁce
to speed them up. Shelley (1993) employed an experiment to test the ref-
erence point model of Loewenstein (1988), and the result is quite consistent
with the model.
The main problem to make full use of the reference dependent model is
that it is very diﬃcult to observe and estimate the reference point of individ-
ual. The reference point might change with expectations, consumption level
in previous periods, and comparison with others. From previous studies,
we still have no idea about how big the reference point is. Donkers (2000)
estimated an intertemporal choice model based on the model proposed by
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). To ﬁx the reference point, he assumed peo-
ple totally adjusted their reference points to the hypothesized situation, e.g.
winning a lottery prize. Four scenarios, delay of gains, delay of losses, speed-42 R e f e r e n c eP o i n t sa n dL o s sA v e r s i o ni nI n t e r t e m p o r a lC h o i c e
up of gains, and speed-up of losses, were considered in his paper, but with
setting the reference point to one, Donkers (2000) got a negative average dis-
c o u n tr a t ea n dr e l a t i v e l ys m a l lc o e ﬃcient of loss aversion between 1.01 and
1.05. If we employ the ratio of the amount of money people used as the ref-
erence divided by the total amount of money involved as the reference point,
then generally, it should be a number between zero and one. The result is
hard to understand and inconsistent with the literature. The assumption that
the reference point equals one might be too strong, as Loewenstein (1988)
proposed, the reference point probably could be some number between zero
and one.
There are also some papers that estimated the coeﬃcient of loss aversion,
but all cases were based on experiments with selective samples. With the
shortage of the data used in these studies, we still have no idea about the dis-
tribution of loss aversion in the total population or how loss aversion might
change with demographics, like age, gender and education. After Kahneman
and Tversky’s (1979) seminal paper about loss aversion, several papers es-
timated the coeﬃcient of loss aversion, measured by the ratio of the slope
of the utility function in the loss domain and the slope in the gain domain.
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991)
employed an experiment to estimate the coeﬃcient of loss aversion. The sub-
jects were randomly divided into two groups: sellers who were given a mug
and had the option to sell it, and choosers who were given the option of re-
ceiving the mug or a sum of money. According to their analysis, the diﬀerent
evaluations of the mug were because of loss aversion, the sellers considered
it as a loss, while the choosers considered it as a gain. The coeﬃcient of
loss aversion they found was slightly greater than two. Pennings and Smidts
(2003) based on an investigation of the global shape of the utility function
among 332 owner-managers, with 46% of them having an S-shaped utility
function, found that the average loss aversion coeﬃcient of those with an
S-shaped utility function was 1.8. Schmidt and Traub (2002) used an exper-
iment to test loss aversion in the framework of cumulative prospect theory.
They found mixed evidence for loss aversion, with women exhibiting both a
more frequent occurrence and a higher extent of loss aversion. Actually loss
aversion and reference point should be consider together, it is diﬃcult to get
an accurate estimation of the coeﬃcient of loss aversion without consider the
reference point carefully. We propose a new method, intertemporal choice, to
estimate the coeﬃcient of loss aversion and the reference point at the same
time.
In this paper, we consider four often used scenarios in intertemporal choice
for eliciting the rates of time preference: delay of gains, delay of losses, speed-
up of gains, and speed-up of losses; and we extend Loewenstein’s (1988) idea,3.1 Introduction 43
by reframing the questions in intertemporal choice, we develop a structural
model with the reference point and loss aversion for intertemporal choice. We
will discuss it in detail in Section 2. With four equations in four scenarios,
we can estimate the reference points of delay and speedup, the coeﬃcient of
loss aversion, and the discount rate at the same time. The main contribution
of our paper is that we propose a new method to estimate the coeﬃcient
of loss aversion in intertemporal choice without risk2, and our paper might
be the ﬁrst time in literature attempting to estimate the reference points of
individuals.
After constructing a structural model with reference points and loss aver-
sion in an intertemporal choice setting, we employ a rich panel dataset from a
Dutch representative household survey over the years 1997-2002, to estimate
the coeﬃcients involved in decision making in intertemporal choices simul-
taneously, namely, the reference points of delay and speedup, the coeﬃcient
of loss aversion and the discount rate at the same time, and we can also in-
vestigate their relationships with some demographic variables. Our ﬁndings
show that the average coeﬃc i e n to fl o s sa v e r s i o ni sa r o u n dt w o ,i nl i n ew i t h
other experimental ﬁndings. We also ﬁnd that the reference point of delay is
larger than that of speedup, and reference points are between zero and one,
all consistent with Loewenstein’s (1988) hypothesis. We ﬁnd that females
are more loss averse than males, and high-education and aging make people
less loss-averse. For the discount rate, we ﬁnd that high-educated and older
people are more patient. The observed relationships of these parameters
could be used to better understand and predict the behavior of households
for policy purposes, such as households’ decisions of investment, saving and
pension. Loss aversion, reference points, and the discount rate are all main
factors that aﬀect these decisions of households.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce a structural model of time preference with the reference points
and loss aversion. Then in Section 3 we use the model to explain some
anomalies of time preference prominent in the literature. We describe the
data in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss the econometric model and the
estimation procedure. In Section 6, the results of the models are presented.
Section 7 concludes.
2With risk situation, loss aversion may be diﬀerent. This paper only discusses the
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3.2 Economic Model
In this paper, we consider the four diﬀerent scenarios of time preference:
delay of gains, speedup of gains, delay of losses, and speedup of losses, which
are commonly used in the literature. According to the traditional DU model,
individuals should have discount rates that are the same in all four scenarios.
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the four questions for the four scenarios,
which we use to elicit four discount rates. Then we discuss the reference
point model for intertemporal choice as proposed by Loewenstein (1988),
a n dp r e s e n tas t r u c t u r a lm o d e lw i t hr e f e r e n c ep o i n t sa n dl o s sa v e r s i o nt o
explain the discount rates in these four scenarios.
We consider “win a prize in the National Lottery” as a gain, and “pay a
tax” as a loss. We select four questions with the amount of money equal to
Dﬂ.1 0 0 0 3 and a time horizon of one year4. Therefore, the questions about
the four diﬀerent scenarios we consider are the following:
Delay of gains
Imagine you win a prize of Dﬂ. 1000 in the National Lot-
tery. The prize is to paid out today. Imagine, however, that
the National Lottery asks if you are prepared to wait A YEAR
before you get the prize of Dﬂ. 1000. There is no risk involved
in this wait. How much extra money would you ask to receive
AT LEAST to compensate for the waiting term of a year? If
you agree on the waiting term without the need to receive extra
money for that, please type 0 (zero).
Speedup of gains
Imagine again that you receive a notice from the National
Lottery that you have won a prize worth Dﬂ. 1000. The money
will be paid out after A YEAR. The money can be paid out at
once, but in that case you receive less than Dﬂ. 1000. How much
LESS money would you be prepared to receive AT MOST if you
would get the money at once instead of after a year? If you are
not interested in receiving the money earlier or if you are not
prepared to receive less for getting the money earlier, please type
0( z e r o ) .
Delay of losses
31D ﬂ. ≈ 0.45 Euro.
4We will discuss the data in detail in the next section.3.2 Economic Model 45
Imagine again that you have to pay a tax assessment of Dﬂ.
1000 today. Suppose that you could wait A YEAR with settling
the tax assessment. How much extra money would you be pre-
pared to pay AT MOST to get the extension of payment of A
YEAR? If you are not interested in getting an extension of pay-
ment or if you are not prepared to pay more for the extension of
payment, please type 0 (zero).
Speedup of losses
Imagine again that you receive a tax assessment of Dﬂ. 1000.
The assessment has to be settled within A YEAR. It is, however,
possible to settle the assessment now, and in that case you will
get a REDUCTION. How much REDUCTION would you like to
get AT LEAST for settling the assessment now instead of after a
year? If you are not interested in getting a reduction for paying
e a r l yo ri fy o ut h i n kt h e r ei sn on eed to get a reduction for paying
early, please type 0 (zero).
Each of these four questions leads to a diﬀerent discount rate, providing
discount rates for the delay of gains (δDG), speedup of gains (δSG), delay of
losses (δDL), and speedup of losses (δSL) respectively. We use xDG, xSG, xDL,
xSL to represent the answer of each question above, and compute these four













With its simple and elegant structure, the traditional DU model is the
basic way to analyze intertemporal choice. If the individual’s utility function
is v(·),a n dδ(t) is her discount factor, then the present value of utility at
time t of two-period consumption is V = v(ct)+δ(1)v(ct+1),w h e r ect and
ct+1 are consumption levels in periods t and t +1respectively. Normally we
assume that people have positive time preference that is δ(t) < 1,a n dp e o p l e
will discount more for a longer period, that is δ(t) <δ (t0) if t>t 0.
By introducing the reference point, Loewenstein (1988) wrote the present
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v(ct − Rt)+δ(1)v(ct+1 − Rt+1),w h e r ev(0) = 0 and Rt and Rt+1 are the
reference points of the individual in period t and t+1respectively. The DU
model becomes a special case when the reference points are equal to zero,
Rt = Rt+1 =0 .
In this paper, we follow the insight of Loewenstein’s (1988) reference
point model, utility of outcome C depends on the reference point R, V (C)=
v(C − R), v(·) is the value function. We also normalize the utility of the
reference points to zero, that is v(0) = 0. In order to make the model
analytically tractable, we use a piecewise linear value function like many
other studies: for gains (x ≥ 0), the utility of x+R is V (x+R)=v(x)=x.
We also use a simple structure the utility of a negative outcome −x + R,
(compared to the reference point R), V (−x+R)=v(−x)=−λv(x)=−λx,
with −x<0.N o t et h a tt h eo u t c o m e−x + R we assume is considered as a
loss compared to the reference point R,e v e ni f−x+R is a positive outcome.
Here, λ is the coeﬃcient of loss aversion, and we have λ>0.L o s sa v e r s i o n
means λ>1, that is the disutilities of losses are larger than utilities of
corresponding gains, −v(−x) >v (x) .W e d e n o t e w i t h d the discount rate
for utility in the next period, so the present value of x in the next period
becomes v1(x)= 1
1+dv(x)= 1
1+dx,w h e nx > 0. For a loss, similarly, we have
v1(−x)= 1
1+dv(−x)=− λ
1+dx,w h e r e−x<0 is a loss.
We can retrieve the traditional DU model as a special case of our model
when λ =1and R =0 ; this means that without loss aversion (λ =1 )o r
with reference point equal to zero (R =0 , like the model without considering
the reference point), our model is the same as the traditional DU model,
predicting that people should have the same discount rates d for all four
scenarios. We now consider the predictions of this model for the four scenarios
separately.
3.2.1 Delay of Gains
For the question of “delay of gains”, the hypothesized situation is winning
ap r i z eo fD ﬂ. 1000 today. It seems reasonable to assume that the prize
today might aﬀect the reference point today but not for next year. Then
the reference points of today and next year could be set as “to get Dﬂ.
RD today and zero next year”. In previous studies like Loewenstein (1988),
Shelly (1992) and Donkers (2000), the reference points were always equal to
the amount of money involved, that is RD = 1000 for our situation. The
answer of the question should be interpreted as that people make a choice
between the following two: original choice a) is “to receive Dﬂ. 1000 today”;
a l t e r n a t i v ec h o i c eb )i st op o s t p o n et h eg a i n ,w a i ta n dr e c e i v em o r el a t e r ,
Dﬂ. 1000+xDG, in next year. We introduce a notation (x1,x 2) to present it,3.2 Economic Model 47
where x1 is the outcome today and x2 is the outcome next year. A positive
number is a gain, and a negative number is a loss; x1 and x2 can both be
either gains or losses.
Taking “to get Dﬂ. RD today and zero next year” as the reference point,
it should be (RD,0) with the new notation, the choice a) becomes to “gain
Dﬂ. 1000 − RD today and zero next year”, (1000 − RD,0),c o m p a r e dt ot h e
r e f e r e n c ep o i n t ;a n dt h ec h o i c eb )b e c o m e st o“ l o s eD ﬂ. RD today and gain
Dﬂ. 1000 + xDG next year”, (−RD,1000 + xDG), compared to the reference
point. Generally, we can expect that RD i san u m b e rb e t w e e n0a n d1 0 0 0 5.
From now on, we use the ratio rD = RD/1000, which should be a number
between 0 and 1, as the reference point. Reframing of the outcome for the
questions in other three scenarios is done similarly.
Choosing of xDG means that these two alternatives have the same utility
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=( 1+( λ − 1)rD)(1 + d)
where δDG is the discount rate of delay of gains, λ is the coeﬃcient of
loss aversion, rD is the reference point (the ratio RD/1000)o fd e l a y ,d is the
discount rate for future utility.
Here, rD =1and rD =0are two special cases which are often used in the
literature. For rD =1 ,w eh a v eδDG = λ(1+d)−1.W i t hl o s sa v e r s i o n ,λ>1
and non-zero reference point, we have δDG >dfor all rD > 0, an individual
will discount delay of gains quite heavily, with δDG increasing in rD and λ.
When rD =0or λ =1 ,w eh a v eδDG = d, as in the DU model.
3.2.2 Speed-up of Gains
For the question of “speed-up of gains”, the hypothesized situation is winning
ap r i z eo fD ﬂ. 1000 next year. We assume that the reference point is “to
5If RD is equal to zero, receiving nothing, it means that the respondant has not adjusted
to the new situation at all; and equal to 1000, it means that the respondant has fully
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get zero today and Dﬂ. RS next year”, (0,R S).P e o p l ec h o o s exSG such that
utilities of the following two choices are equal: a) wait for payment Dﬂ.1 0 0 0
next year, (0,1000); b) now receive less: Dﬂ. 1000 − xSG, (1000 − xSG,0).
Taking (0,R S) as the reference point, the choice a) becomes to “gain 0 today
and Dﬂ. 1000 − RS next year”, (0,1000 − RS), compared to the reference
point; and the choice b) becomes to “gain Dﬂ. 1000 − xSG today, and lose
Dﬂ. RS next year”, (1000−xSG,−RS), compared to the reference point. We














1+( λ − 1)rS
(1 + d)
where δSG is the discount rate of speed-up of gains, rS is the reference
point (the ratio RS/1000)o fs p e e d u p .
For the special case rS =1 ,w eh a v eδSG = 1
λ(1 + d) − 1.I t i s q u i t e
p o s s i b l et h a tw eh a v eλ>1+d,t h e n δSG could be a negative number. With
loss aversion, λ>1, an individual will discount speedup of gains slightly, we
have δSG <dfor all rS > 0,a n dδSG is decreasing in rS if rS > 0.F o rt h e
case of rS =0or λ =1 ,w eh a v eδSG = d,a si nt h eD Um o d e l .
3.2.3 Delay of Losses
For the question of “delay of losses”, the hypothesized situation is a require-
ment to pay for taxes Dﬂ.1 0 0 0t o d a y .W ea s s u m ep a y i n gat a x e si sal o s s
for individuals, and the reference point is “to lose Dﬂ. RD today and zero
next year”, (−RD,0). People choose xDL such that utilities of the follow-
ing two choices are equal: a) to lose Dﬂ.1 0 0 0t o d a y ,(−1000,0);b )t ol o s e
money next year: Dﬂ. 1000 + xDL, (0,−1000 − xDL).T a k i n g (−RD,0) as
the reference point, the choice a) becomes to “loss Dﬂ. 1000 − RD today
and zero next year”, (−1000 + RD,0), compared to the reference point; and
b) becomes to “gain Dﬂ. RD today, and lose Dﬂ. 1000 + xDL next year”,
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where δDL is the discount rate of delay of losses.
For the special case rD =1 ,w eh a v eδDL = 1
λ(1 + d) − 1, and it is quite
possible that λ>1+d, then people even have a negative discount rate of
δDL.W i t hl o s sa v e r s i o n ,λ>1, an individual will discount for delay of losses
slightly, we have δDL <dfor all rD > 0,a n dδDL is decreasing in rD if rD > 0.
When rD =0or λ =1 ,w eh a v eδDL = d, as in the DU model.
3.2.4 Speed-up of Losses
For the question of “speed-up of losses”, the hypothesized situation is a
requirement to pay for taxes Dﬂ. 1000 next year. We assume that the
reference point is “to lose zero today and Dﬂ. RS next year”, (0,−RS).
People choose xSL such that utilities of the following two choices are equal:
a) lose Dﬂ. 1000 next year, (0,−1000);b )l o s el e s st o d a y :D ﬂ. 1000 − xSL,
(−1000 + xSL,0).T a k i n g (0,−RS) as the reference point, the choice a)
becomes to “loss zero today and Dﬂ. 1000−RS next year”, (0,−1000+RS),
compared to the reference point; and b) becomes to “lose Dﬂ. 1000 − xSL
today and gain Dﬂ. RS next year”, (−1000 + xSL,R S), compared to the

















where δSL is the discount rate of speed-up of losses.
For the special case rS =1 , δSL = λ(1+d)−1. With loss aversion, λ>1,
an individual will discount delay of losses heavily, we have δSL >dfor all
0 <r S < 1,a n dδSL is increasing in rS.W h e n rS =0or λ =1 ,w eh a v e
δSL = d, as in the DU model.
3.2.5 Summary of the Model
We now summarize the way the outcomes of delay of gains, speedup of gains,
delay of losses, and speedup of losses are framed in Table3.1.50 R e f e r e n c eP o i n t sa n dL o s sA v e r s i o ni nI n t e r t e m p o r a lC h o i c e
Table 3.1: Summary of outcomes with and without considering the reference
point
Discount rate Delay of gains Speed-up of gains
Reference point (RD, 0) (0,R S)
Without considering the reference point
Choice a (1000, 0) (0, 1000)
Choice b (0, 1000 + xDG) (1000 − xSG, 0)
With considering the reference point
Choice a (1000 − RD, 0) (0, 1000 − RS)
Choice b (−RD, 1000 + xDG) (1000 − xSG, −RS)
Discount rate Delay of losses Speed-up of losses
Reference point (−RD, 0) (0, −RS)
Without considering the reference point
Choice a (−1000, 0) (0, −1000)
Choice b (0, −1000 − xDL)( −1000 + xSL, 0)
With considering the reference point
Choice a (−1000 + RD, 0) (0, −1000 + RS)
Choice b (RD, −1000 − xDL)( −1000 + xSL,R S)
Note: Choice a) is the hypothesized situation, choice b) is the alternative.
Positive number is a gain, and negative one is a loss.3.2 Economic Model 51
For this structural model, we have four equations for four scenarios. From
our data, we can compute the four discount rates for each person from the
reported values xDG, xSG, xDL and xSL, so we can solve and identify the
model with four unknown coeﬃcients. Considering the equations with four
unknowns, actually we have two choices: one is with the same discount rate
d for gains and losses, but with diﬀerent reference points rD for delay and
rS for speed-up, that is the model we just presented. The second one is
with diﬀerent discount rates for gains dG and losses dL, but with the same
reference point r for all four scenarios6. We want to test the hypothesis
of Loewenstein (1988): whether the reference point of delay is larger than
that of speedup, we will only discuss and estimate the ﬁrst model, which has
diﬀerent reference points for delay and speedup but same discount rate for
gains and losses, hereafter.
Loewenstein (1988) proposed that the reference points might be smaller
than one and larger in the delay conditions than in the speedup conditions,
that is, 1 >r D >r S > 0. T h i sm i g h tb et h er e a s o nt h a tp e o p l ea r em o r e
familiar with the delay than with the speedup situation, and in the speedup
scenario rS is more distant in the future (next year) and less vivid than the
delay scenario rD (today). We can test this hypothesis in our model with
four coeﬃcients, which has diﬀerent reference points rD for delay and rS for
speedup. This model can be written as follows:
1+δDG =( 1 + ( λ − 1)rD)(1 + d)
1+δSG =
1
1+( λ − 1)rS
(1 + d)









As a starting point, we will estimate a model with only three coeﬃcients:
loss aversion λ, the same discount rate d for gains and losses, and the same
reference point r for all these four scenarios. This model with three coeﬃ-
cients is a special case when rD = rS.
6Actually, we could solve these two models analytically, four equations with four un-
known parameters, and calculate the four parameters for each individual directly. But the
problem is that for about 40% of the observations we get a negative value of loss aversion,
and reference points less than zero or larger than one. That is diﬃcult to understand.
W i t ht h eh e l po fp a n e ld a t a ,w ec a nu s eas t a t i s t i cm o d e lw i t hr a n d o me ﬀects instead of
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3.3 Explanation of Some Anomalies with the
Model
In this section, ﬁrst we will show some results of our model, and then use these
results to explain some of the anomalies prevalent in the literature. In the
literature on time preference, most of the studies employed experiments to
collect data on discount rates, mainly focusing on diﬀerences of some factors,
w h i c hs h o u l db ee x p e c t e dt oh a v en oe ﬀect on the discount rates according
to the traditional economic theories. For example, many empirical studies
of time preference ﬁnd anomalies that contradict the assumption underlying
t h eD Um o d e l ,w h i c ht h ed i s c o u n tr a t es h o u l db ec o n s t a n tf o ra l lg o o d sa n d
all time periods. It is obvious that our model can explain some anomalies
of time preference prominent in the literature, see Loewenstein and Prelec
(1991, 1992), Shelley (1993), and Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue
(2002) for more detailed discussion.
With the reference points equal to zero, rD = rS =0 , or without loss
aversion, that is with λ =1 ,w eh a v eδDG = δSG = δDL = δSL = d,a si n
the DU model. Thus, it is clear that the DU model is a special case of our
model.
Figure 3.1 shows how δDG and δDL change with rD,a n dh o wδSG and
δSL change with rS. Here, we assume λ =2and d =1 0 % ,w h i c ha r eq u i t e
reasonable compared to ﬁndings in literature. From the ﬁgure we can see,
that δDG and δSL will increase, and δDL and δSG will decrease with rD or rS
monotonically when rD and rS are numbers between zero and one. We have
δDG >δ SL >d>δ DL >δ SG for any 0 <r D = rS < 1.T h i si si nl i n ew i t h
our data and our estimation result presented in Section 6.
One might expect the two discount rates for gains, δDG and δSG,o rt w o
discount rates for delay, δDG and δDL might be more close linked. However
our model implies that δDG and δSL, δDL and δSG h a v et h es a m et r e n d s
increasing and decreasing with reference points respectively. Thus, we expect
δDG to be more close linked with δSL other than δDL and δSG. Same for δDL,
we expect it is more close linked with δSG other than δDG and δSL.
With the help of this structural model, we can explain some anomalies of
time preference prominent in the literature.
3.3.1 The sign eﬀect
One anomaly of time preference dominant in the literature is the sign eﬀect:
gains are discounted at a higher rate than losses, in studies with the discount






































Figure 3.1: δDG, δSG, δDL, δSL change with r: λ =2and d =0 .154 R e f e r e n c eP o i n t sa n dL o s sA v e r s i o ni nI n t e r t e m p o r a lC h o i c e
economic theory7, one should be willing to pay a similar amount to receive
$100 a month later or to postpone paying $100 for a month. That is, gains
and losses should be discounted equally.
In the literature, the discount rate of gains is the delay of gains δDG;a n d
the discount rate of losses is the delay of losses δDL.T h es i g ne ﬀect means
δDG >δ DL. Using the simple model with loss aversion and reference points
we presented here, we can easily explain the sign eﬀect. From the model
above, we always have 1+δDG =( 1+( λ−1)rD)(1+d) > 1+d>1+δDL =
(1 − λ−1
λ rD)(1 + d),t h a ti m p l i e sδDG >d>δ DL, if we assume that λ>1,
and 0 <r D ≤ 1. For example, if we assume λ =2and d =1 0 % ,t h e n
δDG =0 .1+1 .1rD >d=0 .1 >δ DL =0 .1 − 0.55rD;s oe v e nrD is a small
number like 0.1, then δDG =0 .21 >d=0 .1 >δ DL =0 .045.W et h u sh a v e
the result that δDG is much bigger than δDL:t h es i g ne ﬀect.
3.3.2 The “Delay-Speedup” Asymmetry
In the literature, the “delay-speedup” asymmetry means people demand more
to delay a gain than they would like to pay for speeding it up, that is δDG >
δSG. I ti sa l s oo b v i o u st h a t1+δDG =( 1+( λ − 1)rD)(1 + d) > 1+d>
1+δSG = 1
1+(λ−1)rS(1 + d),i fλ>1, rD and rS are between zero and one.
That indicates δDG >d>δ SG i no u rm o d e lw i t hr e f e r e n c ep o i n t sa n dl o s s
aversion, without special assumption for the relationship of rD and rS.
Consider the situation with λ =2and d =1 0 % ,t h e nw eh a v eδDG =
0.1+1 .1rD >d=0 .1 >δ SG =
0.1−rS
1+rS ,i f0 <r i < 1, i=delay, speedup. Thus,
our model can explain the “delay-speedup” asymmetry well.
3.3.3 Negative Discount Rate
The negative discount rates, which are sometimes observed in literature, are
very diﬃcult to understand in traditional theory, see Loewenstein and Prelec
(1992) for more discussion. In our model, δDG and δSL should always be
positive, but δSG and δDL can be negative, it can be used to explain why the
negative discount rates sometimes can appear.
F r o mt h eF i g u r e,w ec a nﬁnd that δSG and δDL are easily become negative
n u m b e r si ft h er e f e r e n c ep o i n t sa r el a r g et h a n0 . 3 .F o re x a m p l e ,i frD = rS =
1, as many studies in the literature assumed, then δDG =1 2 0 % , δSG = −45%,
δDL = −45%,a n dδSL = 120%. From the model, we can get negative
discount rates of δSG and δDL when reference points are relatively high.
7Without loss aversion.3.4 Data 55
3.3.4 Hyperbolic Discounting
In the literature, the ﬁrst dominant anomaly is the ﬁnding that discount
rate declines with the time horizon, i.e., the discount rate over longer time
horizon is lower than that over a shorter time horizon. This anomaly is called
hyperbolic discounting, which makes a hyperbolic functional form ﬁtd a t a
better, as observed in many studies, Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil (1989),
Chapman (1996), Chapman and Elstein (1995), Pender (1996), Redelmeier
and Heller (1993), Thaler (1981). This might lead to preference reversal, an
example of dynamically inconsistent behavior. A famous example is from
Thaler (1981), who found that a person might prefer one apple today to two
apples tomorrow, but at the same time would prefer two apples in 51 days
t oo n ea p p l ei n5 0d a y s .
Our model with reference points and loss aversion might be an alternative
explanation for this ﬁnding, not requiring hyperbolic discounting. When a
gain is very close, for example one apple today, a person can image it easily; if
she wants it eagerly, she will feel a real loss if she can not get it today. So the
reference point when she makes decision for one apple today or two apples
tomorrow could be quite high, close to one. For example, we can assume that
λ =2and d =1 % ,i frD > 0.98,t h e nδDG > 100%, she will choose one apple
today. But for choices of 51 days and 50 days, the time is quite far away,
it is reasonable to assume that she has a smaller reference point compared
to choose between today and tomorrow, and if rD < 0.98,s h ew i l lc h o o s e
t w oa p p l e si n5 1d a y s .I ft h ec o e ﬃc i e n to fl o s sa v e r s i o ni sal i t t l eb i tl a r g e ,
δDG can be larger than 100% with small rD even with d =0 . For a person
with λ =3and d =0 ,i frD > 0.5,t h e nδDG > 100%,s h em i g h tp r e f e ro n e
apple today over than two apples tomorrow; and if she uses rD < 0.5 when
she makes the second decision, she will prefer two apples in 51 days than
one apple in 50 days. We can see it clear, not because of the changing of
discount rate makes people have a dynamically inconsistent behavior, but the
changing of feeling of loss and loss aversion make her reverse her preference.
3.4 Data
The data we use is a panel data set with six waves (1997-2002) taken from
the CentER Savings Survey (CSS). The CSS is a large Dutch household
survey starting from 1993, collected every year of more than 1500 house-
holds. The CSS is a rich data set containing information on employment
status, pensions, accommodation, mortgages, income, assets, debts, health,
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constitute an unbalanced panel, with a total of 5,480 individuals and 11,847
observations. Table4.1 shows the structure of this unbalanced panel. The
average time an individual stayed in the panel is 2.2 years.
Table 3.2: Structure of the panel
By wave By number of waves
Year Observations Number of waves Observations Number of individuals
1997 2,659 1 2,498 2,498
1998 1,365 2 2,716 1,358
1999 1,368 3 2,247 749
2000 1,783 4 1,160 290
2001 2,467 5 1,420 284
2002 2,205 6 1,806 301
Total 11,847 Total 11,847 5,480
Left panel: Year is the survey year, in total we have four waves of the
survey, 1997-2002.
Right Panel: Number of waves the households stay in the panel.
Starting from the year 1997, a detailed set of questions about time pref-
erence is included in the CSS.8 In total, there are sixteen questions about
the way people value opportunities in the future compared to the present.
These questions diﬀer in four aspects with each aspect having two levels,
resulting in a total of sixteen questions. The ﬁrst aspect is the amount of
money concerned, either Dﬂ.1 0 0 0o rD ﬂ.1 0 0 , 0 0 0 9. The second is the time
horizon, either three months or one year. The third is whether the amount
of money is to be received or to be paid10. The last one is speedup or delay
of the receipt or payment of the money.
Some descriptive statistics on these discount rates and demographic vari-
ables are provided in Table 4.2. We only use observations with a discount
rate of at most 100% to compute the descriptive statistics of discount rates.
W eu s eaT o b i tm o d e lw i t hr i g h tc e n s o r i n ga tδ ≤ 1.0 for each equation to
estimate our model.
According to the traditional DU model, in case of perfect ﬁnancial mar-
kets without constraints11, a “rational” individual should have the same dis-
8In earlier waves time preference was elicited with questions that diﬀer in the answering
format. We therefore do not use these data. In the wave of 2003, these questions were
deleted from the survey.
91D ﬂ. ≈ 0.45 Euro.
10We consider “a tax assessment need to pay” as a loss and “win a prize of the National
Lottery” as a gain.
11Our data includes information on savings accounts. More than 96% of the individuals3.4 Data 57
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for the discount rates and demographic vari-
ables.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median Number of obs.
with δ>1
δDG 0.212 0.246 0 1 0.100 138
δSG 0.030 0.080 0 1 0.0 5
δDL 0.036 0.085 0 1 0.0 5
δSL 0.121 0.176 0 1 0.081 11
Age/10 4.67 1.53 1.6 9.5 4.6
Age-squared/1000 2.42 1.49 0.26 9.03 2.12
Female 0.445 0.497 0 1
School2 0.329 0.461 0 1
School3 0.378 0.476 0 1
N o t e :t h em e a na n ds t d .d e v .o fδ are computed with the obs.
which δ is smaller or equal than 1
count rate for all four scenarios, implying that δDG, δSG, δDL and δSL have
similar values on average. As expected from the existing literature, our data
do not support this prediction of traditional DU model. Instead, one can see
from the table 4.2 that our data are in line with the ﬁndings in the litera-
ture. First of all, people discount gains heavier than losses, i.e., the mean of
δDG (the discount rate of delay of gains) is more than ﬁve times larger than
that of δDL (the discount rate of delay of losses); this is what is called the
“sign eﬀect”. The second conﬁrmation of existing ﬁndings is the asymmetry
of delay and speedup, which states that δDG is much bigger than δSG (the
discount rate of speedup of gains). However, we also ﬁnd that δDL is much
smaller than δSL (the discount rate of speedup of losses).
From table 4.2, we ﬁnd for the means of the four discount rates that
δDG >δ SL >δ DL >δ SG. We use t-tests to check the inequality of the
means, the diﬀerences between the four discount rates are all highly signif-
icant. This is exactly the prediction from our economic model. In order to
verify the inequality of the means carefully, we also compute the percentage
of observations which are consistent with δDG ≥ δSL ≥ δDL ≥ δSG by indi-
vidual data. We also compute the correlation coeﬃcients between diﬀerent
discount rates. The results are presented in table 3.4. The upper right part
of the table 3.4 is about the relations, which are percentages of observations
who have δi ≥ δj, i,j = DG,SL,DL,SG. For example, 65% observations
had more than Dﬂ 1,000 in their bank account. This means that these people are not
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have δDG ≥ δSL, and 93% observations have δSL ≥ δSG. All these numbers
are much bigger than 50%, means that this inequality also stands for indi-
vidual data. The lower left part of the table 3.4 are correlation coeﬃcients of
the four discount rates. Our result indicates that the discount rate of delay
of gains δDG is more close linked with the discount rate of δSL rather than
with δDL or δSG, δDL is more close linked with δSG rather than with δDG or
δSL. This result is consistent with our expectation.
Table 3.4: Relations and correlation coeﬃcients of the four discount rates
δi δj
δDG δSL δDL δSG
δDG - 65% 97% 91%
δSL 0.26 - 90% 93%
δDL 0.16 0.13 - 73%
δSG 0.09 0.14 0.29 -
Note: the upper right part is the percentage of obs. who have δi ≥ δj
the lower left part is the correlation coeﬃcients between δi and δj
3.5 Econometric Model
In this section, we present an econometric model, a nonlinear random coef-
ﬁcients model with panel data, to estimate the coeﬃcients in the structural
model. The main advantage of a random coeﬃcients model is that we can
examine the variation of the coeﬃcients we are interested in, like the coef-
ﬁcient of loss aversion λ, the reference points of delay rD and speedup rS,
and the discount rate d across individuals, while still allowing for estimation
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i =1 ,···,N, t=1 ,...,6
We assume that all four coeﬃcients in the structural model are random
and that they are linear functions of other demographic variables, that is3.5 Econometric Model 59
λit = xitβλ+ελ
i , rDit = xitβrD +ε
rD
i , rSit = xitβrS +ε
rS
i ,a n ddit = xitβd+εd
i.
Here xit is the vector of demographic variables of individual i at time t,
and βK, K = λ,rD,r S,d, are vectors of the parameters. We assume that
the random eﬀects εK
i are normally distributed with mean zero and variance
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⎠.H e r eeJ
it, J = DG,SG,DL,SL, is the error term of equa-
tion J of individual i at time t. We assume that they are all independent
a n dn o r m a l l yd i s t r i b u t e dw i t hm e a nz e r oa n dv a r i a n c eσ2
eJ, e
J
it ∼ N(0, σ2
eJ).
We will estimate two versions of this model in this paper. For a simple
version, we assume that every coeﬃcient of each individual i is equal to a
constant plus the random eﬀects term without the demographic variables.
That is λi = λ+ελ
i , rDi = rD+ε
rD
i , rSi = rS +ε
rS
i , di = d+εd
i, i =1 ,···,N.







i vary across diﬀerent individuals i,b u tn o t
over time t. We also estimate a more complicated version of the model using
some demographic variables.
B e c a u s et h e r ea r es o m eo u t l i e r si no u rd a t a ,w eu s eaT o b i tm o d e lw i t h
right censoring at δJ ≤ 1.0 (J = DG, SG, DL, SL) for each equation, that
is the discount rate is smaller than or equal to one, and y
J
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where f(ελ,ε rD,ε rS,ε d) is the joint density function of random eﬀects of
four coeﬃcients, so we need four dimensional integral to compute the likeli-
hood. Together with the nonlinearity of the model, it is very time consuming
to compute the likelihood directly with a numerical method. A feasible ap-
proach is to use a simulation technique, then we can compute the simulated
likelihood of the model, and use maximum simulated likelihood to estimate
all the parameters of this model. First, we draw four random variables for
four coeﬃcients λ, rD, rS and d independently. In order to increase the eﬃ-
ciency, we use the Halton sequences, which can be considered as well-placed
draws from a standard uniform distribution. Then we should transform it
into standard normal distribution η, η ∼ N(0,I),w h e r eI is the identity
matrix. See Train (2003) and Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) for a detailed
discussion of Halton draws and maximum simulated likelihood. We can cal-
culate a Choleski factor C of Ωε, which is a lower-triangular matrix such that







since for εi = Cη,w eh a v eεi ∼ N(0,Ωε). Secondly, after getting a draw of
the random eﬀects εi of individual i,w ec a nc o m p u t et h ef o u rc o e ﬃcients
λi, ri1, ri2 and di with all other parameters, and then repeat this for all four
equations J,t i m ep e r i o d st and all individuals i,w ec a ng e tt h ev a l u eo ft h e
total likelihood L(β,σ). After that, we repeat the ﬁrst and second steps for





and then employ the BHHH12 algorithm to maximize the simulated likeli-
12Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman (1974) proposed this procedure of the numerical
search for the maximum of the log-likelihood.3.6 Results 61
hood. We use 200 Halton draws when we simulate the random eﬀects terms
and estimate the model.
3.6 Results
In this section, we present the results of our model. In order to check the
procedure of estimation we presented in previous section, ﬁrst we estimate a
simple model with only three coeﬃcients: loss aversion λ, the same reference
point r for delay and speedup, the same discount rate d for gain and loss,




will allow correlations between the random eﬀects terms in a more complex
model later on.
Table 4.3 shows the result of this model. We get a reasonable coeﬃcient
of loss aversion of 1.34, smaller than previous studies. The reference point is
around 0.2, meaning that on average people put 20% of the money involved
as the reference point. It is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and from one,
implying that it might be too strong an assumption if we put the reference
point equal to one, like previous studies did. The result λ>1 and r>0 also
give us some evidence that it might be a good way to model the intertemporal
choice by using a model with the reference point and loss aversion. The
estimated discount rate of 9.6% is also a quite reasonable result. All the
parameters estimated are highly signiﬁcant at any level, it suggests that the
result is robust.
Table 3.5: Results of the model: with only three coeﬃcients
Variable Parameter t-statistic
Loss aversion λ 1.34 70.0
σλ 0.070 9.64
Reference point r : rD = rS 0.198 19.1
σr 0.065 18.1







Note: without correlation between random eﬀects terms
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cients: loss aversion λ,d i ﬀerent reference points for delay and speedup, rD
and rS respectively, and the same discount rate for gains and losses d.T a b l e
4.4 presents the estimation results of the simple version of this model. All the
parameters we estimated for this model are highly signiﬁcant at any level.
The coeﬃcient of loss aversion we got is exactly 2.0 on average, consistent
with previous empirical studies. The values of the reference point for delay
and speedup are 0.13 and 0.07 on average respectively. The reference point
of delay is 1.8 times as big as that of speedup, consistent with Loewenstein’s
(1988) hypothesis. The discount rate is around 10%. The standard deviation
of each random coeﬃcient is around half of the average value of the coeﬃcient,
t h i sm a k e ss u r et h a ti nm o s tc a s e sw eh a v eλ>0, 0 <r D < 1, 0 <r S < 1,
and d>0. We will look at the distributions of the four coeﬃcients across all
individuals later on in this section.
Table 3.6: Results of the simple version of the model with four coeﬃcients
Variable Parameter t-statistic
Loss aversion λ 2.00 131.5
σλ 0.646 113.4
Reference points of delay rD 0.129 55.8
σrD 0.076 74.3
Reference points of speedup rS 0.071 45.8
σrS 0.033 54.8







Note: diﬀerent reference points for delay and speedup.
with correlation between random eﬀects terms.
The correlation coeﬃcients between the random eﬀects of coeﬃcients λ,
rD, rS,a n dd f o rt h i sm o d e la r es i g n i ﬁcant at any level. This result is
presented in table 4.5. The random eﬀect of the discount rate is positively
correlated with those of other three coeﬃcients, especially highly correlated
with loss aversion. The correlation coeﬃcient of 0.96 indicates that loss averse
people are impatient. The correlation coeﬃcient between the random eﬀects
of the two reference points, delay rD and speedup rS, is also quite high, 0.55,
consistent with our expectation. It means that people with a high reference
p o i n to fd e l a ya r ea l s om o r el i k e l yt oh a v eah i g hr e f e r e n c ep o i n tf o rs p e e d u p .3.6 Results 63
Table 3.7: Correlation Coeﬃcients of random coeﬃcients
λr 1 r2 d
r1 0.11 (11.4) 1.0
r2 0.19 (12.4) 0.55 (45.8) 1.0
d 0.96 (380.7) 0.36 (26.7) 0.29 (15.6) 1.0
Note: t-statistic in parentheses. This is the result from the
simple version of the model with four coeﬃcients.
In table 4.6, the result of a more complicated version of the model with
four coeﬃcients is presented; the four coeﬃcients are linear functions of some
demographic variables and a random component independent of these demo-
graphic variables. It seems that females are slightly more loss aversion than
males, with a 0.03 higher coeﬃcient of loss aversion on average; higher edu-
cation level, especially the middle education level (school2) makes people less
loss averse; and age also makes people less loss averse. For example, a 20-
year-old person on average has a loss aversion coeﬃcient at 2.22, 0.36 higher
than a 60-year-old person, on average. Females have higher reference points
rD and rS than males; people with the highest education level (school3) have
lower rD and rS;s c h o o l 2h a sd i ﬀerent eﬀects on reference points than school3,
it has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on rD,b u ti tm a k e srS bigger. rD and rS also have
diﬀerent age-patterns, rD has a U-shaped age-pattern, but rS has an inverted
U-shape.
For the discount rate d, we have the result that education makes people
more patient, the eﬀects are not very strong but signiﬁcant. Higher education
makes people slightly more patient, on average, the discount rate is 0.3-0.4
percentage point lower than those low educated. This is in line with the
theoretical prediction of Becker and Mulligan (1997) that higher educated
people are more patient. With the same data set, but diﬀerent waves, Tu et
al. (2004) got the diﬀerent result that education had no signiﬁcant eﬀects
on discount rates, Tu et al. (2004) did not use a structural model with loss
aversion and reference points like this paper, so that the eﬀects on discount
rates might be mixed with eﬀects on loss aversion and reference points. It
seems that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between discount rate of females
and males, so that females and males have the same patience level on average.
Age has a quite big positive eﬀect on patience. For example, on average, a
person of 20-years-old has a discount rate of 0.129, 0.05 higher than a 60-
year-old.
The estimated correlation coeﬃcients of the random eﬀects are almost
t h es a m ea si nt h es i m p l ev e r s i o nm o d e li nt a b l e4 . 5 . W ed on o tp r e s e n t
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Table 3.8: Result of the model with four coeﬃcients
Variable λr D rS d
Para. t-stat. Para. t-stat. Para. t-stat. Para. t-stat.
Age/10 0.062 6.4 -0.012 -5.1 0.005 3.3 -0.010 -4.4
Age-sq./1000 -0.189 -14.1 0.016 4.0 -0.008 -4.2 -0.003 -1.0
Female 0.031 5.9 0.006 3.2 0.004 3.6 0.001 0.6
School2 -0.082 -13.9 -0.001 -0.53 0.003 3.0 -0.003 -2.3
School3 -0.067 -4.7 -0.009 -3.7 -0.003 -2.6 -0.004 -2.2
Constant 2.211 107.1 0.160 24.6 0.056 16.3 0.152 32.5
σ of REs 0.716 109.7 0.077 72.9 0.037 56.6 0.071 106.2
σeDG σeSG σeDL σeSL
Para. t-stat. Para. t-stat. Para. t-stat. Para. t-stat.
0.171 242.3 0.040 318.0 0.052 359.0 0.165 317.1
Loglikelihood 36599.3
Note: four coeﬃcients are two reference points, for delay and speedup
respectively, the coeﬃcient of loss aversion, and the discount rate.
of the simple version in table 4.4 without demographic variables, indicating
that the model with these demographic variables ﬁts our data better.
We use the model and parameters in table 4.6 to compute the estimated
values of the four coeﬃcients we are interested in, λ, rD, rS,a n dd;t h e
random eﬀects are simulated once according to the variances and correlation
coeﬃcients of the random terms. In total we have 11,847 observations. Table
3.9 gives the descriptive statistics of the simulated results. Figure 3.2 shows
the distributions. The mean values of the four coeﬃcients are quite similar to
t h er e s u l t sw eg e tf r o mt h es i m p l ev e r s i o no ft h em o d e l ;t h em e a nc o e ﬃcient
of loss aversion λ is 2.00, also consistent with previous empirical studies.
The reference point of delay is almost twice as big as of that of speedup on
average, 0.120 and 0.063 respectively. The last column of Table 3.9 is the
percentages of estimated coeﬃcients which are smaller than zero. For most
cases, we have λ>0, 0 <r i < 1, i = D,S,a n dd>0. There are 91.5% of the
simulated parameter values have λ>1, showing people are loss averse. 83%
estimated observations satisfy the conditions λ>1, 0 <r i < 1, i = D,S,
and d>0 jointly.
3.7 Conclusions
Our model shows that the discount rates individuals implicitly used to make
intertemporal trade oﬀs depends enormously on the level of loss aversion3.7 Conclusions 65
Table 3.9: Descriptive statistics for the simulated individual coeﬃcients
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max %<0
Loss aversion λ 1.99 2.00 0.741 -0.343 4.59 0.5%
Ref. point of delay rD 0.119 0.120 0.077 -0.153 0.379 5.7%
Ref. point of speedup rS 0.063 0.063 0.037 -0.074 0.193 4.3%
Discount rate d 0.096 0.097 0.073 -0.143 0.338 9.0%
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and the reference point being used. Reference points, loss aversion, and
o fc o u r s et h ed i s c o u n tr a t ei t s e l fh a v eas u b s t a n t i a li m p a c to nh o u s e h o l d s ’
responses to all kinds of policy measures that relate to intertemporal choices.
Understanding the joint distributions of these parameters in the population
and their eﬀects on time preference in diﬀerent scenarios will help us to
predict the behaviors of individuals and households much better.
In this paper, we present a structural model with reference points and
loss aversion for intertemporal choice for four scenarios: delay of gains, delay
of losses, speed-up of gains, and speed-up of losses. In order to estimate
this structural model with four equations, we use a simulation technique to
compute the likelihood. With help of the rich data set representative for
the Dutch population, we are the ﬁrst to get the population distribution of
reference points and loss aversion. We get clear evidence to support the hy-
pothesis of Loewenstein (1988) that the reference point of delay is larger than
that of speedup. We have the result that the mean coeﬃcient of loss aversion
i sa r o u n dt w o ,w h i c hi si nl i n ew i t hp r e v i o u sﬁndings in literature. Our results
also show that females are more loss averse than males, and high-education
and age make people less loss averse; high educated or older people are also
more patient. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant (all at the 1%) correlations between the
random eﬀects of the four coeﬃcients. There is a positive correlation between
random eﬀects of loss aversion and the discount rate, so impatient persons
are more loss averse. These results, distribution of coeﬃcients and observed
relationships of those parameters, may help us predicting and understanding
the behavior of households for policy purposes.
Reference points might be more fragile than loss aversion and discount
rate, as the characteristics of an individual, the coeﬃcient of loss aversion
and the discount rate might not like reference points, change so often. The
data we use here came from four scenarios with ﬁxed time period, one year,
and ﬁxed amount of money, Dﬂ. 1000. A further research project can focus
on testing whether the coeﬃcient of loss aversion and the discount rate keep
as stable when we only change the amount of money or the time horizon
concerned. Models with interaction between loss aversion and risk aversion
will also be interesting topics for further study. Future research can also
focus on the role of loss aversion and reference points in particular policy
applications.Chapter 4
Joint Estimation of Loss
Aversion and Probability
Weighting Function
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4.1 Introduction
In traditional economic theory, risk aversion is a crucial determinant of indi-
vidual decision-making under uncertainty. Nowadays, risk aversion is widely
used in all economic theories, especially in ﬁnancial decision-making, like
portfolio choice. Risk aversion, intuitively, implies that when facing choices
with comparable expected returns, individual tends to choose the less risky
alternative. Traditional theory for decision-making under uncertainty is ex-
pected utility (EU) theory, in which risk aversion is equivalent to concavity
of the utility function. This means that the utility function exhibits dimin-
ishing marginal utility of wealth. The probabilities used to compute EU are
the actual probabilities perceived by the decision-maker, the risk attitude is
solely captured by the shape of utility function.
The EU model cannot explain Allais’ paradox (Allais 1953, Kahneman
and Tversky 1979), suggesting that non-linear probability weights are needed
to transform both very small and very large probabilities. Matthew and
Thaler (2001) criticized the EU model, described it as a "dead parrot", even
though it has "beautiful plumage" - a simple and elegant structure - but it
is dead, and economists should develop better descriptive models for choice
under uncertainty.
The EU model cannot explain the common empirical ﬁnding that the
same individual exhibits risk-aversion and risk-seeking behavior at the same
time. For example, we often observe a person who is risk-averse in most cases
and buys lottery tickets at the same time; it means that she prefers risk aver-
sion for some prospects and at the same time prefers risk-seeking for other
prospects. This phenomenon cannot be explained by EU with a concave (or
convex) utility function only, but theories with probability weighting func-
tion could be good explanations. In all these theories, cumulative prospect
theory (CPT) introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is the dominant
one. Compared to the EU model, not only the shape (concavity or con-
vex) of the utility function aﬀects the risk attitude of individual, but the
probability weighting function also has an impact on the risk attitude. As
Tversky and Kahneman show in their paper, people overweight low proba-
bilities, and underweight moderate and high probabilities both for gains and
losses, and this can make people risk-seeking in small probabilities for gains
and in high probabilities for losses, and risk averse in high probabilities for
gains and small probabilities for losses. By introducing probability weighting,
it is thus possible to explain why risk averse people would also buy lottery
tickets. Therefore, an individual’s risk attitude is determined in two domains
in CPT instead of the one domain in the EU model: one is the domain of
value - concavity of the utility function; the other is domain of probability -4.1 Introduction 69
the nonlinearity of the probability weighting function. Tversky and Kahne-
man’s experimental results indeed conﬁrmed that people overweighted low
probabilities, and underweighted moderate and high probabilities both for
gains and losses, making people risk-seeking in small probabilities for gains
and in high probabilities for losses, and risk averse in high probabilities for
gains and in small probabilities for losses.
Because the risk attitude is determined by the shapes of both the utility
function and the probability weighting functions, and since these two func-
tions are closely linked when people make decisions under uncertainty, it is
important to estimate these two functions together if we want to understand
the risk attitude and the behavior of individuals under uncertainty. Because
of lack of adequate data, no existing study jointly estimates these two func-
tions with a population representative data set. In this paper, we will use
a survey which is a representative of the Dutch population to estimate the
shapes of the value and probability weighting functions for gains and losses
together with the coeﬃcient of loss aversion, and investigate how these coef-
ﬁcients vary with observed demographics and unobserved characteristics of
the individuals.
Nowadays, risk aversion and loss aversion are commonly used and have
become two fundamental concepts in behavioral economics. From a psycho-
logical view, loss aversion is more fundamental; people do not like a risk
not because of the risk itself, but because of the potential loss, which is
the possible result of risk. A recent paper Duxbury and Summers (2004)
investigated whether individuals’ perceptions of risk are linked to variance
aversion1 or loss aversion by an experiment, and found that a link to loss
aversion is supported. After the seminal paper of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), the importance of loss aversion in decision under risk has become
common knowledge, with more and more studies attempting to combine risk
aversion and loss aversion to analyze decisions under uncertainty. Preferences
incorporating loss aversion can reconcile signiﬁcant small-scale risk aversion
with reasonable degrees of large-scale risk aversion (Rabin 2000). Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979) interpreted loss aversion using a symmetric 50-50
bet. Formally, loss aversion holds if (0.5,x;0.5,−x) ≺ (0.5,y;0.5,−y) for all
x>y≥ 0.2 Actually this preference can be also explained by risk aver-
sion, because the variance of the bet (0.5,x;0.5,−x) is larger than that of
(0.5,y;0.5,−y) if x>y≥ 0,s ow ec a ns a yt h a tt h eb e t(0.5,x;0.5,−x) is
more risky. We could use this kind of simple bets to estimate the coeﬃcient
1Variance aversion here refers to the traditional concept of risk aversion. Normally we
call outcomes with higher variance more risky.
2(p,x,1 − p,y) refers to a bet that pays x with probability p and y with probability
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of loss aversion.
In the literature, many experimental studies estimated probability weight-
ing functions from individual choices, see Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
Tversky and Fox (1995), Wu and Gonzalez (1996), Gonzalez and Wu (1999),
Abdellaoui (2000), Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000), Kilka and Weber (2001),
Brandstatter, Kuehberger, and Schneider (2002). Their most remarkable
ﬁnding is that the weighting functions are inverse S-shaped both for gains
and losses, which means that people overweight low probabilities and under-
weight moderate and high probabilities both for gains and losses. This result
implies that people are risk-seeking in small probabilities for gains and in
high probabilities for losses, and risk-averse in high probabilities for gains
and in small probabilities for losses.
There are also many papers in the literature estimating individual risk
attitude under uncertainty. Based on CPT, Donkers, Melenberg, and Van
Soest (2001) used questions about lotteries in a large household survey to
estimate an index for risk aversion. Their result showed that both the value
function and the probability weighting function vary signiﬁcantly with age,
income, and wealth of the individual. Neilson and Stowe (2002) examined
many experimental studies of probability weighting functions based on CPT;
they suggested that the functional forms proposed in the literature were
not suitable for generalization to applied settings. CPT, and especially the
weighting function’s parameterization, still needs more research.
In this paper, based on CPT and the structure of Tversky and Kah-
neman’s (1992) model, we use data from a large representative survey to
estimate the shapes of value functions and weighting functions jointly with
loss aversion. To account for heterogeneity in the population, we allow all
the coeﬃcients we are interested in to vary across individuals using a random
coeﬃcients model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
i n t r o d u c ea ne c o n o m i cm o d e lw ew i l lu s ei nt h i sp a p e r .T h e ni nS e c t i o n3 ,
we describe the data. We discuss the econometric model and the estimation
procedure in Section 4. In Section 5, the results are presented, and Section
6 concludes.
4.2 Economic Model
We follow CPT of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) to construct an economic
model. The utility of a prospect p =( x1,p 1;x2,p 2;···,x n,p n),w h e r epi is4.2 Economic Model 71
the probability of outcome xi, i =1 ,...,n,a n d
Pn
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pj) for 2 ≤ i ≤ m. For CPT, these probability weights
do not necessarily sum to one.
Again following Tversky and Kahneman (1992), we use a power value
function, and with loss aversion, the value function is deﬁned diﬀerently in











Here λ is the coeﬃcient of loss aversion. Tversky and Kahneman expect
that 0 <a≤ b ≤ 1 and λ > 1, implying that the value function is steeper
for losses than for gains: "losses loom larger than corresponding gains." In
this case, the value function is S-shaped: concave for gains and convex for
losses. Without probability weighting, the shape of the value function will
capture the risk attitude of individual. With an S-shaped value function, the
individual is then risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses. On the
other hand, if a>1, the individual is risk-seeking for gains and if b>1,t h e
individual is risk-averse for losses. Thus with a power function speciﬁcation,
the values of the parameters a and b determine completely the shape of value
function and the individual’s risk attitude in the value domain.
We use the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk-aversion to represent
the degree of risk aversion of an individual in the value domain, deﬁned as
Rv(x)=−xv00/v0. For a power value function xa, Rv =1− a for gains, that
is we have constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA). If a<1, Rv =1−a>0,
the individual is risk averse for gains; if a>1, Rv =1−a<0, the individual
is risk-seeking for gains. It is opposite for losses, if b<1, the individual is
risk-seeking for losses; if b>1, the individual is risk averse for losses.
The probability weighting functions also have impact on individual risk
attitude. It is believed that people overweight low probabilities and under-72 Joint Estimation of Loss Aversion and Probability Weighting Function
weight moderate and high probabilities both for gains and losses, so that
people are risk-seeking in small probabilities for gains and in high proba-
bilities for losses, and risk-averse in high probabilities for gains and small
probabilities for losses.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) proposed to use a two-part power function
as the weighting function for probabilities. They use the following functional











(pδ +( 1− p)δ)
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for losses. γ and δ are parameters of weighting functions for gains and
losses respectively, and they should be positive numbers between zero and
one. Tversky and Kahneman used the median value of subjects in their ex-
periment to estimate these parameters. The parameter values they obtained
are a = b =0 .88, λ =2 .25, γ =0 .61 and δ =0 .69.
In our paper, we use a diﬀerent weighting function. The weighting func-
tion for gains is:
p+ =e x p ( −(−lnp)
m)
and the weighting function for losses is given by:
p− =e x p ( −(−lnp)
n)
We have three reasons to choose this functional form. First, it has better
properties than the two-part power function, Prelec (1998) shows that this
weighting function satisﬁes all four target properties he mentioned: regres-
sive, asymmetric, s-shaped, reﬂective, and has an invariant ﬁxed point at
p =1 /e =0 .37.S e c o n d , i t ﬁts our data better, the log likelihood is much
bigger than for the two-part power function. The last reason is most impor-
tant. We use a random coeﬃcients model, so the parameters of the weighting
functions will vary over individuals; the two-part power weighting function is
not a monotonically increasing function when γ and δ is small, for example,
if γ =0 .2, w+(0.5) = 0.0544 <w +(0.1) = 0.0583, this is quite diﬃcult to
understand and will cause some problem when we interpret our model.
With the setting above, the shape of the value functions, a and b,t o g e t h e r
with the shapes of the weighting functions, m and n, will determine the risk
attitude of an individual jointly. The value function will aﬀect the individual4.3 Data 73
risk attitude in the value domain, as in traditional EU theory, but in addition,
the probability weighting function will determine the risk attitude in the
probability domain.
In this paper, we use data of questions about lotteries to estimate the
model introduced above. For a lottery L(−x1,p 1;x2,1−p1), with probability
p1 to lose x1 and probability 1−p1 to gain x2, the utility is VL = p−v(−x1)+
p+v(x2)=−p−λxb
1 + p+xa
2,w h e r eλ is the coeﬃcient of loss aversion, a and
b are parameters of power value function, and p− =e x p ( −(−lnp1)n) and
p+ =e x p ( −(−ln(1 − p1)m) are the weights of probabilities for losses and
gains respectively.
4.3 Data
The data we use is taken from the DNB Household Survey (DNBHS) col-
lected by CentERdata in August 2004. This is a large representative Dutch
survey with panel data for more than 1500 households, starting in 1993. The
DNBHS is a rich data set containing information on employment status, pen-
sions, accommodation, mortgages, income, assets, debts, health, economic
and psychological concepts, and personal characteristics. It is administered
over the Internet and people without access to Internet or without a personal
computer have been provided with the necessary equipment to participate.
Researchers can use the system to conduct their own module of survey ques-
tions. We constructed a questionnaire with seven questions on simple bets3
Questions 1 to 4 have one bet and questions 5 to 7 have two bets. Question
1 presents several bets with a 50% chance of losing 100 euros and a 50%
chance of winning an amount varying from 100 to 900 euros, depending on
randomization of the question. In each case, the question is asked whether the
r e s p o n d e n tw o u l dbew i l l i n gt ot a k ep a r ti ns u c habe t .Q u e s t i o n2a s k sf o rt h e
minimum prize the individual should be able to win with 50% chance if the
lottery also has 50% chance of losing either 500 or 1000 euros (randomized).
Question 3 asks for the minimum prize if the chances of losing 100 euros are
20%, 30% or 40% (randomized) and the chances of winning are, accordingly,
80%, 70% or 60%. Question 4 is similar but reverses the probabilities of
winning and losing. Question 5 asks the respondent to choose between two
lotteries, one with a 30% chance of winning 100 euros and a 70% chance of
neither winning nor losing, and the other with a 50% chance of winning a
larger (randomized) amount but also with a 50% chance of losing 100 euros.
Questions 6 and 7 ask about the maximum loss and minimum prize required
for speciﬁc choices in a similar trade oﬀs between two lotteries.
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There are in total 2,062 individuals who take part in the survey, and
we deleted 230 individuals who did not answer any of the questions in our
module. Normally, data of individual choices are relatively noisy, which
might be the main reason why most of the existing experimental studies only
used some kind of aggregate data in their analysis, like median or mean.
Not every respondent answered all seven questions. The response rates are
between 70%, the lowest for question 4, and 97%, the highest for question 1.
The average answer rate is 78.6% for all seven questions.
To reduce the amount of noise in our data, we decided to check consistency
of the answers and retained only the observations who gave consistent an-
swers.4For a lottery L(−x1,p 1;x2,1−p1), the utility is VL = w−(p1)v(−x1)+
w+(1−p1)v(x2), and the value and weighting functions should be monotoni-
cally increasing functions. According to this basic rule, we can construct ten
checks for the consistency of answers for six of our seven questions.5
1. The lower bound of question 1 should be smaller than the answer of
question 2.
2. The higher bound of question 1 should be larger than the answer of
question 3.
3. The lower bound of question 1 should be smaller than the answer of
question 4.
4. The lower bound of question 1 should be smaller than the higher bound
of question 5.
5. The lower bound of question 1 should be smaller than the answer of
question 7.
6. The answer of question 2 should be larger than that of question 3.
7. The answer of question 3 should be smaller than that of question 4.
8. The answer of question 3 should be smaller than the higher bound of
question 5.
9. The answer of question 3 should be smaller than that of question 7.
10. The the lower bound of question 5 should be smaller than that of
question 7 when the randomization of question 7 is equal to 2.
We deleted all the answers with a consistency problem, (i.e., if two answers
were inconsistent, we deleted both of them) and also deleted around twenty
outlier answers for each question, leaving 89 observations without any answer.
This gives a ﬁnal data set of 1,743 observations for our estimation.
4If we use all the observations of our data without checking for consistency, the algo-
rithm for simulated maximum likelihood does not converge.
5Question 6 is not involved in the consistency checks, because it needs an additional
assumption other than monotonicity of the value and weighting functions if we want to
compare its answer with other questions.4.3 Data 75
This kind of inconsistency might be caused by two reasons. It seems that
low educated people are more likely to answer questions in an inconsistent
way, the reason might be that the questions are more diﬃcult for them to
understand. The other reason is that people do not answer the questions
carefully and randomly pick a number. In order to make full use of our data,
we do not delete those individuals who only answered part of total seven
questions. Table4.1 shows the structure of our data. After cleaning all the
data, 3.7 questions are answered consistently by each individual on average.
Table 4.1: Structure of the panel
Number of observations for each question Number of consistent
answers
Question All answers Consistent Number of ques. Individuals
Question 1 1,768 872 13 1 5
Question 2 1,338 1,110 23 2 3
Question 3 1,398 625 32 9 3
Question 4 1,282 907 42 6 6
Question 5 1,566 835 51 2 8
Question 6 1,354 1,321 67 9
Question 7 1,371 721 73 3 9
Total answers 10,077 6,391 Total 1,743
Exploiting the advantages of an internet survey, in order to increase the
design variance and to help to identify our model, we used a randomization
technique for the survey design. From Figure 4.1 (in Results section), we
can see the distribution of the actual answers of question 2 when randomiza-
tion=1 (50% chance of losing 500), and it seems that the distribution of the
data is more like the log-normal distribution than like a normal distribution.
This will aﬀect the econometric model we want to estimate, which we will
discuss in the next section. Some descriptive statistics on these questions
and demographic variables are provided in Table 4.2. We take the logarithm
of the answers for all questions.
For question 2, if the randomization variable (“randomization”) is equal
to 1, the bet is L(−500,0.5;x2,0.5), and the bet is L(−1000,0.5;x2,0.5)f o r
randomization=2. It is easy to understand that the average (or median)
answer of the former should be smaller than that of the latter, and this is
exactly the result we get from the data. We can have similar expectations
for other questions with diﬀerent randomization, and Table 4.2 shows that
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for the answers of questions and demographic
variables
Variable Obs. Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Question 2, random.=1 557 7.60 8.04 1.97 1.61 13.8
Question 2, random.=2 553 8.52 8.68 2.13 2.30 14.5
Question 3, random.=1 241 5.01 5.08 1.45 0.0 10.8
Question 3, random.=2 206 5.30 5.22 1.61 0.0 10.8
Question 3, random.=3 178 5.41 5.39 1.97 0.0 11.5
Question 4, random.=1 288 7.82 8.57 2.44 2.30 14.5
Question 4, random.=2 293 6.91 7.86 2.51 1.61 14.5
Question 4, random.=3 326 6.91 7.69 2.25 2.30 14.2
Question 6, random.=1 643 4.61 4.25 1.23 0.693 8.82
Question 6, random.=2 678 4.61 4.51 1.28 1.39 9.90
Question 7, random.=1 336 6.21 6.59 1.44 4.50 12.2
Question 7, random.=2 385 6.91 7.30 1.46 5.30 12.4
Female 1743 0 0.447 0.497 0 1
High-education 1743 0 0.439 0.496 0 1
Age/10 1743 4.7 4.80 1.56 1.6 9.0
Age-squared/1000 1743 2.21 2.55 1.54 0.256 8.1
4.4 Econometric Model
In this section, we develop an econometric model and use our survey data to
estimate this. In order to introduce heterogeneity, we use a random coeﬃ-
cients model. The ﬁrst four questions, questions 1 to 4, concern one lottery,
and questions 5 to 7 involve two lotteries. For questions with only one lot-
tery, we assume that the utility of the lottery L(−x1,p 1;x2,1−p1) should be
equal to zero if the subject is indiﬀerent between accepting and not accepting
the lottery. Then the utility Vij of question i, i =1 ,···,4,f o ri n d i v i d u a lj,






For these four questions with one lottery, we always know −x1, p1,a n da s k
for the relevant x2. If we use the weighting function we presented in section
two, then p−1ij =e x p ( −(−lnp1ij)nj) and p+1ij =e x p ( −(−ln(1 − p1ij))mj).








aj , i =1 ,···,4, j =1 ,···,N
The ﬁve coeﬃcients we are interested in are the powers of value functions
for gains and losses aj,a n dbj,t h ec o e ﬃcient of loss aversion λj,a n dt h e4.4 Econometric Model 77
coeﬃcients of the weight functions for gains and losses mj and nj. These
coeﬃcients vary across individuals j, but have nothing to do with a speciﬁc
question i. Because the distribution of data is more like log-normal distribu-
tion (see Figure 3.1 ) and it seems that a log-normal distribution ﬁt our data
better than a normal distribution, we use a logarithm form:










i =1 ,···,4, j =1 ,···,N
Here yij is the observed answer to the question on x2ij,t h ea n s w e r so f
individual j for questions i, i =1 ,···,4. Compared to a question with only
one lottery, a question with two lotteries is more complicated. We assume
that the utilities of two lotteries LA(0,p 3;x3,1−p3)a n dLB(−x4,p 4;x5,1−p4)
should be equal, VA = VB, if the subject is indiﬀerent between these two









i =5 ,6,7, j =1 ,···,N
T h ew e i g h t i n gf u n c t i o n sa r et h es a m ea si nq u e s t i o n s1t o4 ,s op+3ij =
exp(−(−lnp3ij)mj), p+4ij =e x p ( −(−ln(1−p4ij))mj),a n dp−4ij =e x p ( −(−ln(1−
p4ij))nj).
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bj , i =6 , j =1 ,···,N
Like for the one lottery questions, we think our data on x4ij and x5ij are
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Here yij is the observed answer of x5ij for equations 5 and 7, and x4ij for
equation 6.
We assume that the error terms eij of all seven equations are iid with
a normal distribution N(0,σ 2
j), j =1 ,···,7, implying that yij has a log-
normal distribution. We employ a random coeﬃcients model here, so all ﬁve
coeﬃcients we are interested in are random variables, speciﬁed as a linear
function of demographics plus an additive random eﬀect term. We can write
them as aj = x0
jβa +εaj, bj = x0
jβb +εbj, λj = x0
jβλ +ελj, mj = x0
jβm +εmj,
nj = x0
jβn+εnj.H e r exj is the vector of demographic variables of individual
j,a n dt h eβk, k = a,b,λ,m,n, are vectors of the parameters. We assume that
the random eﬀects terms εkj of the ﬁve coeﬃcients are normally distributed
with mean zero and covariance matrix Ωε given by
Ωε =
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
σ2
a ρ21σaσb ρ31σaσλ ρ41σaσm ρ51σaσn
ρ21σaσb σ2
b ρ32σbσλ ρ42σbσm ρ52σbσn
ρ31σaσλ ρ32σbσλ σ2
λ ρ43σλσm ρ53σλσn
ρ41σaσm ρ42σbσm ρ43σλσm σ2
m ρ54σmσn
ρ51σaσn ρ52σbσn ρ53σλσn ρ54σmσn σ2
n
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
.
We also assume that the ﬁve coeﬃcients are jointly normally distributed,
⎛


























⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
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.
For questions 1 and 5, the data is discrete. We use ordered probit mod-
els for these two questions. Since the ordered probit model is quite stan-
dard nowadays, we will not discuss it in detail here, see many econometric
textbooks. Answers to the other ﬁve equations are continuous, with nor-
mally distributed error terms for which we can compute the density easily.
The conditional likelihood conditional on random coeﬃcients can now be
straightforwardly written as:
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Here φ(·) is the density function of the standard normal distribution, k
will change according to diﬀerent questions, x2ij for questions 2, 3, and 4,
x4ij for question 6, and x5ij for question 7. Pij is the probability calculated
from ordered probit models, for questions 1 and 5. F(εaj,ε bj,ε λj,ε mj,ε nj) is
the joint distribution of the random parts of the random coeﬃcients. Due to
the nonlinear way in which the random eﬀects enter the model, we cannot
compute the likelihood function with four dimensional integral analytically.
With the help of a simulation technique, we can approximate the exact like-
lihood with a simulated likelihood, and use maximum simulated likelihood
to estimate all the parameters of this model. First, we draw ﬁve random
variables for ﬁve coeﬃcients aj, bj, λj, mj and nj of individual j indepen-
dently from the standard normal distribution; η is the vector of these draws,
η ∼ N(0,I),w h e r eI is the identity matrix. With the variance matrix Ωε,
we can compute a Choleski factor C of Ωε, which is a lower-triangular ma-
trix such that CC0 = Ωε. Then we can obtain a draw for the random eﬀects
εj =( εaj,ε bj,ε λj,ε mj,ε nj)0,s i n c ew ek n o wf o rˆ εj = Cη we have ˆ εj ∼ N(0,Ωε).
Secondly, after getting a draw ˆ εj for the random eﬀects of individual j,w ec a n
compute the ﬁve coeﬃcients of individual j: ˆ aj, ˆ bj, ˆ λj, ˆ mj,a n dˆ nj together
with all other parameters, and then we can compute the simulated likelihood
of individual j ˆ Lj1(β,σ) straightforwardly for the ﬁrst draw. After that, we
repeat the ﬁrst and second steps K times (for a large value of K)a n dc a l -




ˆ Ljk,a st h es i m u l a t e d
likelihood of individual j; at last, we can get the simulated likelihood of all
data ˆ L(β,σ), and employ the BHHH6 algorithm to maximize ˆ L(β,σ).I n
this paper, we use 400 draws when we simulate the random eﬀects terms and
estimate the model. See Train (2003) for a detailed discussion of maximum
simulated likelihood.
4.5 Results
In this section, we present the estimation results of the econometric model
presented in the previous section. Table 4.3 shows some results of this model.
There are ﬁve coeﬃcients we are interested in: powers of value function for
gains and losses, a and b,t h ec o e ﬃcient of loss aversion, λ, parameters for
weighting functions of gains and losses, m and n, are all modelled as linear
functions of some background variables: dummy of female, dummy of high-
educated, age, age-squared, and logarithm of individual total income, and an
6Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman (1974) proposed this procedure of the numerical
search for the maximum of the log-likelihood.80 Joint Estimation of Loss Aversion and Probability Weighting Function
unobserved random eﬀect. In general, our results are well in line with those
of Tversky and Kahneman (1992); the model with power value functions,
weighting functions together with loss aversion can explain our data well.
Because our data represents the Dutch population, it seems that the model
could be used for modelling decision making under risk at the individual
level.
Table 4.3: Estimation results of model
Variable abλ
Para. t-st. Para. t-st. Para. t-st.
Female -0.061 -2.33 -0.027 -0.68 0.065 0.38
High-edu. -0.023 -0.91 -0.007 -0.18 0.075 0.42
Age/10 0.020 0.48 0.032 0.53 0.180 0.48
Age-sq./1000 -0.030 -0.74 -0.051 -0.84 -0.177 -0.48
Loginc -0.002 -0.36 0.002 0.19 -0.066 -1.65
Constant 0.681 30.4 0.730 31.2 3.14 13.5
σ 0.151 25.3 0.000 0.00 1.14 11.9
Variable mn
Para. t-st. Para. t-st.
Female 0.083 2.04 -0.093 -0.79
High-edu. 0.078 1.76 -0.359 -3.10
Age/10 -0.026 -0.34 0.145 0.87
Age-sq./1000 -0.007 -0.10 -0.122 -0.78
Loginc -0.001 -0.06 -0.037 -1.64
Constant 0.999 30.3 0.593 8.41
σ 0.447 19.7 0.000 0.00
Log-like. -10779.1
Note: all regressors centered around their sample means.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) expected that 0 <a≤ b ≤ 1,a n dt h e i r
experimental result is a = b =0 .88 - the median of the individual estimates,
supports their statement. Our result does fully support their expectation, the
average of a is 0.68, less than that of b, 0.73, and they are all between 0 and 1.
The result a<bmeans that the marginal utility of gains is diminishing faster
than that of losses; and the averages of a and b are both smaller than 0.88,
meaning that on average people are more risk-averse for gains and more risk-
seeking for losses in our data than in those of Tversky and Kahneman. The
average relative risk-aversion coeﬃcient (1−a) is 0.32 for gains. We also get
the result that females are signiﬁcantly more risk averse than males, because
the estimated value of a for females is 0.061 smaller than that of males with4.5 Results 81
the same other characteristics. Other variables have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on
a, and all variables have an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on b.
People with high income are more loss averse, but the income eﬀect is only
signiﬁcant at the10% level. Other variables have no signiﬁcant eﬀects on λ.
Our result imply that people are more loss averse on average than the sample
of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). We ﬁnd an average value of λ equal to
3.1, larger than their result, 2.25. Because we get the result that a<b ,
the marginal value functions of gains and losses are diminishing at diﬀerent
speeds. If we deﬁne the “real” loss aversion as ˜ λ = −v(−x)/v(x)=λxb−a,
then ˜ λ is not a constant anymore, because a is a little bit smaller than b,
b−a>0,s o˜ λ will increase slowly when x increases. For example, if x =1 0 ,
˜ λ =3 .5;i fx = 100, ˜ λ =3 .9;i fx = 1,000, ˜ λ =4 .4;i fx = 10,000, ˜ λ =4 .9;i f
x=1,000,000, ˜ λ =6 .2. Compared to our pervious study,7 the coeﬃcient of
loss aversion that we ﬁnd here in a setting with risky choices is much bigger
than in the riskless situation of the previous chapter.
For the speciﬁcation of the probability weighting function we use, pa-
rameters m and n less than one mean that people are overweighting small
probabilities and underweighting for moderate and high probabilities. The
average parameters for the weighting functions are 1.0 and 0.59 for gains and
losses respectively. The fact that the average value of m is very close to one
means that the weights of probabilities of gains should are almost equal to
the objective probabilities, on average. We only use probabilities between
0.1 and 0.9 in the design used to estimate m in our data, and we do not use
very small probabilities like 0.001 or very high probabilities like 0.99, so it
might be that people just use objective probabilities for most cases, except
for very small or a very big probabilities, like in real life lotteries, where
people may then still overweight the very small probability of winning. The
standard deviation of m is substantial, and approximately half the people
have m larger than one, and half less than one. Those with m smaller than
one are risk-seeking in small probabilities and risk-averse in high probabili-
ties; on the contrary, the 50% with m larger than one are risk-averse in small
probabilities and risk-seeking in high probabilities. Only those people with
m small enough, making them heavily overweight small probabilities, will
buy lotteries, so it seems more than half people will not buy any lotteries in
our sample.
The average of n is much smaller than one, meaning that people are
really overweighting low probabilities and underweighting moderate and high
probabilities for losses. This diﬀerence between gains and losses is diﬀerent
from Tversky and Kahneman (1992), who ﬁnd that people overweight low
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probabilities and underweight moderate and high probabilities both for gains
and losses.8
Our result shows that females have a higher m than otherwise similar
males. Also, high educated people have a higher m, though the education
eﬀect is only signiﬁcant at 10% level. With high m, people are less likely
to buy lotteries, so our results also indicate that females and high educated
people are less likely to buy lotteries. In contrast, high education has a
diﬀerent eﬀect on n: high educated people have a signiﬁcantly lower n,a n d
people with high income also have lower n,s i g n i ﬁcant at 10% level.
Of the standard deviations of the random eﬀects terms of the ﬁve coef-
ﬁcients we estimated, two are close to zero: those for b,t h ep o w e ro ft h e
value function for losses, and n, the parameter of the weighting function of
losses. The other three standard deviations are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. They are all smaller than half of the means of corresponding coef-
ﬁcients, implying that for the large majority of the observations, we get a
positive a, λ and m (and b and n) . W h yo n l yt h et w or a n d o me ﬀects that
are connected with losses are close to zero is not clear. Standard deviations
of error terms of all questions are presented in Table 4.4. They are highly
signiﬁcant, indicating noise in the answers.
Table 4.4: Standard deviations of error terms for all questions
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
S.D. t-stat. S.D. t-stat. S.D. t-stat. S.D. t-stat.
1.10 41.7 1.10 44.3 1.39 50.6 1.00 63.7
Equation 5 Equation 6 Equation 7
S.D. t-stat. S.D. t-stat. S.D. t-stat.
0.704 31.3 0.431 17.9 0.581 25.3
We present the estimated correlation coeﬃcients of the random eﬀects in
T a b l e4 . 5 .B e c a u s et w oo ft h eﬁve variances of the random eﬀects go to zero,
we only have estimates for the correlations between the other three, a, λ,
and m. a and m are highly negatively correlated, the correlation coeﬃcient
is -0.85. People with a small m will thus have a big a, perhaps because
a and m both capture risk attitudes for gains, in two diﬀerent domains.
A smaller m means people are more risk-seeking in small probabilities and
risk-averse in moderate and high probabilities. We don’t discuss very small
and big probabilities in this paper, and for moderate probabilities, a smaller
m means that people are more underweighting the probabilities for gains,
and are more risk-averse in the probability domain. A bigger a means that
8We use a diﬀerent weighting function.4.6 Conclusion 83
people have a less concave value function for gains, and are less loss-averse
in the value domain. A highly negatively correlation between a and m might
indicate that the level of risk aversion in the value and probability domains
are complementary; if a person has a high risk aversion in one domain she
should have a low risk aversion in another domain. This property might be
useful to understand and predict the behavior of individual decision-making
under risk. The correlation coeﬃcient of the random eﬀects of λ and m is
0.58, meaning that people with higher loss aversion might be less risk-averse
in the probability domain.
Table 4.5: Correlation coeﬃcients of random eﬀects
ab λm
b --
λ -0.05 (-0.35) - 1.0
m -0.85 (-21.3) - 0.58 (8.99) 1.0
n -- --
Using the model we estimated in this paper, we computed all ﬁve coeﬃ-
cients for each individual, using only one draw for the random eﬀects. The
descriptive statistics for the ﬁve estimated coeﬃcients are presented in Table
4.6. The means of all these coeﬃcients are almost the same as in Table 4.3,
as expected. Figures 2 to 6 are kernel density estimates of the ﬁve random
coeﬃcients (estimated using Stata).
T a b l e4 . 6 :D e s c r i p t i v es t a t i s t i c sf o rt h eﬁve estimated coeﬃcients
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
a 0.679 0.683 0.153 0.118 1.26
b 0.737 0.730 0.032 0.565 0.775
λ 3.18 3.19 1.15 0.01 6.88
m 1.00 0.995 0.454 0.01 2.57
n 0.771 0.593 0.219 0.191 1.08
Figure 4.1 also shows the distribution of the estimated result of question
2 when randomization=1 (50% chance of losing 500), using the model we
presented before and coeﬃcients we estimated.
4.6 Conclusion
Cumulative Prospect Theory is becoming more and more prevalent in deci-
sion making under uncertainty, and our results show that a simple structure84 Joint Estimation of Loss Aversion and Probability Weighting Function
Distribution of the answer of Q2, randomization=1
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of a CPT model with power value function, loss aversion, and probability
weighting can explain our data well. A random coeﬃcients model is employed
in this paper to capture the heterogeneity of individuals in the population of
interest.
With the power value function, we get on average powers for gains and
losses are all between zero and one, and the power of gains is smaller than
for losses, implying that the marginal utility of gains is diminishing faster
than that of losses. The standard deviation of the power of losses is close to
zero, so that its distribution is more concentrated around the median, while
the power of gains is more dispersed. Females have a signiﬁcantly smaller
power of gains than males, indicating that females are more risk averse than
males in the value domain. No demographic variable has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the power of losses.
The mean of the coeﬃcient of loss aversion we get is 3.1, a little bit
bigger than the results in literature. But the results in the literature mostly
come from decisions without uncertainty. Our result might indicate that
uncertainty makes people more loss averse, or the coeﬃcient of loss aversion
grabs some of the risk aversion under uncertainty.
The parameter of the probability weighting function for gains, m,i sc l o s e
to one on average. Because its standard deviation is about half of its mean,
it seems that m is varying heavily across individuals. Half of the people in
our data have an m smaller than one, and half larger than one. We could
conclude that half of Dutch population will overweight small probabilities
and is risk-seeking in small probabilities.
Further research can focus on models with more complicated weighting
functions both for gains and losses. With only one parameter for weighting
functions, there are only two kinds of people considering their risk attitude
to gains, either risk-seeking in small probabilities and risk-aversion in big
probabilities (m<1), or risk-aversion in small probabilities and risk-seeking
in big probabilities for gains (m>1). At least we should consider a model
with four kinds of risk attitude to gains: the two kinds of people we mention
above, plus people always risk averse and people always risk-seeking in all
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4.7 Appendix to Chapter 4
Exact Wordings of the Questions
The following questionnaire concerns your attitude towards events with
uncertain outcomes. For this purpose we would like to ask you a number of
questions concerning lotteries. In case you do not participate in lotteries out
of principle, please indicate so here.
Out of principle, I never participate in lotteries: Yes/No
The lotteries that these questions refer to are not standard lotteries. In
these lotteries you can win money, but you can also lose money, while partici-
pation to the lottery is for free. We would like to know under what conditions
you are willing to participate in such lotteries. Most people will like to par-
ticipate (for free) in a lottery where you can only win prizes, but where you
cannot lose. In contrast, almost nobody would like to participate in a lottery
where you always lose money. We are interested in the situation where you
are indiﬀerent between participating or not. It is important to realize that
this will be diﬀerent for everybody. The right answer will therefore also be
diﬀerent for diﬀerent people.
Question 1: Imagine a lottery where you lose a certain amount of money
with 50% chance and with 50% chance you win a certain amount of money.
The probability of winning is the same as the probability of losing, but the
amounts are not necessarily the same. In the ﬁrst question, the amount you
can lose is 100 euro (with 50% chance). This amount is in the table below in
t h el e f tc o l u m n .I nt h er i g h tc o l u m ni st h ea m o u n ty o uc a nw i n( w i t h5 0 %
chance). For every combination of a loss and a gain, please indicate whether
you would like to participate in this lottery or not.
You lose with You win with Will you participate?
50% chance 50% chance
100 euro 100 euro Yes/No?
100 euro 150 euro Yes/No?
100 euro 200 euro Yes/No?
100 euro 250 euro Yes/No?
100 euro 300 euro Yes/No?
100 euro 350 euro Yes/No?
100 euro 400 euro Yes/No?
100 euro 500 euro Yes/No?
100 euro 750 euro Yes/No?
The answer “You win with 50% chance” is randomized as four choices:4.7 Appendix to Chapter 4 87
1234
100 euro 750 euro 100 euro 900 euro
150 euro 500 euro 200 euro 800 euro
200 euro 400 euro 300 euro 700 euro
250 euro 350 euro 400 euro 600 euro
300 euro 300 euro 500 euro 500 euro
350 euro 250 euro 600 euro 400 euro
400 euro 200 euro 700 euro 300 euro
500 euro 150 euro 800 euro 200 euro
750 euro 100 euro 900 euro 100 euro
In case a respondent answers yes to a question and later on no, ask
whether she is certain about this.
In the previous question, you indicated that you would not want to par-
ticipate when you could lose 100 euro and could win xx euro, but that you
do want to participate when one could win yy euro instead of xx. Probably,
there is a certain prize for which you would just like to participate in the
lottery, but when the prize is 1 euro lower, you would not. This prize we call
t h el o w e s tr e q u i r e dp r i z ef o ry o ut op a r t i c i p a t ei nt h i sl o t t e r y .
Question 2: Imagine you could participate in a lottery where you lose X2
(randomized, 500 or 1000) with 50% chance. With the same probability you
can win a certain amount of money. What is the lowest acceptable prize for
you to participate in this lottery? .... Euro
Question 3: Imagine you could participate in a lottery where you lose
100 euro with P% (randomized, 20, 30 or 40) chance. With (100-P)% chance
you can win a certain amount of money. The probability of loosing in this
lottery is therefore smaller. What is in this case the lowest acceptable prize
foryoutoparticipateinthislottery? .... Euro
Question 4: Imagine you could participate in a lottery where you lose 100
euro with P% (randomized, 80, 70 or 60) chance. With (100-P)% chance you
can win a certain amount of money. The probability of loosing in this lottery
is therefore larger. What is the lowest acceptable prize for you to participate
in this lottery? .... Euro
Question 5: In the next question you are asked to choose between two
lotteries, A and B. In lottery A you win 100 euro with 30% chance and
nothing otherwise. In lottery B you win with 50% chance a larger amount
of money, but at the same time you lose 100 euro with 50% chance. Please
indicate in each row which lottery you prefer, A or B.88 Joint Estimation of Loss Aversion and Probability Weighting Function
Lottery A Lottery B Your
You win with You win with You lose with You win with choice
30% chance 70% chance 50% chance 50% chance
100 euro 0 euro 100 euro 150 euro A/B?
100 euro 0 euro 100 euro 200 euro A/B?
100 euro 0 euro 100 euro 250 euro A/B?
100 euro 0 euro 100 euro 300 euro A/B?
100 euro 0 euro 100 euro 350 euro A/B?
100 euro 0 euro 100 euro 400 euro A/B?
100 euro 0 euro 100 euro 500 euro A/B?
100 euro 0 euro 100 euro 700 euro A/B?
100 euro 0 euro 100 euro 900 euro A/B?
Same “soft” consistency check here.
The answer “Lottery B: with 50% chance you win” is randomized as four
choices:
1234
150 euro 900 euro 100 euro 900 euro
200 euro 700 euro 200 euro 800 euro
250 euro 500 euro 300 euro 700 euro
300 euro 400 euro 400 euro 600 euro
350 euro 350 euro 500 euro 500 euro
400 euro 300 euro 600 euro 400 euro
500 euro 250 euro 700 euro 300 euro
700 euro 200 euro 800 euro 200 euro
900 euro 150 euro 900 euro 100 euro
Question 6: In lottery A you can win X6 euro (randomized, 500 or 1000)
with 10% chance. In case you do not win, you win or lose nothing. In lottery
B you win with 50% chance X6 euro, but in case you do not win, you lose
a certain amount of money. What is the highest acceptable loss for you to
participate in this lottery? .... Euro
Question 7: In lottery A you can win X7 euro (randomized, 50 or 100)
with 80% chance. In case you do not win, you win or lose nothing. In lottery
By o uw i nac e r t a i na m o u n to fm o n e yw i t h5 0 %c h a n c e ,b u ti nc a s ey o ud o
not win, you lose 2*X7 euro. What is the lowest acceptable prize for you to
participate in this lottery? .... EuroChapter 5
Modelling Mobility and
Housing Tenure Choice
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Housing tenure choice (renting or owning a dwelling) is an important de-
cision for all households and closely linked to housing consumption. In most
industrialized countries, housing expenditure makes up a substantial share of
the household budget on average. For example, as a whole, households in the
United States spent almost one third of their total budget on housing during
the years 1998-20021. Moreover, for home owners, the investment in the own
home is typically much larger than the amount held in ﬁnancial assets, such
as saving accounts, stocks, or bonds, and a mortgage on the house is the
most important form of debt holding.
Modelling the household’s choice between renting and owning is not straight-
forward. A seminal article is Henderson and Ioannides (1983)2.I n t h e i r
theoretical framework, if there were no transaction cost, tax distortion or
borrowing constraint, the household’s tenure choice would be entirely de-
termined by the diﬀerence between two kinds of demands for housing: in-
vestment demand and consumption demand. Ioannides and Rosental (1994)
empirically analyzed the relationship of housing tenure choice, consumption,
and investment demand for housing under this stylized theoretical structure
in a static model.
Housing tenure choice is closely linked to residential mobility. We of-
ten observe that a household moves and changes its housing tenure choice
at the same time. It is very diﬃcult to distinguish the causality of mov-
ing and tenure-choice because of lack of data. Some households may decide
to move ﬁrst, and then choose between renting and owning. Changing the
tenure choice ﬁrst may be the motive for others; then, in most cases, in or-
der to change the status from renter to owner or vice versa, they need to
move. For a long time, the housing tenure choice and residential mobility
have been studied separately in the literature. There are only few exceptions.
Boehm (1981) is one of the ﬁrst to recognize that the household decides on
the housing tenure choice and residential mobility jointly, and employed a
multinomial logit model to capture this feature. Ioannides and Kan (1996)
used a dynamic multinomial probit model with random eﬀects to estimate
the probabilities of the choices stay, move & rent,a n dmove & own.T h e i r
probit model allows for a more ﬂexible error structure than the correspond-
ing multinomial logit model. Kan (2000) used a dynamic random eﬀects
simultaneous equations model for the household’s housing tenure choice, the
residential mobility decision, and the expectation of future mobility.
In these dynamic models, a lagged dependent variable is used as one of
1From expenditure shares tables, 1998-2002. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor. http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxshare.htm.
2See also Fu (1991).91
the explanatory variables to model state dependence. The household’s lagged
tenure status and lagged moving decision in the ﬁrst sample period cannot
be observed, resulting in an initial conditions problem. In short panels, this
needs to be accounted for in order to get consistent estimates of dynamic
discrete choice models with random eﬀects, as already discussed by Heckman
(1981). Ioannides and Kan (1996), and Kan (2000) assume that the initial
conditions are exogenous, leading to consistent estimates if the number of
panel waves tends to inﬁnity. Heckman (1981) shows that this problem may
lead to biased estimates in short panels and suggest solutions for this.
This paper has a similar structure for the econometric model as Ioannides
and Kan (1996): a dynamic binary probit model with random eﬀects is used
to model the household moving decision and a dynamic multinomial probit
model with random eﬀe c t si su s e dt om o d e lt h eh o u s e h o l dt e n u r ec h o i c ea n d
residential mobility decisions jointly. The main methodological novelty of
the present study compared to the existing panel data models of Ioannides
and Kan (1996) and Kan (2000) is to account for the initial conditions in
an appropriate way for a short panel: Following Heckman (1981), the initial
conditions are modelled by using ﬂexible reduced form equations. We use
the method of maximum simulated likelihood and the GHK (Geweke - Ha-
jivassiliou - Keane) simulator to estimate the model, allowing for a ﬂexible
structure of error terms.
The model is applied to the Dutch housing market, using an unbalanced
panel containing ten annual waves. In line with ﬁnding in the literature, the
probability to move is signiﬁcantly lower for home owners than for renters,
keeping other variables constant. We ﬁnd a robust and interesting age pattern
of the households’ moving and housing tenure choice decisions. When the
head of the household is young, the moving rate is high, and the household
is more likely to rent. Around retirement age of the head of household, the
probability of moving attains its minimum and the probability of ownership
attains a maximum. After the usual retirement age, the moving rate increases
and the household becomes more likely to change to renting.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We give a brief de-
scription of the Dutch housing market and household moving rates in Section
2. We describe the data we use, the CentER Panel 1994-2003, in Section 3.
We present the econometric models and discuss how these can be estimated
in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss the estimation results, and the con-
clusions are given in Section 6. In the appendix we introduce a behavioral
model, which constitutes a theoretical framework for the econometric models.92 Modelling Mobility and Housing Tenure Choice
5.1 The Dutch Housing Market and Moving
Rates
It is well known that the social rented dwelling sector plays an important
role in the Dutch housing market. After World War II, the Netherlands has
experienced a housing shortage until recently; large numbers of social rented
dwellings were built in order to solve this problem. The market share of the
social rented dwelling sector had been growing continuously for more than
40 years since World War II, and reached its peak in the early 1990s, when
41% of the total housing stock belonged to this sector.
Social housing provides dwellings of reasonable quality at relatively low
prices for families whose incomes are below some threshold. Other than in
the United States, it does not only give access to the poor families: many
Dutch households with median or even higher income live in social rented
housing. Consequently, the home-ownership rate of Dutch households is still
relatively low compared to the United States, although it has been rising
remarkably in the last 40 years, see Figure 5.13. The Dutch home-ownership
rate was 54% in the year 2000 compared to 66.2% in the United States.
See Priemus (1998, 2000), and van Kempen and Priemus (2002) for a more
detailed discussion of the Dutch housing market4.
Compared to the United States, the household moving rate, deﬁned as the
percentage of households that moved in a year, is very low in the Netherlands.
It is only around 5% in the late 1990s, see Figure 5.25, less than one third of
the United States’ level6. Furthermore, there are relatively more renters in
the Netherlands than in the United States. In addition, in the United States
renters move much more frequently than owners. For example, in the year
1999, 34.7% of the renters and 8.2% of the owners moved in the previous
3The data in Table 1 are taken from van Kempen and Priemus (2002) (years 1960—85),
from the Ministry of Housing (VROM; year 1989), and from Housing Demand Surveys
(years 1990-1999) by Statistics Netherlands.
4The situation is similar in Germany, where owner-occupied housing has also increased
over the past years, but remains at a rather low level, even compared to other EU countries.
In 1998, the home-ownership rate in Germany was 40.9% (43.1% in former West-Germany).
The data comes from the Federal Statistical Oﬃce Germany, 2002.
5We use the household moving rate for CentER Panel; for the CBS data the percentage
of the total population moved (except those do not live within a family) in the previous
year is used.
6In the United States, the residential housing market is extremely dynamic, the house-
hold moving rates are 17.6% and 17.0% in 1997 and 1999, respectively. See “The Ameri-
can Housing Survey”, from the website of U.S. Census Bureau, in particular, for the year
1997: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs97/ahs97.html and for the the
year 1999: http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/h150-99.pdf.5.1 The Dutch Housing Market and Moving Rates 93
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year so that the moving rate of renters in 1999 was more than three times
higher than that of owners.
T h eh u g ed i ﬀerence in the household moving rate between these two coun-
tries may be due to diﬀerent structures of the housing market, geographic,
cultural, and economic or social diﬀerences. The huge diﬀerence could be
partly explained by the big market share of the social rented housing sec-
tor in the Netherlands. Quite a lot of evidence indicates that renters move
less frequently and consume less on housing in rent-controlled housing mar-
kets than their optimal status without rent-control, see, for example, Olsen
(1990), Clark and Heskin (1982) for the U.S., and Turner (1988) for Swe-
den. A detailed review of rent control can be found in Turner and Malpezzi
(2003). The other reason might be that, compared to the United States,
the Netherlands is a very small country with a convenient and concentrated
public transportation system; as a result, even when people change their
jobs, commuting is potentially a good alternative for moving.7 Ekamper and
van Wissen (2000) found some evidence of substituting commuting for do-
mestic migration, pointing at the remarkable increase of the total number of
commuting persons in the Netherlands after 1987, especially in the period
1989-1992. Though the overall increase of commuting diminished in the pe-
riod 1992-1997, the increase of commuting was even higher for those regions
with positive employment growth.
5.2 Data
The data we use is an unbalanced panel with ten waves (1994-2003)8 taken
from the DNB Household Survey (formerly known as the VSB Panel, then
the CentER Savings Survey). Data is collected every year for a panel of more
than 1,500 households. The data contains rich information about employ-
ment, pensions, accommodation, mortgages, income, assets, debts, health,
economic and psychological concepts, and personal characteristics.
The variables we use to estimate the model stem from several parts of
the questionnaire. We employ a dynamic model and, therefore, only use the
7Job mobility in the Netherlands is of the same order of magnitude as in the US: In
our data (1994-2000), at least one member of the household has changed job since the
previous year in 17.2% households, on average; according to Ioannides and Kan (1996),
15.1% of the households in the U.S. (1970-1987) have job-changes every year.
8Data from the ﬁrst two years (1993 and 1994) are merged into one wave. The survey
of the 1994-wave was conducted over the period May through December 1994, while the
1993-wave had only ﬁnished by the end of April 1994. As a consequence, households who
answered the questions about their accommodations in the 1993-wave did not answer the
same questions again in the 1994-wave.5.2 Data 95
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households that participate in at least two consecutive waves. There is a
very small number of households that change tenure status without moving,
about 0.6% of all observations. These observations are deleted, and our
models assume that households can only change tenure status by moving.9
A total of 4,189 households and 15,320 observations are used for estimation.
Table 5.1 shows the structure of the unbalanced panel that is retained for
the estimations. The balanced subpanel of households that are included in
the panel during all ten waves consists of only 141 households. Therefore, we
will use the complete unbalanced panel in all the estimations.10 The average
time that one household stays in the panel is 3.7 years for the data we use.
As mentioned before, the moving rate is quite low in the Netherlands,
around 5% per year on average over the years 1994-2003. In ﬁgure 5.2, we
9Dutch households rarely change their housing tenure choice without moving: renters
can buy the dwellings they rent before and become owners; and owners can sell their
dwellings and still live there as renters; owners can also change their housing consumption
without moving by reconstructing their house, but we ignore them because we cannot
observe these in our data. In recent years, the Dutch government started to encourage
households to buy the dwellings they were renting, but in practice the sale of rented
dwellings is negligible even in recent years. See van Kempen and Priemus (2002) for a
more detailed discussion.
10The small number of observations in the 2000 wave is probably due to a change in
interviewing technique; since 2000, the panel is internet based.96 Modelling Mobility and Housing Tenure Choice
Table 5.1: Structure of the unbalanced panel
By wave By number of waves
Year Number of Obs. Number of waves Obs. Number of households
1994 2,113 2 2,992 1,496
1995 2,464 3 3,207 1,069
1996 2,203 4 2,604 651
1997 1,928 5 1,420 284
1998 1,550 6 1,890 315
1999 1,202 7 742 106
2000 791 8 704 88
2001 966 9 351 39
2002 1,111 10 1,410 141
2003 992
Total 15,320 Total 15,320 4,189
Left panel: Year is the survey year, in total we have ten waves, 1994-2003.
Right Panel: Number of waves that the households stay in the panel.
compare our data with the aggregate moving rates published by Statistics
Netherlands (CBS). CBS data comes from its online service, StatLine, the
central database of Statistics Netherlands. The two rates are quite similar,
suggesting that our data is representative for the residential mobility in the
Netherlands.
Table 5.2 contains descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent
variables used in the empirical models, the deﬁnitions of all variables can be
found in the appendix. The total moving rate (m) c a nb ed e c o m p o s e di nt h e
moving rate of renters (7.3%) and that of owners (2.9%), showing that the
group of renters is a more mobile group than the group of owners. If owners
move, more than 86% of them keep the same tenure mode: homeowner as
before; but for renters, less than half, only 48% retain their status as a
renter. Table 5.3 contains the transition matrices of the household mobility
and tenure choices. The moving rate is 4.4% for those households that did
not move in the previous year, higher than the rate 2.7% of those that already
moved in the previous year. Compared to the 3.7% of the households that
change from renter to owner, only 0.4% of the households change from owner
to renter.5.2 Data 97
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
m 0.0513 0.221 0 1
mt−1 0.0535 0.225 0 1
tc 0.677 0.468 0 1
tct−1 0.674 0.468 0 1
age 4.83 1.39 1.9 10.2
age-sq. 2.53 1.42 0.361 10.4
school2 0.279 0.448 0 1
school3 0.417 0.493 0 1
morct−1 0.0874 0.282 0 1
nchild 0.783 1.12 0 7
nadult 1.76 0.467 1 6
div 0.0104 0.100 0 1
jobch 0.166 0.367 0 1
retiret−1 0.0372 0.187 0 1
logrt−1 0.00 0.210 -4.53 4.75
ratiot−1 0.00 0.796 -0.994 4.41
loghvt−1 0.00 .631 -5.22 4.42
logwt−1 6.30 7.13 -13.86 15.01
Note: the lagged variable labelled t − 1 has only
11,131 obs. while total obs. is 15,320.
Table 5.3: Transition matrixs of the househould mobility and tenure choice
Household mobility Household tenure choice
In the year t In the year t − 1 In the year t In the year t − 1
Stay Move Renter Owner
Stay 95.6% 97.3% Renter 96.3 0.4%
Move 4.4% 2.7% Owner 3.7% 99.6%
Total 100% 100% Total 100% 100%98 Modelling Mobility and Housing Tenure Choice
5.3 Econometric Model
In this section we present the econometric models that we employ in our
estimation. The appendix contains a behavioural model, which serves as a
motivation for the econometric models.
Discrete choice models are often used to model the discrete alternatives
chosen by decision-makers. Among cross-section data discrete choice models,
the multinomial (and binomial) logit and probit model are the most popular
ones. The multinomial logit model exhibits restrictive substitution patterns
between choice options due to the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA) property; its generalization to panel data has the drawback that it
cannot be used when unobserved factors are correlated over time and/or al-
ternatives for each decision-maker. The multinomial probit model can solve
the IIA problem. The probit model is based on the assumption that the
unobserved factors are jointly normally distributed, allowing for complicated
patterns of correlation. Compared to the logit model, the ﬂexibility in han-
dling correlations over alternatives and time is the main advantage of the
probit model. Therefore, we use a dynamic binary choice model to describe
the moving decision and a dynamic multinomial probit model for the joint
decision of moving and tenure choice.
5.3.1 A Binary Choice Model for Moving Decisions
In time t, the household can choose from two possibilities: stay,o rmove.
The decision will be based upon the diﬀerence in utility between moving






it = Vit + εit i =1 ,···,N; t =1 ,···,T
The household chooses to move if Uit > 0, resulting in yit =1 , otherwise the
household chooses to stay, i.e., yit =0 . Here Uit is the diﬀerence in utility
of household i in time period t consisting of a systematic part (Vit), repre-
senting the eﬀects of observed factors, and an error term (εit), representing
the unobserved factors. We postulate that the systematic part Vit includes




where Xit is a vector of observed socioeconomic variables that may inﬂuence
the household’s moving decision, the lagged variable yit−1 captures the state
dependence, and β and γ are parameters. Thus we can write
yit =1 ( X
0
itβ + γyit−1 + εit > 0)5.3 Econometric Model 99
The parameter γ is expected to be negative: a household that just moved
has adjusted its housing consumption recently towards an optimal value, and,
unless a large shock takes place, it is unlikely to move again because moving
is costly.11
We use a random eﬀects structure for the unobserved factors, so εit =
ηi + δit,w h e r eηi is a household-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n tw h i c hr e ﬂects a time
invariant unobserved component of the cost of moving; δit is the time variant
part, for which we allow for an AR(1) structure: δit = ρδδit−1 + ζit.
We also need to specify the initial conditions (ICs) for the dynamic
process, see Heckman (1981), and Heckman and Singer (1986) for a detailed
discussion on this. We follow the approach suggested by Heckman (1981),
which consists of using a ﬂexible reduced form to approximate the initial con-
ditions. We implement this approach by using the initial period regressors
(Xi0)f o ryi0 and allowing the initial period error term (εi0)t ob ec o r r e l a t e d
with other period errors (εit) in an arbitrary way. Hyslop (1999) uses the
same approach and compares it with several other ways to deal with the ini-
tial conditions, estimating an intertemporal labor force participation model
of married women.
With these inputs we can present the model. For households i =1 ,...,N,
we model
yi0 =1 ( X
0
i0β0 + εi0 > 0)
yit =1 ( X
0
itβ + γyit−1 + εit > 0) with εit = ηi + δit, t =1 ,···,T
where
δit = ρδit−1 + ζit.
By assumption, the error term subvector
(ηi,ζi1,···,ζiT,δi0)
0
follows a (T +2 )−variate normal distribution, with zero mean vector, and




















The resulting distribution of the subvector
 i =( εi1,···,ε iT)
0
11Alternatively, habit formation could induce a positive eﬀect, although we expect this
is less relevant for moving than for, for example, consumption.100 Modelling Mobility and Housing Tenure Choice












1 − ρ2, t,s =1 ,···,T.





follows a (T +1 )−variate normal distribution, with zero mean vector, and

























For identiﬁcation, we normalize both the variance of εi0 and δit equal to 1,
i.e., σ2
0 =1 ,and σ2
δ =1 . This latter condition means σ2
ζ =1−ρ2. In addition,
in order to reduce the number of parameters we have to estimate, we assume
that the absolute value of the correlations ρt between the errors in the initial
period and the other periods, εi0 and εit, t =1 ,...,T, is decreasing over time,
i.e., ρt = ρt
1,w h e r eρ1 is the correlation between εi0 and εi1.
Assuming a random sample (over the observations i =1 ,...,N)t h i sm o d e l
(and restricted versions of it) can be estimated by maximum simulated like-
lihood (MSL).
5.3.2 A Multinomial Probit Model for the Moving and
Tenure Choice Decisions
We use a dynamic multinomial probit model for the joint decisions of moving
and housing tenure choice. Households choose among three alternatives: stay
(S), move & rent (MR),a n dmove & own (MO). The utility household i







it j = {S,MR,MO}; t =1 ,···,T; i =1 ,···,N.
Without loss of generality, the normalization US
it =0can be imposed, or,
equivalently, UMR
it and UMO
it can be seen as the diﬀerences between the utility
of alternatives MRand MOwith the utility of the benchmark alternative S.5.3 Econometric Model 101
T h ec h o i c eo fh o u s e h o l di at time t is represented by two dummy variables,
representing the moving decision (M) and the tenure choice decision (TC):
Choice S (stay): Mit =0 ,TC it = TC i,t−1
Choice MR (move & rent): Mit =1 ,T C it =0
Choice MO (move & own): Mit =1 ,T C it =1
The observation rule for the multinomial probit model is given by
Stay ( Mit =0 ), if U
MR
it < 0 and U
MO
it < 0
Move & own (Mit =1 ,T C it =0 ), if U
MR





Move & rent (Mit =1 ,T C it =1 ), if U
MO





The utility of the alternatives move & rent (MR),a n dmove & own (MO),









































Here, V represents the systematic part and ε the error term. The systematic
part is modeled to depend on observed characteristics (xit) and past decisions
(Mi,t−1 and TCi,t−1). The past decisions (Mi,t−1 and TCi,t−1)a r ei n c l u d e d
to represent state dependence. We expect that β
j
2, j = MR, MO, will be
negative, because, in general, owners are less likely to move, both for move
&r e n tand move & own.T h es i g n so fβ
j
1, j = MR, MO,a r en o tv e r yc l e a r .
If we believe moving is costly, then β
j
1 should be negative. But if we think
there is “habit formation”, people who moved often in the past are more
likely to move and have lower moving cost than those who rarely move, then
β
j
1 m i g h tb ep o s i t i v e .T h es i g no fβ
j
1 depends on the magnitudes of these two
eﬀects.
Again following Heckman’s (1981) approach, we formulate static (“re-
duced form”) equations to approximate the initial conditions for Mi0 and
TCi0 at t =0 . This gives the following two binary probit equations for the
initial conditions:













i represents the unobserved factors in the tendency to move at t =0 ,
and eT
i the unobserved factors in preferences for owning versus renting at
t =0 .102 Modelling Mobility and Housing Tenure Choice
We denote the vector of error terms of household i for the alternatives j =












¢0 . As in the binary choice
model, we decompose the error term ε
j







it. The random eﬀects part, η
j
i, does not change over time.
We assume that the time varying part δ
j









Imposing distributional assumptions analogously to the binary choice case,
we obtain that εi follows a 2T−variate normal distribution, with zero mean






















0 then follows a 2T +2−variate normal distribution, where
we assume that the correlations between the ICs error terms and the other







 j ,   = M,T; j = MR,MO
where ρ j are correlation coeﬃcients between the error terms of ICs and the





it equal to 1.
Overall, we use model the covariance matrix of dimension 20×20 (using
T =9 ), with 12 parameters in total:
• the variances of ηMR
i , ηMO










• the autocorrelation coeﬃcients of the error terms ζ
MR




• the correlation coeﬃcients between the random eﬀects ηMR
i and ηMO
i
(ρη)a n db e t w e e nζ
MR
it , and ζ
MO
it (ρδ);
• the correlation coeﬃcients between eM
i and eT
i (ρM,T);
• and the correlation coeﬃcients between the error terms of the ICs eM
i0
and eT
i0 and the other periods errors εMR
it and εMO
it (ρM,MR, ρM,MO,
ρT,MR, and ρT,MO).5.4 Results 103
Again, we use the GHK simulator and the method of maximum simulated
likelihood (MSL) to estimate the model. Train (2003) gives a good introduc-
tion of how to use the GHK simulator and MSL to estimate the multinomial
probit model. Also see Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994).
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Binary Probit Models for Moving Decision
The results of binary probit models for the moving decision are presented
in table 5.4. For the sake of comparison, we estimate the model with and
without initial conditions (IC). When we estimate the model, we also use
eight time dummy variables, which are dummies for diﬀerent waves, in order
to allow for a time eﬀect. In the version without IC, 11,131 observations are
used. For the version with ICs, more observations, namely, 15,320 are used
because of the initial observations.12
Most results of the version without ICs are quite similar to the one esti-
mated with the ICs, but the parameters of lagged moving (mt−1)a n dρ,t h e
autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the error terms δit,a r ed i ﬀerent. The estimated
parameter of mt−1 in the model with ICs (-0.49) is much less signiﬁcant and
has much smaller absolute value than in the model without ICs (-0.73). The
same applies to ρ.
As discussed in the previous section, a negative eﬀect of the lagged depen-
dent variable mt−1 can reﬂect substantial moving costs that make it unattrac-
tive to adjust housing consumption shortly after it has been adjusted. Ap-
parently, the evidence for such an eﬀect is much weaker in the model that
t a k e sa c c o u n to ft h eI C s .I tm i g h ta l s ob et h ec a s et h a tt h i se ﬀect is partly
cancelled by the positive eﬀect of habit formation. Households that recently
moved may be able to move more eﬃciently (i.e., have lower cost of moving)
than those who did not recently move.
Without ICs there seems to be a clear signiﬁcant time persistence eﬀect,
both through state dependence and through individual heterogeneity via the
autocorrelation in δit. Notice that the estimations of ση are close to zero,
suggesting that the individual eﬀect is much less important than the time
varying errors δit, which have normalized variance 1. However, taking into
account the ICs, the time persistence parameters are not signiﬁcant anymore.
12Due to lack of data on earlier points in time, the lagged variables cannot be included
among the regressors in the initial condition equation. This means that we do not include
eight variables: mt−1,t c t−1,m o r c t−1,r e t i r e t−1, logrt−1,r a t i o t−1, loghvt−1, and logwt−1
in the ICs equation of the model with ICs.104 Modelling Mobility and Housing Tenure Choice
Possible inconsistency due to omitted ICs might thus particularly aﬀect the
understanding of state dependence and time persistency of the errors.
Table 5.4: Moving Decision Model
Without ICs With ICs
Variable Initial
Para. t-st. Para. t-st. Para. t-st.
mt−1 -0.733 -2.99 - - -0.491 -1.30
tct−1 -0.507 -8.83 - - -0.502 -8.74
age -0.622 -5.12 -1.13 -7.02 -0.583 -4.64
age-sq. 0.442 3.64 0.915 5.30 0.410 3.32
school2 0.051 0.79 -0.085 -1.00 0.052 0.82
school3 0.275 4.52 -0.024 -0.31 0.273 4.50
morct−1 0.171 2.00 - - 0.173 2.04
nchild -0.053 -2.31 -0.075 -2.29 -0.051 -2.20
nadult 0.277 5.43 0.034 0.47 0.271 5.27
div 0.368 1.89 0.365 1.67 0.366 1.90
jobch 0.206 3.42 0.173 2.30 0.207 3.42
retiret−1 0.164 1.23 - - 0.166 1.23
logrt−1 0.177 1.86 - - 0.175 1.84
ratiot−1 -0.167 -2.72 - - -0.167 -2.73
loghvt−1 -0.149 -2.26 - - -0.149 -2.27
logwt−1 0.002 0.46 - - 0.002 0.47
constant -0.140 -0.47 1.24 3.19 -0.265 -0.83
ση 0.001 0.02 0.00 0.01
ρ1 -0.241 -1.39
ρ 0.243 2.00 0.155 0.84
log-likelihood -1778.5 -2723.3
Note: 11,131 obs. in the model without ICs, 15,320 with ICs.
Other than in the complete model discussed below, tenure status is as-
sumed to be strictly exogenous here. As indicated by the regression coeﬃcient
of tct−1 and consistent with our prior expectations, the probability to move is
signiﬁcantly lower for home owners than for renters, keeping other variables
constant. This corresponds to the notion that moving costs, including costs
of selling the current dwelling, are higher for owners than for renters. The
small and insigniﬁcant parameter on retiret−1 shows that retirement has no
direct eﬀect on the probability of moving. The signiﬁcant parameters on age
(negative) and age-squared (positive) indicate that the probability of moving
is higher when the household head is younger, and falls with age until the5.4 Results 105
head of the household is about 71 years old. The model without ICs gives
almost the same estimation of the point where the minimum is attained, 70
years old. This result is consistent with the notion that younger households
more often adjust their housing consumption, due to, for example, the needs
of the children, an increasing income pattern, or diminishing importance of
liquidity constraints. After housing consumption is adjusted, the moving in-
tensity decreases. Around 70 years old, the household is in its most stable
phase of its life-cycle, and the probability of moving is the lowest. Ioannides
and Kan (1996) obtain two signiﬁcant parameters of age and age-squared
with the same signs as ours. Normally, 70 years old is ﬁve to ten years after
retirement, when income typically falls, so people of age around 70 might
already have used some part of their saving to support their non-housing
consumption. They are more likely to move to a cheaper place when they
are getting older, and sell the former expensive dwellings if they are own-
ers, e.g. to save money from housing consumption to support non-housing
consumption in old age.
Job changes and changes in household composition also aﬀect the prob-
ability of moving. If there is a job change, the household is more likely to
move, as expected; a divorce also increases the probability of moving, but
this is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level. With more adults in the household,
the probability of moving increases; and moving becomes less likely if the
number of children is larger. The latter result may be explained by the size
of the perceived moving costs, which can be higher if children have to move
schools, etc. The dummy variable school3 points out that the households
with a higher-educated head are more likely to move, perhaps because their
income is higher. The parameter of morct−1 shows that if the household faced
binding mortgage constraints in the previous year, it is more likely to move
and adjust its housing consumption.
If the moving cost is an increasing function of housing consumption, ht,
the parameters of logrt−1 and loghvt−1 should be negative. But we do not ob-
tain this kind of result. The positive parameter of logrt−1 (0.18, signiﬁcant at
the 10% level) and the negative one of loghvt−1 (-0.15) show that renters and
owners may have diﬀerent structures of moving costs. A renter with higher
rent is more likely to move than a renter with a low rent. An explanation
may be that the low rent families often live in socially protected housing with
an artiﬁcially low rent. If they move, they will either have to pay a much
higher rent or they will have to buy a house. Alternatively, a high rent may
indicate borrowing constraints, uncertainty, or expected changes. Moreover,
renters with a high rent are probablym o r el i k e l yt ob u yah o u s ea n dm o v e
into their own dwelling. We can investigate this in more detail in the next
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For owners, it is quite clear that a higher house value means a higher cost
of moving. This corresponds to what we ﬁnd: with a more expensive house,
the owner is less likely to move. The variable ratiot−1 shows the household’s
expected return on its dwelling, it has the same inﬂuence on the moving
decision as the house value. The signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of ratiot−1 implies
that with a higher expected return, the household might expect the price
of its dwelling to continue to increase in the future, leading to a smaller
probability to move. Ioannides and Kan (1996) get insigniﬁcant parameter
estimates on the real rent and the real house value, indicating that there
m i g h tb ed i ﬀerent moving cost functions for the U.S. and the Netherlands.
One such a diﬀerence may be the tax structure: every home purchase in the
Netherlands is taxed with 6% of the sales price.
5.4.2 Tenure Choice and Household Mobility
We use a dynamic multinomial probit model with the initial conditions to
estimate the joint decision of housing tenure choice and household mobility.
The results are presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. We also use eight time
dummies in order to capture the ﬂuctuations in the housing market over
time.
As we expected, the parameters of TC t−1, β
j
2,a r es i g n i ﬁcantly negative,
both for move & rent and move & own; this implies that owners are less
likely to move than renters. For Mt−1, the parameter in case of move & own
is signiﬁcantly negative, but in case of move & rent the parameter is close to
zero. These outcomes mean that if a household moved in the previous period,
this does not change the probability of move & rent, but the possibility move
&o w nbecomes less likely.
As seen in Table 5.6 the variances of the two random eﬀects ηMR
i and
ηMO
i are close to zero, like in the binary choice model for the moving decision,





it . There is a highly signiﬁcant autocorrelation
structure for the error terms δ
MO
it but not for δ
MR
it .
Thus, time persistency seems to be clearly present, both via path depen-
dence and via unobserved heterogeneity. However. in case of move & rent,
the main channel of time persistency seems to be the path dependence rep-
resented by tenure choice, while in case of move & own the path dependence
is via both path dependence and via unobserved heterogeneity. In both cases
the unobserved heterogeneity is via the household and time speciﬁci d i o s y n -
cratic eﬀects (δ), and not via the household speciﬁce ﬀects (η). The highly













is then what we expect: it means5.4 Results 107
Table 5.5: Result of multinomial probit model for MR and MO
Initial conditions Move Move
Variable Moving Own or rent & rent & own
Para. t-st. Para. t-st. Para. t-st. Para. t-st.
mt−1 -0.008 -0.03 -0.729 -5.68
tct−1 -0.750 -7.72 -0.273 -4.04
age -1.16 -7.37 1.26 12.1 -0.448 -3.27 -0.186 -2.06
ages 0.943 5.59 -1.17 -11.2 0.375 2.76 0.102 1.17
school2 -0.106 -1.31 0.316 5.65 -0.018 -0.22 0.047 1.20
school3 -0.014 -0.19 0.487 9.22 0.108 1.35 0.112 2.69
morct−1 0.107 0.63 0.035 0.73
nchild -0.063 -1.98 0.151 7.21 -0.040 -1.21 -0.012 -0.88
nadult 0.042 0.60 0.804 18.0 0.163 2.97 0.113 2.85
div 0.351 1.67 -0.207 -1.33 0.506 2.32 0.108 0.79
jobch 0.101 1.48 -0.215 -3.68 0.231 2.79 0.044 1.37
retire 0.001 0.01 0.102 1.18
logrt−1 -0.174 -1.66 0.076 1.28
ratiot−1 -0.099 -0.90 -0.031 -0.90
loghvt−1 -0.165 -1.11 -0.045 -1.27
logwt−1 -0.001 -0.20 0.000 -0.02
constant 1.27 3.34 -4.28 -17.0 -0.754 -2.15 -0.123 -0.66
Loglike. -4876.8108 Modelling Mobility and Housing Tenure Choice
that the probabilities of move & rent and move & own always change in the
same direction if there is an unexpected shock.
Table 5.6: The parameters of the variance matrix
ICs Multinomial Probit
Variable Para. t-st. Variable Para. t-st.
ρM,T -0.01 -0.18 σηMR 0.00 0.01
ρM,MR -0.09 -5.83 σηMO 0.00 0.00
ρM,MO 0.57 26.9 σζMO 0.41 4.94
ρT,MR 0.05 0.60 ρMR -0.05 -0.78
ρT,MO 0.24 5.18 ρMO 0.56 24.9
ρη 0.00 0.00
ρδ 0.92 25.4
Two kinds of moves can be distinguished: moving within the region (intra-
regional moves) and moving between diﬀerent regions (inter-regional moves).
When the household wants to move to another region, it often cannot directly
ﬁnd a suitable dwelling to rent or buy in that region. If the incentive to
move is strong enough, the household might then ﬁrst move to an imperfect
dwelling in the new region, and will then adjust its housing consumption
again after it has found a more suitable dwelling, thus, moving within the
same region. This implies that an inter-regional move is often followed by an
intra-regional move13. According to our data, the Netherlands shows a similar
job mobility as the United States. But the Netherlands is a small country,
and commuting can be a good substitute for moving, even for inter-regional
moving. This makes it less likely to observe an inter-regional move followed
by an intra-regional move. This might explain why the moving rate in the
Netherlands is so low. Only 0.89% of the households move more than once
in our data, and only 0.33% households have moved twice in two subsequent
years, providing some evidence that the Dutch households do not need to
move twice if they want to change region. This makes the moving decision
much more important than the housing tenure choice in the Netherlands,
and might explain why the probabilities of move & rent and move & own
13In the US, around 60% of all moves are within county moves. For example, between
March 1999 and March 2000, 56% of those moves were local (within the same county),
20% were between counties in the same state, and only 19% were moves to a diﬀerent
state. This data of moving is based on individuals, not household, but the results should
be similar. Data comes from Current Population Reports, Geographical Mobility (P20),
U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-538.pdf.5.5 Conclusion 109
change in the same directions, with a highly positive correlation coeﬃcient
of the error terms.
The parameters of age and age-squared are all signiﬁcant except the one
of age-squared for move & own. The initial conditions of moving show a sim-
ilar age-pattern as in the binary moving model: the probability of moving
is higher when the household head is younger, decreasing with age until the
head of the household is retired, and increasing with age beyond retirement
age. The initial conditions of owning or renting have an opposite age-pattern
to moving. This is consistent with the ﬁnding that owners move less fre-
quently than renters. The probability of owning a dwelling is low when the
household head is younger, increases with age until the head of the household
is around retirement age, and falls with age when the head of the household
is beyond retirement age. The probabilities of move & rent changes with a
similar age-pattern like the ICs of moving, but move & own has a slightly
diﬀerent pattern: the probability of move & own is always decreasing with
age.
School3 makes the household more likely to move & own.S e v e r a l v a r i -
ables, like nchild, morct−1, retire, logrt−1,r a t i o t−1,l o g h v t−1 and logwt−1,t h e y
all have no signiﬁcant eﬀect both on move & rent and move & own. With
more adults in the household, the household is more likely both move & rent
and move & own. But divorce and job-changing make the household more
likely to move & rent rather then move & own.
5.5 Conclusion
Where and how to live are important decisions for all households. In this
paper we estimated, using the method of simulated maximum likelihood, a
dynamic binary probit model with random eﬀects to quantify the household
moving decision and a dynamic multinomial probit model with random eﬀects
to quantify the household tenure choice and residential mobility jointly. We
estimated the models using a Dutch unbalanced panel consisting of ten waves.
The main methodological novelty of our paper is to account for the initial
conditions in an appropriate way, as is required in such a relatively short
panel, following the suggestion in Heckman (1981).
Our empirical ﬁn d i n g sc a nb es u m m a r i z e da sf o l l o w s . F i r s t ,i nc a s eo f
t h eb i n a r yc h o i c em o d e l ,w ec o m p a r et h e outcomes with and without initial
conditions (ICs). Most results of the version without ICs are quite similar
to the ones estimated with the ICs, but the inference on the parameter of
lagged moving (mt−1) as well as the autocorrelation of the individual and
time speciﬁc error terms turn out to be clearly diﬀerent. This suggests that110 Modelling Mobility and Housing Tenure Choice
the inference on time persistency and state dependence is sensitive to the
presence or absence of the initial conditions, indicating the importance of
including and modelling ICs in an appropriate way.
Secondly, the time persistency seems to be absent in the binary choice
model with ICs. But in case of the multinomial probit model, time persis-
tency seems to be clearly present, both via path dependence and via unob-
served heterogeneity in case of move & own and mainly via path dependence
represented by tenure choice in case of move & rent. The unobserved het-
erogeneity seems to be mainly via the time speciﬁc idiosyncratic eﬀects, and
not so much via the household speciﬁce ﬀects.
Thirdly, and in line with our expectations, we ﬁnd that the probability to
move is signiﬁcantly lower for home owners than for renters, keeping other
variables constant. This corresponds to the notion that moving costs, in-
cluding costs of selling the current dwelling, are higher for owners than for
renters.
Finally, we get a robust age pattern of the households’ housing decisions
in our models. In the binary choice model, we ﬁnd that the probability of
moving falls with the age of the head of household, until the head reaches the
age of 70, when the probability of moving starts increasing again. This age-
pattern is conﬁrmed in the multinomial probit model. So, when the head of
the household is young, the moving rate is high, and the household is more
likely to rent, while round retirement age, the household has the smallest
probability of moving and the highest probability of owning a dwelling. After
retirement age, the moving rate increases and the household becomes more
likely to change to renting.5.6 Appendix to Chapter 5 111
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Appendix A: Variable Deﬁnitions
mD u m m y v a r i a b l e o f m o v i n g : 0 s t a y ; 1 m o v e .
mt−1 Lagged dummy variable of moving.
tc Dummy variable of the housing tenure choice: 0 rent; 1
own.
tct−1 Lagged dummy variable of tenure choice.
age Age of the head of household / 10.
age-sq Age square of the head of household / 1000.
school2 Dummy variable of head-of-hh-s education level 2: 0 no, 1
yes.
school3 Dummy variable of head-of-hh-s education level 3: 0 no, 1
yes.
morc Mortgage constraint, comes from the question: “Would you
have chosen to buy a more expensive house if you had been
able to receive a larger mortgage loan on the basis of your
income at that time?” 0 no 1 yes.
morct−1 Lagged dummy of mortgage constraint: 0 no, 1 yes; 0 for
all renter.
nchild Number of children in the household.
nadult Number of adults in the household.
div Dummy variable of divorce in last three years: 0 no, 1 yes.
jobch Dummy variable of job changing in the previous year: 0
no, 1 yes.
retire Dummy variable of retirement in the previous year: 0 no,
1y e s .
logr (log rent) — (mean of log rent) for renter; 0 for owner.
logrt−1 Lagged logr.
ratio (ratioexp) — (mean of ratioexp) for owner, 0 for renter.
ratioexp=expected selling price of the house now / house
value,
using 3% as the appreciation rate of the house value
ratiot−1 Lagged ratio.
loghv (log house value) — (mean of log house value) for owner, 0
for renter.
loghvt−1 Lagged loghv.
logwt−1 Lagged variable of log total wealth.112 Modelling Mobility and Housing Tenure Choice
Appendix B: Behavioral Model
In this appendix, we present a dynamic behavioral model in which a
household maximizes its utility of housing and non-housing consumption and
decides on the housing tenure choice and residential mobility simultaneously.
We use the structure of expected utility over an inﬁnite lifetime to model
the household’s problem of utility maximization. We assume that every
household can have only two kinds of assets: one is the risk free ﬁnancial asset
with a ﬁx e dr e t u r n ,g i v e nb yt h ei n t e r e s tr a t er; the other one is the house
with an uncertain return. We assume that preferences are intertemporally
separable. In each period, every household makes a decision about whether
to move or not and whether to rent or to own a dwelling, and decides on its
housing and non-housing consumption at the same time.
We assume that the household’s utility is only determined by its hous-
ing and non-housing consumption. The moving decision and housing tenure
choice do not enter the utility function directly, they will aﬀect the house-
hold’s utility only through the budget constraint. In each period, the house-
hold will choose its non-housing consumption ct and housing consumption ht
conditional on its moving decision and tenure choice together, so as to maxi-
mize the expected utility of its remaining lifetime. The household’s expected









where U(·) is the utility in one period, Xt is a vector of characteristics of
t h eh o u s e h o l di np e r i o dt, capturing shifts of the household’s tastes, and
δ is the discount factor of utility, representing the household’s rate of time
preference. We assume that the household can only change the housing
consumption and tenure choice by moving. In each period, the household
can decide to move to a rented or owned dwelling in order to adjust its
housing and non-housing consumptions jointly and maximize the expected
utility of its remaining lifetime. We also assume that the household can only
move or change its tenure choice once in a period14. Following the standard
approach, an intertemporal budget constraint with an inﬁnite time horizon
is used, abstracting from mortality risk and bequest motives.
In each period, combining the decisions of housing tenure choice and
household mobility, there are three options for all households, both for renters
and owners. A renter can choose among: staying at the same place and
14Households might move more than once in one period (a year), but it is not so common
and we did not observe it in our data.5.6 Appendix to Chapter 5 113
remaining as a renter, moving and renting a new place, or moving and be-
coming an owner. Similarly, a homeowner can also choose to stay at the
same dwelling and remain as an owner, to move and rent a new place (and
thus become a renter), or to move and own a new place. We assume that
the household solves the problem of the housing tenure choice and moving
decision simultaneously in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, it solves the utility
m a x i m i z a t i o np r o b l e mf o re a c hp o s s i b l ec h o i c e( s t a y ,m o v e&r e n t ,m o v e&
own) separately, conditional on its former tenure choice, moving decision, its
characteristics and given the budget constraint (which we will discuss it in
detail later on). In the second step, the household will choose one of its three
available alternatives, which gives it the maximum utility.
Let Rt denote the renting price of per unit of housing consumption for
the dwelling in period t, At is the household’s total amount of ﬁnancial
assets in period t.I f At is a negative number, it could be interpreted as a
debt, for example, the household might have a mortgage loan for buying a
house15. yt is the labor income in period t,a n dr is the interest rate, which is
assumed a constant over time. We use two dummy variables, TC t and Mt,t o
represent the household’s tenure choice and moving decision respectively. If
the household is an owner in period t, the tenure choice TCt =1 ;o t h e r w i s e
TCt =0 . If the household moves in period t, the moving dummy satisﬁes
Mt =1 ; otherwise Mt =0 .
Ioannides and Kan (1996) used a similar standard life-cycle model, but
with a relatively simple budget constraint. Compared to their model, we take
advantage of a more complicated budget constraint with dummy variables
in order to model the decision procedure more clearly in a single equation.
Ignoring the maintenance costs of owner-occupied housing and restrictions on









(1 + r)τ−t[yτ + Mτ−1[TC]τ−1hτ−1Pτ]
The left hand side of the equation is the total life-cycle consumption plus
actual moving cost in case of moving. cτ is the household non-housing con-
sumption in period τ. (1−[TC]τ)hτRτ is the cost of renting if the household
i sar e n t e r ,0f o ra no w n e r .Mτ−1[TC]τhτPτ is the price of buying a dwelling
if the household moved in the previous time and is an owner now. Finally,
Mτmcτ is the moving cost if the household decides to move. The right hand
15We assume that households will have no assets left at the end of their lifetme.114 Modelling Mobility and Housing Tenure Choice
side of the equation is the total life-cycle income. At−1 is the initial assets in
time t−1; yτ is the household income in period τ, assumed to be given exoge-
nously; and Mτ−1[TC]τ−1hτ−1Pτ is the price of selling the previous dwelling
if the household was an owner and moved.
At the time t, a former renter in previous period (tct−1 =0 ) will choose
the option among the following three choices combining housing tenure choice
and moving decision together: stay as a renter, move and rent, and move and
own, which gives a maximum utility for the renter. Note that the budget
constraint depends on which option is chosen.
1. Stay as a renter, then ht = ht−1, tct = tct−1 =0 , mt =0 ,
max
{ct,ht,tct,mt}
U(ct,h t = ht−1)+βEtV (ct,h t = ht−1,tc t =0 ,m t =0 ;Xt+1)
where EtV (·) is the household’s expected utility of the remaining life-
time.
2. Move and rent, then tct = tct−1 =0 , mt =1 ,
max
{ct,ht,tct,mt}
U(ct,h t)+βEtV (ct,h t,tc t =0 ,m t =1 ;Xt+1)
3. Move and own, then tct =1 , tct−1 =0 , mt =1 ,
max
{ct,ht,tct,mt}
U(ct,h t)+βEtV (ct,h t,tc t =1 ,m t =1 ;Xt+1)
Similarly, a former owner in previous period (tct−1 =1 )c h o o s e st h ea l t e r -
native among the following three alternatives that gives the highest utility
subject to the budget constraint.
1. Stay as an owner, ht = ht−1, tct = tct−1 =1 , mt =0
max
{ct,ht,tct,mt}
U(ct,h t = ht−1)+βEtV (ct,h t = ht−1,tc t =1 ,m t =0 ;Xt+1)
2. Move and rent, tct =0 , tct−1 =1 , mt =1
max
{ct,ht,tct,mt}
U(ct,h t)+βEtV (ct,h t,tc t =0 ,m t =1 ;Xt+1)
3. Move and own, tct = tct−1 =1 , mt =1
max
{ct,ht,tct,mt}
U(ct,h t)+βEtV (ct,h t,tc t =1 ,m t =1 ;Xt+1)5.6 Appendix to Chapter 5 115
The main link between the theoretical model and the econometric model is
that moving costs enter the econometric model through state dependence:
if moving is costly, tenure choice in this period will aﬀect tenure choice and
moving decision next period. Moreover, adjustment of housing consumption
will be lumpy: instead of moving every year to adjust housing consumption
immediately and gradually, it will be optimal to move less often and then
adjust housing consumption substantially. This may lead to a negative state
dependence in moving decisions: people who have just moved are less likely
to move again in the next year.116 Modelling Mobility and Housing Tenure ChoiceBibliography
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Dit proefschrift is gebaseerd op vier onafhankelijke artikelen. De eerste drie
gaan over de interacties tussen preferentiekenmerken, zoals verliesafkeer (‘loss
aversion’), referentiepunten, verdisconteringsvoeten, risico-aversie, en hoe de-
mograﬁsche en socio-economische variabelen deze kenmerken be"invloeden.
Hoofdstuk twee is een artikel over de tijdsvoorkeur van winsten en ver-
liezen. Speciaal ontwikkelde experimenten, maar ook empirische studies
hebben laten zien dat mensen geneigd zijn winsten meer te verdisconteren
dan verliezen, en dat er verschillen zijn in de wijze waarop uitstel van be-
talingen in vergelijking met vervroegde betalingen worden verdisconteerd.
Zulke verschillen in verdisconteringsvoeten kunnen belangwekkende gevolgen
hebben voor de analyse van de uitkomsten van economisch beleid, waardoor
een beter begrip ervan belangrijk is. Gebruikmakend van een representatief
huishoudpanelbestand worden de ge"impliceerde verdisconteringsvoeten van
de volgende vier scenario’s geanalyseerd: uitstel van winst, uitstel van ver-
lies, vervroegde winst en vervroegd verlies. Eerst wordt er een samenvat-
ting gegeven van de bestaande literatuur over de relaties die er bestaan
tussen verdisconteringsvoeten en andere individuele karakteristieken. Ver-
volgens worden de verbanden onderzocht tussen de verdisconteringsvoeten
en vaak geobserveerde demograﬁsche grootheden, zoals geslacht en leeftijd,
maar ook subjectieve grootheden, zoals prijsverwachtingen. Veel van deze
variabelen hebben een signiﬁcante invloed op de verdisconteringsvoeten en
—belangrijker— deze variabelen be"invloeden de verschillende verdisconter-
ingsvoeten op verschillende wijze. Zulke verschillen bieden de mogelijkheid
om scenario-speciﬁeke individuele verdisconteringsvoeten te genereren. We
laten niet-geobserveerde heterogeniteit toe. Dit verklaart voor een belan-
grijk deel de spreiding in de geobserveerde verdisconteringsvoeten. Inter-
essant genoeg blijken de niet-geobserveerde heterogeniteit en de resterende
storingstermen onderling gecorreleerd te zijn tussen de vier scenario’s. De
waargenomen relaties kunnen worden gebruikt voor zowel een beter begrip
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als het doen van voorspellingen van huishoudgedrag in het kader van het
ontwikkelen van economisch beleid.
Om te komen tot een beter begrip van de tijdsvoorkeur van winsten en
verliezen in de vier scenario’s, wordt er in hoofdstuk drie een structureel
model gepresenteerd dat verliesafkeer en referentiepunten in de modellering
van de intertemporele keuze meeneemt, gebaseerd op inzichten van Loewen-
steins (1988) referentiepuntenmodel. Er wordt gebruik gemaakt van data
afkomstig van een representatief Nederlands huishoudpanelbestand over de
jaren 1997-2002. Deze data bevatten een keur aan informatie over indi-
viduele tijdsvoorkeuren en andere individuele karakteristieken. Er wordt
een niet-lineair model met stochastische co"eﬃci"enten gebruikt —geschikt
voor paneldata— om gelijktijdig de referentiepunten van zowel uitgestelde als
vervroegde betalingen te kunnen schatten, alsmede de risico-afkeerco"eﬃci"ent
en de verdisconteringsvoet. De uitkomst is dat gemiddeld gezien het refer-
entiepunt van uitgestelde betalingen hoger ligt dan het referentiepunt van
vervroegde betalingen, overeenkomstig de hypothese van Loewenstein; het
gemiddelde niveau van de verliesafkeerco"eﬃci"ent ligt rond de twee, in lijn
met bevindingen van anderen. Dit houdt in dat het negatieve nut van een
verlies twee keer zo groot is als het nut geassocieerd met een winstbedrag
van dezelfde omvang; vrouwen hebben een grotere verliesafkeer dan man-
nen, en een hogere opleiding of leeftijd maken mensen verliesafkeriger; hoger
opgeleiden en ouderen zijn ook geduldiger.
In hoofdstuk vier wordt de verliesafkeer samen met een kanswegingsfunc-
tie geschat. ‘Cumulative prospect’ theorie is een standaardbenadering aan
het worden voor het modelleren van individuele beslissingen onder risico.
Tversky en Kahneman hebben een model geschat met een machtsnutsfunctie
met verliesafkeer en tweedelige machtsfuncties als kanswegingsfuncties voor
winsten en verliezen. In de onderhavige studie gebruiken we een vergelijkbare
structuur om beslissingen van individuen te modelleren. De vijf belangrijke
parameters zijn de twee machten van de nutsfuncties voor winsten en ver-
liezen, de verliesafkeerparameter en de twee co"eﬃci"enten van de kansweg-
ingsfuncties voor winsten en verliezen. Om heterogeniteit binnen de pop-
ulatie te modelleren, worden deze parameters in het empirische model als
stochastische co"eﬃci"enten behandeld, afhankelijk van zowel waargenomen
demograﬁsche factoren als niet waargenomen karakteristieken. De data die
we gebruiken zijn afkomstig uit een onderzoek dat representatief is voor de
Nederlandse bevolking, met zeven vragen over één of twee weddenschap-
pen. Onze resultaten laten zien dat gemiddeld genomen de machten van de
nutsfuncties gelijk zijn aan 0,68 en 0,73 voor respectievelijk winsten en ver-
liezen. Vrouwen hebben een lagere macht voor winsten dan mannen, hetgeen
impliceert dat vrouwen risico-afkeriger zijn in geval van winsten. De gemid-127
delde waarde van de verliesafkeerparameter is 3,1 en de gemiddelde waarden
van de kanswegingsfunctieco"eﬃci"enten zijn 1,0 en 0,59 voor respectievelijk
winsten en verliezen.
Het laatste artikel, hoofdstuk vijf, heeft een behoorlijk andere inhoud dan
de andere drie artikelen, maar maakt gebruik van dezelfde econometrische
technieken en modellen. Het onderwerp van het hoofdstuk is de vraag hoe
de mobititeit (verhuisbeslissing) en de woonsituatie (beslissing om te huren
of te kopen) van huishoudens gezamenlijk te modelleren, gebruikmakend van
een multinomiaal probit model dat geschikt is voor paneldata. Hierbij wordt
uitgegaan van de veronderstelling dat een verandering in de woonsituatie
eigenlijk alleen kan worden waargenomen als een huishouden ook daadw-
erkelijk verhuist. De modellen worden geschat met de methode van de ges-
imuleerde maximale aannemelijkheid, waarbij het belang van het goed mod-
elleren van de beginvoorwaarden benadrukt wordt. De schatting is gebaseerd
op een niet-gebalanceerd panelbestand afkomstig van het CentER Panelbe-
stand 1994-2003. Er wordt een negatieve toestandsafhankelijkheid in de ver-
huisbeslissing gevonden. Huizenbezitters verhuizen met kleinere kans naar
(opnieuw) een koophuis of naar een huurhuis dan huurders, hetgeen kan wor-
den verklaard uit de veel hogere verhuiskosten voor huizenbezitters.